GREEK PHILOSOPHY

  1. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) [Stagira, Athens]
    1. Life of Aristotle
      Aristotle was born in the Greek colony of Stagira, in Macedon, theson of Nicomachus, the physican of King Amyntas of Macedon. In his 18th year Aristotle became a pupil of Plato at Athens and remained for nearly twenty years a member of the Academy. After the death of Plato a rival was named head of Plato's Academy, and Aristotle left Athens and resided for some time at Atarneus, in the Troad, and at Mitylene, on the island of Lesbos, with friends of the Academy. About 342 B.C. he became and for several years was the tutor to the young Alexander, son of King Philip of Macedon. Upon Alexander's accession to power Aristotle received support, financially and otherwise, from the young ruler. In 335 B.C. he returned to Athens, where he spent the following 12 years as head of a school which he set up in the Lyceum. The school also came to be known as the Peripatetic, and members Peripatetics, probably because of the peripatos, or covered walk, in which Aritotle lectured. As a result of the outburst of anti-Macedonian feeling at Athens in 323 after the death of Alexander, Aristotle went voluntarily into exile "lest," he said, "Athens sin twice against philosophy," to Chalcis, in Euboea, where he died a year later.

    2. Works of Aristotle
      The extant works of Aristotle cover almost all the sciences known in his time. They are characterized by subtlety of analysis, sober and dispassionate judgment, and a wide mastery of empirical facts. Collectively, they constitute one of the most amazing achievements ever credited to a single mind. They may conveniently be arranged into seven groups:
      1. The Organon, or logical treatises.
        1. Categories, or the various ways in which a thing can be said "to be".
        2. De Interpretatione, or the doctrine of propositions.
        3. Prior Analytics, or the discussion of syllogism.
        4. Posterior Analytics.
        5. Topics, or rules for logical arguing.
        6. Sophistici Elenchi, or Fallacious Refutations and how to expose them.

      2. The writings on physical sciences.
        1. Physics.
        2. De Caleo, or On the Heavens.
        3. De Generatione et Corruptione, or On Coming-to-be and Passing-away.
        4. Meteorologica, or on the phenomena of the region of sky below the Sun, Moon, and stars.

      3. The biological works.
        1. Historia Animalium, or the History of Animals.
        2. De Partibus Animalium, or on the Parts of Animals.
        3. De Motu and De Incessu Animalium, or on the Motion in Animals and their mode of progression.
        4. De Generatione Animalium, or On the Generation of Animals.

      4. The treatises on psychology.
        1. De Anima, or On the Soul.
        2. Parva Naturalia, a collection of short Treatises on Nature, dealing with sensation and the sensible, memory, and the power of recall, sleep, dreams, divination in sleep, length and shortness of life, youth and age, life and death.

      5. Metaphysics, or First Philosophy.

      6. The treatises on ethics and politics.
        1. Nicomachean Ethics.
        2. Eudemian Ethics.
        3. Politics.
        4. Constitution of Athens.

      7. The treatises on literary arts.
        1. Rhetoric.
        2. Poetics.

      A large number of other works in these several fields are usually included in the Aristotelian corpus, though they are now generally believed not to have been written by Aristotle. It is probable also that portions of the works listed above are the work, not of Aristotle, but of his contemporaries or successors in the Lyceum.

