THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATION BETWEEN

VALUATION AND COGNITION

INTRODUCTION.
Interest in the problem of the relation between valuation and cognition has been stimulated in recent philosophy by the logical positivist's denial of a cognitive status for value-judgments. They have asserted an absolute dichotomy between cognition and valuation. Value-judgments are purely expressions of one's emotions (the emotive theory -- Ayre) or of one's decisions (the volition theory -- Reichenbach). As such they do not have cognitive standing and are meaningless. This denial is made upon the basis of the verifiability theory of meaning. According to this criterion only those statements which are empirically verifiable have meaning. Let us examine this problem and a proposed solution which is not only a philosophical but a religious solution.

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
   What is the problem of the relation between cognition and valuation, between judgments of "fact" and judgments of "value"? Dr. Henry David Aiken in an essay titled "Reflections on Dewey's Question about Value" which appeared in the book Value: A Cooperative Inquiry, edited by Ray Lepley, states the traditional problem in the form of a paradox.

   ". . . if judgments of value are not distinct from judgments of fact, then (a) the all-important distinction between what is and what ought to be is blurred, and (b) valuation is reduced to a mere description of what already exists, hence negating the ideality or normative character which is regarded as essential to values. But if judgments of value are distinct from judgments of fact, then it seems impossible to regard them as verifiable by scientific means, and a science of value or morals is an illusion. In short, either value-judgments are not factual, in which case they cannot be regarded as scientific, or they are factual, in which case the distinction between what is and what ought to be is lost." [1]

2. THE ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM.
   The logical positivists viewing the problem in this form say that judgments of value are distinct and different from judgments of fact and that a science of value or morals is an illusion. For, according to the logical positivists, judgment of values are expressions of either one's emotions or one's volitional decisions. The seeming contradiction between the two halves of this paradox is non-existent for the logical positivists because they regard a science of value and morals as unnecessary. An individualistic and relativistic view of values and morals is the only view compatible with a free democratic form of life and society. [2]

   The non-positivists reject this denial of the possibility and necessity of a science of values and morals. However, this position of the non-positivists gets them into trouble. The position that a science of values and morals is possible and necessary seems to commit them also to the position that judgments of value are not distinct from judgments of facts. This position, however, would mean that the all important distinction between what is and what ought to be is blurred. How can the non-positivists have their cake and eat it too? How can he maintain the possibility of a science of values and morals and at the same time avoid blurring the distinction between what is and what ought to be? The non-positivists have not always given a clear and precise answer to this problem.

   So it seems that this problem is really a problem for the non- positivists. For the positivists there is no problem. A science of values and morals is unnecessary and, yea, impossible. However, the non-positivists are faced with this problem because they maintain both the possibility of a science of values and the distinction between existence and value.

   Now since the non-positivists are unwilling to deny the possibility of a science of values and morals, their only alternative seems to be a denial of the separation of existence and value. However, not all non-positivists have been willing to make this denial. Thus these non-positivists are faced this problem.

   In a way this situation is strange because in western philosophy, except for a few rare instances, the inseparability of value and being has been an unquestioned axiom. As Dr. Wilbur M. Urban says in his article "Axiology" in Twentieth Century Philosophy (editor Dagobert D. Runes), "the axiom of inseparability of value and being. . . has, from the beginning, characterized traditional European philosophy." [3] In Plato's philosophy being and value are united in the idea of the Good. Spinoza, in the modern period, reflects this axiom in his book on Ethics, which is substantially a book on metaphysics. Being and value were inseparabile because they were basically the same. The dominant concept of being in Western philosophy was the essentialist concept -- being is essence. [4] As in ontology so also in axiology we have essentialism. Value also is an essence. Now if value and being are both basically essence, how can they be separated? With these particular concepts of being and value they could not be separated. Thus the "axiom of the inseparabilitily of being and value" has dominated Western philosophy.

