EMPIRICISM

  1. INTRODUCTION.
    Empiricism as a solution to the problem of knowledge makes two basic assumptions concerning knowledge:
    1. The source of knowledge is sense experience. There are no innate ideas. The mind is a blank tablet (tabla rasa) at birth; any ideas that the mind has is acquired through sense experience subsequent to birth.
    2. The criterion of knowledge is sense experience. The senses are the only criterion by which ideas can be tested to determine whether our ideas are true or not. Empiricism would define truth as the correspondence of our ideas with fact or objective reality.
    To determine whether our ideas correspond with reality there has developed in the history of philosophy a number of theories of perception. These theories of perception describe how our ideas or perceptions correspond with reality.

  2. THEORIES OF PERCEPTION.
    1. NAIVE REALISM OR OBJECTIVISM.
      This is simplest theory of perception. In addition to the assumptions common to all forms of empiricism, naive realism makes the following further assumptions concerning the knowing of objective reality:
      1. We perceive objective reality (physical objects) directly.
      2. These objects exist independently of ourselves.
      3. The characteristics of these objects are as we perceive them.
      The problem with naive realism is that our perceptions of the object can and do vary, whereas the object (naive realism assume) do not.

    2. COMMON SENSE REALISM.
      Common sense realism is that form of naive realism tending toward dualistic realism. This was the theory of knowledge of a school of Scotish thinkers founded by Thomas Reid (1710-1796) which attempted to set up a theory of knowledge which whould support the realistic belief of the man on the street. This theory held that we perceive the external world directly and that the sense-data either do not exist or play subordinate role in perception. In Aristotle's psychology common sense is the faculty by which the common sensibles are perceived. Aristotle probably attributed to this faculty the functions of perceiving what we perceive and of uniting the data from the different senses into a single object. In his An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principle of Common Sense (1795), Reid took this concept to emphasize that the common consciousness of man is basic. He held that all humans possess, by nature, a common set of capacities - both epistemological and ethical - through which they could grasp the basic realities of nature and morality. He opposed the theory of ideas of Berkeley and Hume that the perception of ideas are our sole source of knowledge of the world.

      This theory is due to the influence of John Locke on Modern Western thought. When some philosophers, following John Locke, made sense-knowledge more complicated by interposing "ideas" between our minds and the real world, so that these ideas, they said, were the immediate objects in our minds, and hence we do not have immediate direct knowledge of the objects, but only of the ideas in our minds, David Hume raised the question of how do we know that these ideas correspond with what is actually there. The answer of Thomas Reed was akin to Samuel Johnson's kicking a rock to refute the similar theory proposed by Bishop Berkeley. Reed answered that only philosophers would take seriously this skeptical doctrine with its absurd implications. Everyone in his senses believes such truths as the existence of the real world, cause and effect, and the continuity of the self; they believe that the mind has the ability to know such things. If philosophers question such truths, so much the worst for the philosophers. The common-sense of mankind, whether of the man behind the plow or the man behind the desk, is the surest guide to the truth.

    3. EPISTEMIC DUALISTIC REALISM.
      This theory of perception was developed by the English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) in his book Essay Concerning Human Understanding Epistemic dualistic realism or dualism makes the following assumptions concerning the knowing of objective reality:
      1. Our perception of the object and the object itself are two different things. Hence the dualism.
      2. Our perception of the object is caused by the object.
      3. Our perception of the object is like a copy, picture or representation of the object, which is like its cause, the object.
      This theory denies assumptions one and three of naive realism.
      1. Instead of assumption one of naive realism, it maintains an indirect knowledge of the object but a direct knowledge of ideas or perceptions only.
      2. Instead of assumption three of naive realism, it maintains the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are those qualities of the object that are in the object, such as size, shape, hardness, etc. Secondary qualities are those other qualities that are in the knowing subject. Primary qualities have objective existence in the object, while secondary qualities have subjective existence in the subject only.
      3. But dualism retains assumption number two of naive realism. These objects have an existence independent of ourselves. Hence this theory is called realism.
      The problems with epistemic dualistic realism are the following:
      1. What assurance do we have that there is any correspondence at all between our perceptions, "ideas," and their external cause, the object?
      2. How do we know there is an external cause, an object? Do our senses give us a perception of that cause?