    3. Philosophy of Aristotle.
      1. Aristotle's Logic.
        1. Aristotle divides the sciences into the theoretical, the practical, and the productive. The aim of the first is disinterested knowledge, of the second is the guidance of conduct, of the third is the guidance of the arts. The science, which is now called logic but he called "analytic," is a discipline preliminary to all the other sciences, since its purpose is to set forth the conditions that must be observed by all thinking which has truth as its aim.
        2. Science, in the strict sense of the word, is demonstrated knowledge of the cause of things. Such knowledge is obtained by syllogistic deduction from premises in themselves certain. Thus the procedures of science differ from dialectic, which employs probable premises, and from eristic, which aims not at truth but at victory in disputation. The center, therefore, of Aristotle's logic is the syllogism, or that form of reasoning whereby, given two propositions called premises, a third proposition follows necessarily from them. Every syllogism contains three propositions: two propositions are premises and the third is the conclusion. Every proposition must contain two terms, a subject and a predicate, something spoken about and what is said about it. The truth or falsity of the proposition lies in the relation between the subject and the predicate. There are various modes of the syllogism but they are all derived from the basic mode called Barbara, a name invented to designate the following form of syllogistic implication: if all M is P, and all S is M, then all S is P. The letter P stands for Predicate of the conclusion and is called the major term, the letter S stands for the Subject of the conclusion and is called the minor term; and the lettr M stands for the middle term. The middle term is the concept in whose content the contents of the other terms become identical; it is the reason or cause of connection between the major and minor terms, and is therefore of primary importance in the sciences, which seek the causes of things. The basis of syllogistic inference is, therefore, the presence of this term common to both premises (the middle term) which is so related as either subject or predicate to each of the other two terms (major and minor terms) that a conclusion may be drawn regarding the relation of these two terms to one another. Aristotle was the first to formulate the theory of the syllogism, and his minute analysis of its various forms was definitive, so far as the subject-predicate relation is concerned; so that to this part of deductive logic little has been added since his day. It may be truly said that he is father of logic.
        3. Aristotle recognized two of the three laws of thought. He says of the law of contradiction that "the firmest of all principles is that it is impossible for the same thing to belong and not belong to the same thing at the same time in the same respect." And he says of the law of the excluded middle: "It is not possible that there should be anything between the two parts of a contradiction, but it is necessary either to affirm or deny one thing of any other thing." He nowhere states the law of identity, although it is presupposed.
        4. Alongside of deductive reasoning Aristotle recognized the necessity of induction, or the process whereby premises, particularly first premises, are established. This involves passing from the particulars of sense experience (the things more knowable to us) to the universal and necessary principles involved in sense experience (the things more knowable in themselves). Aristotle did not think that a valid induction needed a complete enumeration, but only a sufficient enumeration, of instances. For him, the mind had the capacity of abstracting from the particulars the universal character of the class under investigation. A botanist does not have to examine every plant in the world to produce a true scientific definition of each type. Aristotle attached most importance, in search for premises, to the consideration of prevailing beliefs (endoxa) and examination of the difficulties (aporiai) that have been encountered in the solution of the problem.
        5. The ultimate basis of Aristotle's epistemology is intuition, or indubitable intellectual apprehension. Intuition has two main roles:
          (1) The particulars of sense are intuited directly. From the sensed particulars we form definitions, make inductions, and provide the premises for deduction.
          (2) The most general of principles, including logical principles themselves, are also directly intuited.
          Plato thought that this certain, infallible, indemonstrable knowledge of what is was innate. Aristotle denied that this knowledge was innate but asserted that it must be acquired and that through sensation. All animals are naturally endowed with the faculty of sensation by which they distinguish or discriminate one thing from another. In the lower animals sense impressions are evanescent and these animals seem to have no knowledge beyond the present sensation. In the higher animals sense impressions leave a trace that continues for a time. Among such animals some are not but others are able to order and arrange these persisting impressions into what we call memory. Man has the capacity to form from these many repeated memories of the same thing a universal concept, the common factor within all of them, the one besides the many. This process of abstraction in the act of perception grasps the universal. From the sense impressions the universal is abstracted and the truth of the universal is grasped. Aristotle calls this intuition and the process induction.
        6. Among these most general principles of explanation are axioms, postulates and hypotheses. Axioms are the indemonstrable primary premises of demonstration, concepts commonly held to be true. Postulates relate to the substances whose attributes are to be examined by the particular science. Unlike axioms they are demonstrable, but used in the given inquiry without demonstration. Hypotheses are like postulates in that they are capable of proof, but accepted for the purpose of the examination without proof. They differ from postulates in ranging more widely, and including more than the primary premises of the demonstration.
        7. Aritotle thought that definition made it possible for our ideas to parallel the world. He believed in real definitions; that is, definitions were true, or not true, of the thing defined. And a true definition would express the essence of the thing defined. To do so, it was necessary to relate the term being defined to the largest class of which it is a member, that is, its genus, and at the same time tell how the sub-class of the thing (the species) differs from other members of the genus class. When "man" is defined as "rational animal," this is a definition by genus and differentia, the genus being "animal" and the differentia being "rationality." This description of definition gives us three of the five predicables: species, genus, and differentia. The other two predicables are "property" and "accident". While the definition states the essence of a thing, a "property", while not stating the essence, yet belongs only to that thing. For example, to be capable of learning grammar is a property of man, and yet this capacity is not part of the essence of "man". An "accident", on the other hand, is a predicate with only a contingent relation to its subject. It just happens to characterize the subject. The brown of the table is an accident in that the table might have been some other color.
        8. It should be noted that the linguistic distinctions of Aristotle's subject-predicate logic are paralleled by an ontology made up of individual substances characterized by properties of various sorts. When Aristotle lists his Categories, a list of the basic ways a thing may be said "to be", substance is listed first as the basic category; and the remainder of the list is composed of the attributes of the substance, or the ways in which a substance exists: in a certain Quantity, of a certain Quality, with a certain Relation, in a certain Place, at a certain Time, in a certain Position, in a certain State, in a certain mode of Activity, or of being acted upon (called "Passivity" or "Suffering" ). The following sentence will illustrate the ten categories. "There is a man (Substance), alone (Quantity), looking like a doctor (Quality), and wiser than Hippocrates (Relation); he is in the street (Place), now (Time), walking (Position), barefooted (State), toward a surgery, either to treat (Activity) a patient or to be treated (Passivity) as a patient." The categories, therefore, are the primary attributes of things, except for the first category, grouped with the others for convenience, is the thing to which they are attributed. For Aristotle existence is basically the existence of substances; and the meaning of existence for the other categories is different - more dependent, derivative.