   "The magnificent metaphysical and theological structure, the philosphia perennis which constitutes European philosophy, was a value-charged scheme of thought, a scheme of thought in which value and being were forever inseparable. The metaphysical disjunction between value and existence is a wholly modern phenomenon." [5]

   This disjunction of value and existence arose out of what may be called the modern revolt from essentialism. Various thinkers of the late medieval and the early modern era became dissatisfied with the traditional metaphysical and theological structure. This dissatisfaction appeared in the late Middle Ages in the nominalistic revolt from the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical theology. The Reformation lent support at its beginning to this dissatisfaction. However, soon after the Reformation the Protestant theologians reverted to an Aristotelian metaphysics in support of their theological dogma. The dissatisfaction broke into an open revolt as the experimental philosophy (as it was called in England) became stronger with ever increasing discoveries of such men as Galileo and Newton. In varying degrees the philosophers with support of the discoveries of the sciences revolted from essentialism and the whole traditional philosophy built around it. The many movements of modern philosophy have arisen and flourished because of their revolt and protest against it. This revolt from essentialism is thus the dominant theme of modern Western thought. It underlies all the scientific, ethical, political, and economic thought and action of the modern world.

   This revolt, in the physical sciences especially, placed an emphasis on existence; that is, physical existence -- existence of things in time and space -- rather than on essence. The particulars of physical existence are empirically apprenhended. It was this emphasis on physical existence which brought about the disjunction of existence and value. Value was still conceived in terms of essences -- a value is an essence. Physical existence was something else than essence. Thus there arose the disjunction between value and existence. The statement of our problem in the paradoxical form assumes this separation of fact (existence) and value.

   The logical positivists have not only abandoned the essentialist's concept of being (Thus the source of their repudiation and condemnation of metaphysics. For metaphysics means to them essentialism -- of course, this identification is not explicitly stated by them.) but also the essentialist's concept of value. Some of them define value in terms of emotions and others of them in terms of volition. Thus the logical positivists retain the disjunction between value and existence with exception of the substitution of an emotive or volitional concept of value for the essentialist's concept of value. Since facts (existents) are different from values, a science of values, in the sense of traditional philosophy -- a normative science, is impossible. Some logical positivists would allow, however, a science of values, meaning here a description of the emotional or volitional responses of individuals and groups. This is, however, utterly different from what traditional philosophy would mean by a science of values.

   What can we conclude from our analysis of the problem of the relation of cognition to valuation as stated in the above paradoxial form? First of all, we can conclude from our analysis that the source of our problem is the disjunction between existence and value. This disjunction arose in the modern revolt from essentialism. Secondly, if our problem is to be solved we must abandoned this separation between existence and value. But this raises another problem. How are being and value to be united? Must we return to essentialism in the concept of being in order that they might be united? This is impossible without abandoning the empirical method of modern science which repudiates the search for essences and emphasizes existence and the many existents of our space-time world. This we must retain. Then how can being as existence rather than essence and value as essence be united? Must we then abandon the essentialist concept of value as we have abandoned the essentialist concept of being? It appears that we must. The logical postivists have pointed us in that direction. But with what concept of value can the concept of being as existence be united? Shall we adopt the emotive or the volitional theory of value that logical positivists have formulated? No, because both theories are purely subjectivistic and relativistic. This is true of any pyscho-biological account of value. What concept of value other than the essentialistic, emotive, or volitional concepts can we adopt? This is the problem that must be solved in order to unite being and value and thus lead to the solution of the problem of the relation between value judgments and factual judgments.

3. THE CLUE TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.
   Our foregoing analysis showed us that the crux of our problem is the concept of value. What concept of value will unite being and value? Essentialism, as pointed out above, unites value and being by identifying both of them with essence. Being is an essence (the most general or universal concept which can be predicated of all things or substances) and value is an essence (that concept of perfection that may be predicated of any thing). Thus could being and value be united. Ens est unum, verum, bonum. [Being is one, truth, good.] However, this essentialist concept of being (being as an essence, that is, the most general essence) has been abandoned in the face of the emphasis of the modern physical sciences on physical existence. Science is no longer a search for the essences of things. And as we saw above, value is still conceived in terms of essence. The ideals or norms defining values are essence, rational concept. Thus, as we saw above, the disjunction between existence and value arose.

