Notes on My Ethical Views

By Ray Shelton

Final Examination

Seminar in Ethics, USC, Jan. 1955

I find it very difficult to determine which of the general types of ethical theory is nearest to my own view. As far as I can tell, the approbative theory in its second type, the theological approbative theory, comes nearest to my own. I will try to clarify my view in the following discussion of value or the good, moral law, metaphysical foundation of moral actions, and the problem of euthanasia.

1. In regard to value or good there seems to me to be two problems: the problem of the formal definition of the good and material definitions of the good. The formal definition may be stated thus: What does one mean when he says that something is the good. Notice that this question is not "What is the good?" but rather "What is it to say that something is the good?" The former question expresses the problem of the material definition of the good. Now, I think, when one says that something is good, he is attempting to say at least two things concerning that object.
   (a) Unless the context otherwise indicates, he is asserting his approval or approvative choice of that object and that it is really good (approvable) apart from his appproval or approbative choice. I believe that this is common to every assertion of good whether it be that the food tasted is good or that a certain act is morally good.
   (b) Now when someone asserts that something is good, I understand them also to be asserting two things: (1) that they approve of it and (2) that it is approvable or good apart from their approval. However, in the case of the good they are asserting one additional thing -- that is, that it, the ultimate good, is that good by which all other goods are to be judged and determined.

   Now with regard to the material definition of the good -- that is, What is the good -- the Good is a person. By person we mean a being who has will or make decisions (this is not a formal definition but merely an indication where personal existence is to be located). This person which is the good is not myself, but another besides myself. And again this person is not just human but suprahuman -- that is, above the limitations of human existence. (This does not mean that this person cannot take human form. On the contrary we would assert that he did.) The Good could not be less than a person, a self. For at least I am that. (Man is not just a person but something less as well -- a non-person.) On the other hand, the Good cannot be myself or another human person like myself. For it is obvious that I or another human person will not qualify as the Good. The Good must be a person like myself yet above human limitations and existence.

2. This is the weaknesses of most other views of the Good. While recognizing correctly that one's own self or another human self or person cannot be the good, they abandon entirely the view that the Good is a person. If the good is pleasure, or happiness, or the moral law, it is something subhuman rather than suprahuman: it is an "it," a thing, a non-person. In my view, the moral law has a place as the command of that person which is the Good but it is in no wise the highest Good. It is good because, not good absolutely. The moral law as the Good is a limitation on man's freedom, the spontaneity of decision which is intrinsic to being a person; it is rigid, non-flexible and unyielding. However, on the other hand, the moral law as the command of the person who is the highest Good is the guide to the fullest expression of man's freedom.

   It is apparent from the preceding discussion that my view is a teleological view -- the Good -- the highest value -- is basic and the law is an instrument of the good. Dualism and diontology are both rejected as inadequate.

3. In regard to the metaphysical foundation of moral action, from what I have already said it will be seen that my ethical views have a metaphysical foundation. However, it is also quite obvious that this is not any traditional metaphysics: idealism or naturalism. It is a personalistic, or more correctly, a personistic metaphysics. Time or space will not permit me to discuss fully my view. I will indicate only those features which are pertinent to my ethical views. That person who is the highest Good is also the highest or ultimate being. He has created all other beings, man and world. He has created man, however, like himself. Man is a person like the ultimate person; however, man is also a non-person unlike that ultimate person. It is on the basis of this likeness or analogy that man posseses a higher worth or value than other beings which are non-persons. The moral law being the command of this ultimate person has been expressed in the structure of the world which has been created by this highest or ultimate person. These expressions in the structure of the world we call orders, the orders of creation. These are the criteria of other laws.

4. In regard to the problem of euthanasia, I am not fully acquainted with all aspects of this problem. I understand euthanasia to be the act of inducing a painless death in a person or animal suffering from a lingering, distressing, or incurable disease. I can appreciate the motive of kindness that prompts one to advocate such an act to relieve the suffering of a fellow human being. However, I do not think we should let our emotions and sentiments be the basis for deciding this issue. It must be decided from within an overall view of reality. On the basis that man has been created in the likeness of the person who is the highest good, I believe that euthanasia is not good. Because human life has a likeness to the highest Good, it should not be destroyed. Man is not mere animal but has a worth or value that the animals do not have. This worth or value is grounded in man's likeness to The Good.