      2. Aristotle's Physics.
        1. There are four kinds of causes which it is the aim of scientific inquiry to discover:
          (1) the material cause (that of which a thing is made),
          (2) the efficient cause (that by which it comes into being),
          (3) the formal cause (its essence or nature, that is, what it is), and
          (4) the final cause (its end, or that for which it exists).
          In natural objects, as distinct from the products of art, the last three causes coincide; for the end of a natural object is the realization of its essence, and likewise it is this identical essence embodied in another individual that is the efficient cause in its production. Thus for Aristotle every object in the sense world is a union of two ultimate principles: the material constituent, or matter (hyle), and the form, or essence, which makes of these constitutents the determinate kind of being it is. Nor is this union an external or arbitrary one; for the matter is in every case to be regarded as possessing the capacity for the form, as being potentially the formed matter. Likewise the form has being only in the succession of its material embodiments. Thus Aristotle opposes what he considers to be the Platonic doctrine that only the forms or universals are real and exist independent of the objects that imperfectly imitate them. On the other hand, against the earlier nature-philosophies that found their explanatory principles in matter, to the neglect of form, Aristotle affirmed that matter must be conceived as potentiality that becomes actualized only through the activity of forms.
        2. With these principles of matter and form interpreted as potentiality and actuality, Aristotle claims to have solved the difficulties that earlier philosophers had found in the fact of change. The changes in nature are to be interpreted, not as the passage from non-being to being, which would make them unintelligible, but as the process by which what is merely potential being passes over, through form, into actual being. The philosophy of nature, which results from these basic concepts, views nature as a dynamic realm in which change is real, spontaneous, continuous, purposeful. Matter, though indeed capable of form, possesses a residual inertia, which on occasion produces accident effects; so that alongside the teleological causation of the forms Aristotle recognizes what he calls "necessity" in nature; but the products of the latter, since they are aberrations from form, cannot be made the object of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, the system of nature as developed by Aristotle is a graded series of existences, in which the simpler beings, though in themselves formed matter, function also as matter for higher forms. At the base of the series is prime matter, which as wholly unformed is mere potentiality, not actual being. At the top of this series is pure form.
        3. Aristotle selected "substance" as his basic category because "substance" is his basic ontological unit and substance in its primary sense, "that which is", defines the order of nature, involving form, matter, and an internal principle of movement. Substance in this primary sense, termed ousia prote or "first substance" is formed matter. Together, form and matter makes an individual substance; and it is the accidents of matter which make the substance into this particular chair.
        4. The simplest formed matter is the so-called primary elements: earth, water, air and fire. From these as matter (potentiality) arise by the intervention of successively more complex forms the composite inorganic bodies, organic tissues, and the world of organisms, characterized by varying degrees of complexity in structure and function.
        5. Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of change:
          (1) qualitative or alteration,
          (2) quantitative or growth and diminution,
          (3) substantial or birth and death, and
          (4) locomotion or change of place.
          The last is primary, since it is presupposed in all the others. Aristotle is not suggesting a mechanical explanation of change, for not even locomotion can be explained by impact alone. The motion of the primary elements is due to the fact that each has a natural place to which it moves when not opposed; earth down toward the center, then water, air, and fire up to successive spheres about the center. The ceaseless motion of these primary elements results from their ceaseless transformation into one another through the interaction of the forms of hot and cold, wet and dry. Thus qualitative differences of form underlie even the most elemental changes in the world of nature.
        6. The earth consists of the four elements, Earth, Water, Air, and Fire. This is the region of change, and the natural movement of these elements is up or down, which produces a certain intermixture of them. But the region of the eternal and divine begins with the moon. Here the movement is always circular; therefore, the substance of the heavens must be different from those of earth. Aristotle said it was Ether or Quintessence, the fifth element. The natural motion of Ether is in circles of unvarying speed.