   Now, in order to unite being and value, when being is conceived in terms of existence, it is necessary to reduce value to existence also. As we saw above the logical positivists have done this with their emotive or volitional theories of value. Emotions and volitions are existents, that is, when they are interpreted in terms of physical psycho-biological behavioral patterns. However, we have noted above that this gives us a subjectivistic and relativistic theory of values and morals. And it is against this kind of theory of values or morals that the non-positivists protest. For them only an objectivistic and absolutistic theory of values and morals would be adequate. The essentialist concept of values as such seems to be the only adequate view.

   Now, we believe that the interpretation of values in terms of existence is the right direction. However, the taking of existence in the narrow sense of psycho-biological existence has precluded the possibility of an absolutistic and objectivistic theory of value which the non-positivists rightly see to be characteristic of an adequate theory of values and morals.

   The taking of existence in such a narrow sense is not surprising in view of the emphasis of modern science on physical existence. A contributing factor to this taking of existence in this narrow sense is also the influence of traditional essentialist metaphysics. Since the reality of a thing was its essence, existence was reduced to a mere unessential attribute or quality of the thing, or substance. It is in this way that existence came to be conceived in the narrow sense of physical existence, that is, to exist is to be in a certain place at a certain time. This meaning of existence was thus carried over into modern philosophy. Sein is dasein. It is a interesting thing to note that when physical existence became all important in philosophical thinking as a result of the discoveries of modern science, the question was raised of the metaphysical status of these essences. It was answered that whereas things exist, essences subsist. This distinction between existence and subsistence is one of adjustments of essentialism to the revolt from essentialism which emphasizes physical existence.

   1. EXISTENTIALISM
      Now, to return to our main line of thought, a solution to the problem of uniting being and value and also of formulating an absolutistic and objectivistic theory of values and morals could be arrived at if we take existence in a much broader sense. How shall we conceive of existence in such a broader sense? Here, I believe, we can get a clue for a satisfactory answer from the emphasis of historical existentialism on our own self as the place where existence can be discovered. [6]

      Existentialism has maintained that existence cannot be defined. This would amount to reducing existence to essence -- a compromise with essentialism. However, they say, existence is not necessarily incomprehensible ". . . the word 'existence' carries an intelligible meaning. In addition it is a key-word which permeates the whole of human discourse and which cannot be safely ignored by any philosophy. Hence we must assume that existence is understood by virtue of a trans-rational act, an 'encounter.'" [7] The nature of this act of comprehension is a point of divergence in existentialism. Dr. Helmut Kuhn delineates two types of existentialism on the basis of the two answers that may be given to the question: What is the nature of the act of comprehension of existence? That is, "What is the form under which existence is met with or encountered? According to the various answers to this question Existentialism becomes diversified into a number of conflicting types of thought." [8] The two main answers given to this question are "Existence is met with through crisis" and "Existence is met with through communion." Correspondingly, Dr. Kuhn points out the two main types of existentialism:
      Critical Existentialism and
      Social Existentialism.
      This question of the comprehension of existence is the epistemological question asked from the existentialist view-point and the two main answers given above are two main epistemological positions of existentialism.

      1. CRITICAL EXISTENTIALISM.
         The first answer, which is the answer of the historical movement by the name of Existentialism, places the emphasis on our human self as the place where existence is encountered. Attention is focused especially on that "passionately intensified form of human life which makes the mind susceptible to experiencing a crisis and through crisis, existence." [9] This form of existentialism has been called critical existentialism. [10] It seems to me that attention need not be so exclusively focused on just those intensified forms of human life in order to discover existence. Existence, and particularly our own existence, may be met with in any act of decision. A crisis only makes us particularly aware of the fact that our existence consists in our acts of decision. To be, that is, to exist, is to decide. Thus it is in terms of decision that we can conceive of existence in a broader sense.

         But in the conceiving of existence in terms of decision are we not in our attempt to unite being and value in terms of existence just returning to the volitional theory of value propounded by some logical positivists? No, because the existential view of decision is not psycho-biological behavior pattern. In addition we are not saying that our decision constitute value. Such a position would give us a purely subjectivistic and relativistic theory of value. Then how can existence conceived in terms of decision help us to formulate a theory of value which will unite being and value in terms of existence and at the same time give us an objectivistic and absolutivistic theory of value? Here, I believe, that the second answer to the question mentioned above of the nature of the act of comprehension of existence can help us. This answer was that "Existence is met with through communion."