    4. EPISTEMIC IDEALISM OR SUBJECTIVISM.
      This theory of perception was developed by the English philosopher, George Berkeley (1685-1753). Epistemic idealism makes the following assumptions concerning the knowledge situation:
      1. Since the mind knows directly only ideas or perceptions and not the objects, we cannot know of the existence of the objects outside of our perceptions.
      2. All qualities are subjective, that is, relative to the perceiving mind. Since things are a collection of ideas, things cannot exist apart from a knowing mind or subject. Things do not have absolute or independent existence in themselves. Hence no material substances. The source of our ideas or perceptions are not physical.
      3. Objects do not have an existence independently of our perceptions of them. The complex of sensations are the object. For a thing to be, it must be perceived (Esse est percipi).

      Conclusion: Epistemic Idealism reduces to Solipism. That is, I and my ideas alone exist. This leads to the egocentric predicament. How do I know whether there are any other minds besides my own? Berkeley avoided this conclusion by the introduction of God. All perceptions of objects and other minds are placed there by God.

    5. SKEPTICISM.
      Skepticism is the ultimate and logical conclusion of empiricism. The ancient version was developed by Protagoras and the modern form by David Hume (1711-1766). Skepticism makes the following assumptions concerning the knowledge situation:
      1. All we know are our sense impressions and the ideas built up from them.
      2. These sense impressions are separate and distinct from one another. Sense impressions gives us no necessary connection between them.

      Conclusion: There is no grounds to justify belief

      1. in the existence of enduring physical objects which cause the sense impressions and which preserve their identity from one moment to the next or
      2. in the enduring selves or minds which apprehend the sense impressions or underlie the string of impression or memories of them.
      Why do we believe in their existence?
      Hume's answer: habit and custom.
      Need a better reason but empiricism cannot provide it.
      Hence empiricism leads to skepticism. There is no human knowledge of anything. Hence there is no truth; truth is unattainable.
      But skepticism is self-contradictory. Skepticism asserts that it knows that knowledge of anything is not possible.

    6. CRITICAL IDEALISM.
      The skepticism of Hume struck the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as destroying the foundations of philosophy and science. He tells us that Hume "interrupted my dogmatic slumber, gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction." He saw that, if Hume was right, there are no grounds in experience for indispenable universal or general judgments, such as inductive generalization and causal inference. The problem is, says Kant, how are universal and necessary judgments possible, or, in Kant's terminology, how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? As Hume pointed out, sense experience gives us separate and unconnected particulars, X then Y, X then Y, etc. Whence comes the universal and necessary character of the judgments X causes Y ?

      Kant's answer is that universal and necessary judgments are possible because of the structure of mind itself. The mind is not an inert block of wax, a tabula rasa, which passively receives and records the impressions of the senses, as the British empiricists like Locke held. The mind is creative, dynamic and active process; it is equipped with certain innate forms which order and interpret sense experience.

      1. The forms of the mind orient the data of sense experience in space and time. Space and time have no objective existence independently of us. They are forms of mind which are impressed on the sense data.
      2. After the sense data is oriented in space and time, the part of the mind Kant called the "understanding" takes over. The understanding possesses twelve innate categories with which the mind operates on the sense experience to produce universal and necessary judgments.
      This results in conceptual knowledge that is universal and necessay. The senses provide immediately perceptual knowledge of particulars; percepts come from experience and concepts are formed by the internal structure of the mind. Both percepts and concepts are necessary elements in any act of knowledge which does not lead to deception. As Kant says, "Concepts without percepts are empty and percepts without concepts are blind." Conceptual knowledge is subjective and perceptual knowledge is objective, derived from the objects of the senses.

      Conclusion: The dramatic conclusion of Kant's theory of knowledge is that we can never know the "real" nature of the external world or any object in it, if by "external world" we mean the world independent of human knowledge. What we do know are the appearances (phenomena) produced by the operation of the space-time forms of the mind. Things-in-themselves (noumena) are unknowable and forever hidden from us. There is really no way we can know whether our concepts really correspond to things-in-themselves. This is a just another form of skepticism; Kant started out to overcome Hume's skepticism and ends up with another form of skepticism. As it is often said Hume gave Kant the problem of knowledge and Kant gave it back as if it were its solution.