      3. Aristotle's Metaphysics.
        The necessity to assume the existence of a supreme form appears from physics. Since every movement or change implies a mover, and since the chain of causes cannot be infinite, if the world is to be intelligible, there must be an unmoved first mover. Furthermore, since motion is eternal (for time is eternal, and time is but the measure of motion), the first mover must be eternal. This eternal unmoved first mover, whose existence is demanded by physical theory, is described in the Metaphysics as the philosophical equivalent of the god or gods of popular religion. Being one, he is the source of the unity of world process. In himself he is pure actuality, the only form without matter (potentiality), the only being without extension. His activity consists in pure thought, that is, thought which has thought for its object (self-thinking thought); he knows only his own being, but not the world; and he influences the world, not by mechanical impluse, but by virtue of the perfection of his being, which makes him not only the supreme object of all knowledge, but also the ultimate object of all desire.

      4. Aristotle's Biology.
        It is in his biology that the distinctive concepts of Aristotle show to the best advantage. The conception of process as the actualization of a potentiality is well adapted to the comprehension of biological phenomena, where the immanent teleology of structure and function is almost a part of the observed facts. It is here also that the persistence of the form, or species, through a succession of individuals is most evident.

      5. Aristotle's Psychology.
        Aristotle's psychology is hardly separable from his biology, since for Aristotle (as for Greek thought generally) the soul (psyche) is the principle of life; it is "the primary actualization of a natural organic body." But souls differ from one another in the variety and complexity of the functions they exercise, and this difference in turn corresponds to differences in organic structures involved. Fundamental to all physical activities are the functions of nutrition, growth and reproduction, which are possessed by all living beings, plants as well as animals. Next come sensation, desire, and locomotion, exhibited in animals in varying degrees. Above all are deliberative choice and theoretical inquiry, the exercise of which makes the rational soul, peculiar to man among the animals. Aristotle devotes special attention to the various activities of the rational soul. Sense perception is the faculty of receiving the sensible form of outward objects without their matter. Besides the five senses Aristotle posits a "common sense", which enables the rational soul to unite the data of the separate senses into a single object, which accounts for the soul's awareness of these very activities of perception and of its other states. Reason is the faculty of apprehending the universals and first principles involved in all knowledge, and while helpless without sense perception it is not limited to the concrete and sensuous, but can grasp the universal and the ideal. The reason thus described as apprehending the intelligible world is in one difficult passage characterized as passive reason, requiring for its actualization a higher informing reason as the source of all intelligibility in things and of realized intelligence in man.