      2. SOCIAL EXISTENTIALISM.
         Some forms of existentialism found that existence was to be encountered in the normal social intercourse. In social intercourse existence was encountered in the person with whom one worked, lived and had to meet. This form of existentialism which is called social existentialism [11] avoids the emphasis of critical existentialism on the wierd and extraordinary experiences of crisis in which existence is encountered in the human self. Social existentialism is more concernied with the normal and ordinary experiences of coummunion, which is a strand in the tissue of all human experience, and with the alter ego as the place to encounter existence. Existence as decision is encountered in the will of the other persons.
      These two main answers to the question of the nature of the comprehension of existence are the two main epistemological positions of existentialism. Behind these two existential epistemological positions lies two forms of existential ontology. They may be called
      Atomistic Existentialism and
      Relational Existentialism.
      Let us try to make clear these two forms of existential ontology.
      1. ATOMISTIC EXISTENTIALISM.
         In Critical Existentialism the focused is on the human self rather than on existence in general. It focuses especially on that "passionately intensified form of human life which makes the mind susceptible to experiencing a crisis and through crisis, existence." It is this situation that gives rise to Atomistic Existentialism. This extreme emphasis on the individual gives rise to the view of each individual is an atomistic unit independent of every other individual. My own self alone is the locus where existence is discovered or even where it originates. For the most part what has been known as existentialism is of this form.

      2. RELATIONAL EXISTENTIALISM.
         Thus ontological Atomistic Existentialism arose. How does ontological Relational Existentialism arise? This form of existential ontology agrees with the former that existence may be discovered in our own human self. However, this is not the only place it may be encountered. It may be encountered in the other whom I may meet and do meet. This other may be another self, a person, or a thing. A careful analysis of crisis on which the Atomistic Existentialist places such an emphasis as the place of discovering existence would reveal that the other is presupposed. It is the other which creates the situation of crisis in which the passionate decision has to be made. The inadequacy and one-sided emphasis of the Atomistic Existentialism becomes immediately evident. The other must be taken into account in developing an adequate existentialist ontology. Only an ontology which views the existent that we call the self in relation to many other existents will be adequate to account for the other.

         Thus there has arisen a form of existential ontology which may be called ontological Relational Existentialism to account for the other. Now it seems to me that the form of ontological Relational Existentialism that most adequately accounts for the other is a personalistic existential ontology. This form of ontological Relational Existentialism may be called Personism.

   2. PERSONISM.
      Personism is not to be confused with Personalism which is a pluralistic form of essentialism. Personalism views reality as being in essence personal. Brightman calls this qualitative idealism. [12] Thus for Personalism essence has the primacy in the concept of being. For this reason Personalism is classified as a form of essentialism. Personism, on the other hand, is not a view concerning the essence of reality; it does not tell us nature of beings. Personism as an ontological relational existentialism only affirms that persons exist, and that existence may be encountered in persons: ourselves and other selves. Whether there are other beings and what kind of beings they are, Personism makes no affirmations; it is not a view concerning the essence of reality.

      Since Personism affirms that persons exist, the question naturally arises: What is a person? In answer to this question let us return to the shift that has taken place in the discussion of existence.

      The shift of attention was from the general concept of existence and the attempt to define it to the locus where existence can be discovered: the human self. As pointed out above this shift took place because of the impossibility of defining existence in the traditional way. Existence just cannot be reduced to essence. Now within the self existence is known in the act of decision. To exist is to decide. This is particularly apparent in those momentous passionate decisions of a crisis. In fact, every act of decision, whether a great crisis or not, is the place where existence can be found. The act of decision itself is also an act of existence. That is, to be is to choose. This was partially apprehended in Descartes' phrase: cognito ergo sum; "I think, therefore I am". Descartes saw that the act of thinking or even doubting is to exist. For one to think or doubt he had to exist. However, since he sought to fit this into an essentialistic scheme of thought, Descartes did not recognize that thinking and doubting are basically acts of decision. Not only to think or doubt but to decide is to exist. Any act of decision is an act of existence: decerno ergo sum, "I choose, therefore I am". A person therefore should be defined as a being (an existent) that is self-determining, not determined, who has freedom, free will, the ability to choose. A person is distinguished from a non-person, a thing, an "it", which is a being that is determined, not self-determining, that has no freedom, no free will, no ability to choose.

      Now a careful analysis of decision reveals that every act of decision involves three elements: the agent making the decision, the alternatives to be decided between, and a criterion to decide by. The last two elements involve the act of decision of the agent deciding in relations to something else beyond the act of decision itself. The criterion and the alternatives of an act of decision involve relations to other existents. Personism is pluralistic. But it is a relational pluralism, not an atomistic pluralism; that is, there are many existents that are interrelated in various ways. We have given to Personism and other forms of existential relational pluralism the general name of Relational Existentialism. However, we believe that there is only one form of the Relational Existentalism which adequately relates the many existents: Personism. This will become clear later.

   3. PERSONISM AND GOD.
      The third element of every decision, the criterion by which the choice is made, means that every human decision involves a reference to a criterion beyond the self. In other words, behind every human decision as to what a person should do or think, there must be a reason. And the ultimate reason for any decision, practical or theoretical, must be given in terms of some particular criterion, an ultimate reference or orientation point beyond the self or person making the decision. This ultimate criterion is that person's god. In this sense every man must have a god, that is, an ultimate criterion of decision. Thus in the very exercise of his freedom, decision, man shows that he is such a being that must necessarily appeal to an ultimate criterion, a god. In fact, his every uncoerced decision implies this ultimate criterion. [13]

      From this point of view, no man is an atheist in the basic meaning of that word (that is, no god). Every man must have a god. Man is a religious animal who must necessarily have some object of ultimate allegiance and trust which functions as his guide of truth and his norm of conduct. Every man must choose a god. Though free to adopt the god of his choice, no man is free to avoid this decision. Every attempt to do so turns out to be not a denial of the of having a god but an exchange of gods. Every man must choose and have a god. To ask whether one believes in the existence of God is to completely misunderstand the issue. The issue is not whether one should choose between atheism or theism, that is, to believe in the existence of God, but whether one should choose this god or that god as the true God.

      Since everyone must have a god, the crucial question for every man is: Which god is the true God? Or to put the question differently: How are we to distinguish between the one true God on the one hand, and the many false gods on the other? In other words by what means can we determine which of all possible gods are pretenders and which is the true one? The clue to the answer to these questions may be found in a further analysis of freedom.

      As we have already seen, every man by the structure of his freedom must have a god. That is, in every one of his choices a person must necessarily appeal to some criterion by reference to which the decision is made. And the ultimate criterion by which a person makes his choices is his god. Clearly then the choice of one's god is the most basic and fundamental choice that a man can make, it lies behind and is presupposed by every other decision as to what a man will do or think; it is clearly the most important exercise of his freedom. What should one choose as his ultimate criterion of decision? Negatively, he should not choose that as his ultimate criterion which will deny, destroy or limit the very freedom of choice by which it is chosen. And positively, he should choose that ultimate criterion which will enhance and fulfil that freedom. Any ultimate criterion that denies or takes away the very freedom of choice by which it is chosen cannot be the true God. The choice of such an ultimate criterion is a contradiction of man's basic freedom of choice; such a god is fatal to man's freedom.

      By freedom we do not mean purposeless caprice or chance, indeterminism, but rather the ability of choice, freedom of decision, self-determination. Neither is this freedom an abstract entity, "freedom-in-general," Freiheit, but rather the concrete decision of someone, of a free agent. The most appropriate word for such a being who has such freedom is the word "person". A person is a being that is self-determining, not determined, who has freedom, free will, the ability to choose. A person is to be distinguished from a non-person, a thing, an "it", a being that is determined, not self-determining, that has no freedom, no free will, no ability to choose.