      6. Aristotle's Ethics.
        In the Ethics these basic principles are applied to the solution of the question of human good. The good for man is an actualization, or active exercise, of those faculties of the rational, as distinct from the vegetative and sensitive souls. But human excellence thus defined shows itself in two forms, in the habitual subordination of the sensitive and appetitive tendencies to rational rule and principle, and in the exercise of reason in the search for and contemplation of truth. The former type of excellence is expressed in the moral virtues, the latter in the dianoetic or intellectual virtues. A memorable feature of Aristotle's treatment of the moral virtues is his theory that each of them may be regarded as a mean between excess and defect; courage, for example, is a mean between cowardice and rashness, liberality a mean between stinginess and prodigality. In the Politics Aristotle sets forth the importance of the political community as the source and sustainer of the typically human life. But for Aristotle the highest good for man is found not in the political life, nor in any other form of practical activity, but in theoretical inquiry and contemplation of truth. This alone brings complete and continuous happiness, because it is the activity of the highest part of man's complex nature, and of that part which is least dependent upon externals, that is, intuitive reason, nous. In the contemplation of the first principles of knowledge and being, man participates in that activity of pure thought which constitutes the eternal perfection of the divine nature.

      7. Aristotle's Politics.
        Man is a political animal: and virtue must be exercised as a citizen. Aristotle regarded the family as the basic unit of the state, and the state as a creation of nature, since in isolation man is not self-sufficient. He distinguished three forms of acceptable government: monarchy, aristocracy, and polity. The third, somewhat akin to constitutional democracy, he preferred, criticizing communism, and stressing the importance of the family and of a prosperous middle class. Three unacceptable forms of government are tranny, oligarchy, and popular democracy; these are deformations of the acceptable forms.

      8. Aristotle's Aesthetics.
        In the general sense, art is a branch of knowledge different from both theoretical science and practical wisdom. It is concerned with the application of theoretical principle to beautiful or useful objects.
        1. In the Poetics Aristotle advanced the idea that a work of art is an imitation of the possible or probable, not of something actual only, thus expanding Plato's doctrine of imitation. Poetry differs from history in that history deals with the particular, and poetry - in this respect like philosophy - deals with the universal. Aristotle's expansion of the criterion for beauty in fact stressed unity in variety, an organic unity with no unessential features. His canons of tragedy - designed to provide a catharsis of the emotions of terror and pity, the action occurring within a single day, etc. - are of great historical importance.
        2. In the Rhetoric Aristotle searches for the rules of persuasion through analysis of examples of effective oratory. Rhetoric is not a science but an art. It is not an art of persuasion but rather the art of being able to discern in each case the available means of persuasion. It is the counterpart of dialectic since both deal with probabilities and commonly held opinions. But the end of persuasion entails that the popular syllogism (enthymeme) will be central to analysis and practice of this art. (An enthymeme is an "incomplete syllogism," an inference in which one of the premises, or the conclusion, is implicit.) The Rhetoric contains a distinction between types of law. Aristotle distinguishes between written law and universal law, permanent and changeless. He also calls this natural law. His advice is that one should appeal to the universal law if the written law goes against one's case; if not, one's appeal should be to the written law.

    4. Older Peripatetics
      1. Theophrastus (372-287 B.C.) [Lesbos, Athens] succeeded Aristotle as head of the Peripatetic School in 322 and continued in that office until his death. He made Botany his field and wrote a work that remained the botanical authority for centuries. He also composed works on the history of philosophy and on the history and nature of religion. Only parts of these works have come down to us.
      2. Aristoxenus [Tarentum] denied the immortality of the soul because of certain Pythagorean theories which he held about the soul being the harmony of the body. He thus championed the view suggested by Simmias in Plato's Phaedo. But he followed in the footsteps of Aristotle by his empirical work on the nature and history of music.
      3. Demetrius [Phaleron], a pupil of Theophrastus and a prolific writer, was active in politics, governing the city of Athens from 317 to 307 B.C. He urged Ptolemy Soter to found the library and School of Alexandria. Demetrius went there in about 297 B.C. and, when this project was accomplished by Ptolemy Philadephus, the successor of Ptolemy Soter, shortly after 285 B.C., Demetrius furnished the link between the Peripatetic School in Athens and the scientific and research work of the Greeks at Alexandria.