      A god that is a thing has less freedom than the person who chooses it as his god. Such a god does not have as much freedom as the one who chooses it to be his god. Now a god who does not have at least the freedom that man himself has cannot be the true God. It cannot do any more for them than they can do for themselves. Such a god is only the projection of the whims and fancies of its worshippers because it is in reality inferior to them. As a minimum criterion, therefore, a god can be recognized as a false god if it has less freedom than man himself. To choose such a god as one's ultimate criterion of choice would be a denial of one's freedom of choice and the worst kind of bondage. Thus having used his freedom to give this god his ultimate allegiance, the worshipper finds his freedom denied to the point of extinction and himself bound in a miserable slavery. As long as the false god remains his ultimate criterion of decision, he will not have the grounds for rejecting that god, since that god has not allowed him to have freedom of choice to do so. His power of choice having been effectively taken away from him, he is unable to reject the false god and free himself from its bondage. The commitment to such a god is the denial of human freedom. Therefore a false god can also be recognized by the effect that it has upon the freedom of the one who gives it his allegiance; it limits the freedom and puts into bondage the one who chooses it as his god. The true God, on the other hand, sets free the one committed to him and fulfils and enhances his freedom. The true God must be at least a person in order to have at least as much freedom as the one who chooses Him as his god. But the true God must not only be a person, He must also have unlimited freedom if He is to be able to do the things He promises and to deliver the one who cries to Him in trouble and need. A god without unlimited freedom might not be able to keep his promises or to save the one who cries to him. Therefore, a god that does not have unlimited freedom must be a false god. The true God, on the other hand, has unlimited freedom; He can do whatever He pleases (Psa. 115:3; 135:6); He can save when He is called upon (Isa. 43:11; 45:15-17). The true God, therefore, is a person (or persons) with unlimited freedom.

      It is this knowledge of what the true God must be like that lies behind all primitive religions, with their anthromorphic gods. Primitive man knows what a god must be like in order for it to be the true God. This knowledge derived intuitively from the nature of his freedom makes him uneasy about the things that he worships as god. He knows that the true God must be a living God. But having failed to encounter such a God, he fills the vacuum with what he imagines to be a facsimile of Him. And since the highest living being he knows is himself, he makes gods in his own image. He also knows that the true God must be a God of unlimited power, not limited like himself. He therefore identifies these anthropomorphic creations with the powerful forces that he sees in the physical world about him. Beyond the simple and profound suspicion that such a God does exist, he is at the end of his knowledge ("...whom ye ignorantly worship..." Acts 17:23 KJV). [14]

      In what way can man find any additional knowledge of the true God? In the same way in which he gets knowledge about another person: by what the other person says and does. But the initiative lies with the other person. If he remains silent and inactive, no knowledge is available in addition to the fact that he is there. Therefore, if man is to know anything additional about the true God, God must take the initiative and reveal Himself in word and/or deed. And God has taken the initiative and has revealed Himself in word and deed. The Bible is a record of the "words and the mighty acts of God." The true God is not silent and He is not inactive; He has spoken and He has acted. This is recorded for us in a book, the Bible. And we know that these are the words and deeds of the true God because they are the words and the acts of a God who is personal being and has unlimited freedom and power. The God who is revealed in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament is the living God who created all things.
      (The living God - Joshua 3:10; I Sam. 17:26; Psa. 84:2; Jer. 10:10; Matt. 16:16; Acts 14:15; I Thess. 1:9; I Tim. 3:15; Heb. 10:31;
      The Creator - Gen. 1:1; 2:3-4; Ex. 4:11; Neh. 9:6; Job 38:4; Psa. 90:2; 102:25; 104:1-5,24; Isa. 40:28; 44:24; 45:11-12,18; 48:12-12; Jer. 10:11-12; John 1:1-3; Acts 17:24; I Cor. 8:6; Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:2,10; 11:3; Rev. 4:11).
      Because He is a person, He is alive; and because He has unlimited freedom, He is the all powerful Creator of all things. The God of the Bible is the true God, and all other gods are false.

4. THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.
   Let us restate the problem: What concept of value will unite being and value? Essentialism, as pointed out above, unites value and being by identifying both of them with essence. Being is an essence (the most general or universal concept which can be predicated of all things or substances) and value is an essence (that concept of perfection that may be predicated of any thing). Thus could being and value be united. Ens est unum, verum, bonum. [Being is one, truth, good.] However, this essentialist concept of being (being as an essence, that is, the most general essence) has been abandoned in the face of the emphasis of the modern physical sciences on physical existence. Science is no longer a search for the essences of things. And as we saw above, value is still conceived in terms of essence. The ideals or norms defining values are essence, rational concept. Thus, as we saw above, the disjunction between existence and value arose. The existential solution to the problem is to unite being and value in an existent, a person. But not with just any person, but with that person or persons who is ultimate reality, God. This personal God is the highest value, the Good, and is the criterion of all values. The Biblical answer is that the only person qualified to be identified with this highest value is the person, Jesus Christ, who is the Son of God in human form. As Creator-Lord, He is the ultimate being (existent) and the source of all other beings, persons and non-persons. And as Redeemer-Lord He is the highest value, the Good, and the source of our values. Thus in the person, Jesus Christ, both being and value are united.

   It is easy to see how this theory of values is absolutistic and objectivtistic. It is objective in the sense that it is not one's self that is the highest value, but another self. It is absolute in the sense that his person, Jesus Christ, is the ultimate being and the source of all being, the Creator of all persons and things.

   Since we have cleared up the perplexing situation in which being is considered an existence while value is considered as an essence, the paradox may be considered resolved. Now we can return to our original question -- are value judgments distinct and separate from judgments of fact? The answer is No; they are not totally distinct and unrelated. They may be distinguished between them but in reality they are not separate. How can that be? What is meant by cognition and valuation, judgment of fact and judgments of value? In other words, what theory of cognition and valuation relates them thus? Here I believe that decision is again the clue to our answer: Both cognition and valuation are functions of decision.

   Let us clarify this by the analyzing decision again. In every instance of decision there seems to be three elements: the act of decision, the altenatives to be chosen between, and the criterion by which the decision is to be made. The ultimate criterion of any decision is one's highest value. In a valuational form of decision a relation is thus established between the criterion and the alternatives by the decision, a relation of worth and importance. Value statements are an expression of that relation established by the choice. For example, the statement and affirmation "A is good" expresses the relation of value which was established by the decision between the criterion, the Good, and the object A. On the other hand, in the cognitive form of decison the existence of the object is affirmed or a relation is said to hold between objects. A factual or cognitive statement expresses this affirmation. Here also a reference to a criterion is made in order to affirm either the existence of an object or a relation between objects. Since the ultimate criterion of any choice is the highest value, it may seen that cognition is basically valuation. This what has been called valuation basis of cognition or "the value character of the theoretical." [15]

   In conclusion, we see that, on the one hand, value statements have a factual basis because of the union of being and value in the Person who created all things and pronounced them good. On the other hand, factual statements have a value basis, because every factual statement has a value basis. Every factual statement expresses an act of cognition, that is, an act of decision, which is made with reference to to a ultimate criterion, that criterion being a highest value.

Author: Ray Shelton

ENDNOTES

[1] Lepley, Ray, ed. Value: A Cooperative Inquiry
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), 26-27.

[2] Reichenbach, Hans, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951), chap. 17.

[3] Urban, Wilbur M., "Axiology,"
Runes, Dagobert D., ed.,
Twentieth Century Philosophy
(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1947), 69.

[4] Essence is what a thing is and existence is that a thing is.

[5] Urban, op. cit., 71.

[6] Helmut Kuhn, "Existentialism,"
Vergilius Ferm ed.,
A History of Philosophical Systems
(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1950), 408.

[7] Ibid., 407.

[8] Ibid., 407.

[9] Ibid., 409.

[10] Ibid., 407.

[11] Ibid., 407.

[12] Runes, D.D. ed., Twentieth Century Philosophy
(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1947), 346.

[13] E. La B. Cherbonnier, Hardness of Heart
(New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), p. 40.
See also E. LaB. Cherbonnier,
"Biblical Metaphysic and Christian Philosophy,"
Theology Today 9 (October 1952): 367.
To read this article, click here.

[14] Cherbonnier, "Biblical Metaphysics," p. 369.
To read this article, click here.

[15] Urban, Wilbur M., The Intelligible World
(London: Goerge Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1929), 147.