Historically, there have been five distinct answers given to the problem of knowledge when stated from within the subject-object antithesis; three answers are given from within epistemic dualism -- sensationalism or empiricism, rationalism, and agnosticism or critical answer -- and two of the answers are given from within epistemic monism -- idealism or panobjectivism.
Within epistemic dualism, which asserts that the subject and object are numerically distinct, it is asserted that the gap can be bridged by sensations (sensationalism) and/or experience (empiricism) or by reason (rationalism). Rationalism lays the emphasis upon the mental side of man's nature and usually leads to metaphysical idealism (man's mind is a part or a reflection of the eternal mind or of the ultimate rational order of reality by the way of innate or a priori ideas). Sensationalism and empiricism lay emphasis upon the non-mental side of man and usually leads to a realistic position in metaphysics. But ultimately sensationalism and empiricism lead to skepticism as in Hume: all we know is constantly changing stream of sense data and not the object itself. Kant was awakened from his dogmatic rationalism by this conclusion of Hume's. Accepting Hume's conclusion, Kant attempted to build an epistemology as a basis for theoretical knowledge. Kant's answer was the same as Hume's for bridging the gap between subject and object -- skepticism. And this answer leads to metaphysical skepticism. Kant saw that there were forms and categories of rational thought in the subject but it was impossible to get to the object (noumena) by way of sensations. The forms and categories of the mind could not be assumed to be in the object (noumena, the thing-in-itself) for there was no way of knowing whether they were in the object. There is sense data but it is confused and manifold and could only be turned into knowledge by the forms and categories of the understanding in the subject; the result was knowledge of the phenomena, not the noumena.
Kant's epistemology turned the stream of modern thought in the direction of epistemic monism which holds that the subject and object are numerically identical. This epistemic monism took two forms: epistemic idealism and epistemic panobjectivism. Fichte took a clue from Kant's one-sided emphasis on the subject and denying the dualism of subject and object (noumena), blew the subject up big into a "super-ego". This was developed by Fichte himself, Shelling, and Hegel into a gigantic objective rationalistic, monistic, absolutistic idealism. The "Weltgeist" (the world-spirit) is coming to self-realization in the finite subjects. Man's thinking is the thinking of the Weltgeist as he (or it) realizes himself or itself.
Marx and many others revolted against this monistic idealism and put forth a dialetic materialism or a monistic naturalism: the object revolted against the subject. This revolt found clear epistemological expression in America in the rise of Neo-realism and in Britian in the New-Realism of G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and A. N. Whitehead. But a reaction arose against monistic realism or panobjectivism in the dualism of critical realism, which is a new form of the old dualistic epistemology. Thus it is that since Kant, the philosophers have tried to bridge the gap by an epistemic monism; First, it was by assimilating the object to the subject (blown large or universalized in metaphysical idealism) or secondly, by assimilating the subject to the object. But modern philosophers became dissatisfied in turn with each one of these monisms and returned to the epistemic dualism which now asserts or postulates a dualism without trying to explain how the gap is bridged. Some attempted to abandon this statement of the problem of epistemology within the subject-object antithesis and there has arisen pragmatism or instrumentalism, positivism, existentialism, etc.
Is there any solution to the problem of epistemology stated within the subject-object antithesis? As far as I can see, there is none. Epistemic monism in either the form of idealism or panobjectivism can not account for error, illusion, etc. If the subject is numerically identical with the object or vice versa, it is impossible to show how the subject could make errors in judgment, or be disillusioned as to what the truth is. And epistemic dualism leads to skepticism for there is no way possible to bridge the gap between the subject and object. Sensationalism and empiricism leave knowledge at the mercy of the flux of sensations and experience. The gap cannot be bridged by innate ideas; that is, by those ideas which all men everywhere hold to be true of necessity. Thus it is that they seek to establish those ideas by their universalism -- that all men hold everywhere -- and by necessity -- that all men hold these ideas to be true of necessity. Now an appeal to universalism of these ideas is an appeal to experience. but empiricism is acknowledged by most rationalists as not an adequate source of knowledge. An appeal to necessity of these ideas destroys the contingency of free choice. If one must of necessity hold these ideas, then that one is no longer a free agent. Now, sometimes it is argued that innate ideas must be posited to explain experience, but one fact that cannot be explained is the act of free will which must choose to posit these ideas. Thus present day epistemic dualism of critical realism is set forth without any attempt to bridge the gap. We conclude that a solution to the problem of knowledge, "How does one know?" must not be given from within the subject-object antithesis and neither must the problem of knowledge be formulated in its terms. As long as the problem of knowledge and its solution is formulated within this category of thought, no true and stable epistemology can be had.
Largely ignored until World War I (1914-1918), S.K. was rediscovered
in the aftermath of the war by the European philosophers
Martin Heidegger and
Karl Jaspers
in Germany, who created the philosophy of
Existentialism. The main thesis of this
"philosophy of existence" is that man
is neither merely a (knowing) subject, nor merely a (known) object,
but is a existing individual whose existence is found in his decisions.
This element is common in every kind of existentialism.
The first kind of existentialism is the philosophy of
Martin Heidegger,
which is a synthesis of Husserl's phenomenology, Dilthey's philosophy of
history, and Kierkegaard's Christian philosophy of existence, to which he
owes the concept of existence, of being in time (dasein).
In his later writings, Heidegger approaches nearer and nearer to an ontologism
(a philosophy of Being) that he derived from his interpretation of the
ancient Greek word aletheia.
The second kind of existentialism is the philosophy of
Karl Jaspers,
which grew out of his "psychology of world outlooks,"
and seeks a synthesis of existenialism and Neo-Kantianism or Platonism.
The third kind of existentialism, which is the
best known and most influential, is the philosophy of
Jean-Paul Sartre,
who has had a really sensational influence on the intellectual life of France,
as well as elsewhere.
All these kinds of existentialism are descendants of Kierkegaard's existenialism. He was the originator of the concept of existence, transcending the subject-object antithesis and apprehending man as a totality. But while Kierkegaard was able to do this by philosophizing as a Christian, Heidegger, Jaspers and Sartre in different ways and varying degrees have repudiated their Christian ancestor. Sartre did this by starting with atheism as an axiom; Heidegger by evading the question of God; Jaspers by acknowledging God in the Neo-Platonic sense as the transcendent ground, but affirming Him (It) as absolute and therefore unknowable Being, denying the belief in revelation, whose affirmation Sartre declares to be arrogant and mythological. Thus the truth about man is not be found in existential philosophy, either. And it cannot be found at all, if we take man as our starting point and point of departure.
Buber was influenced by the mysticism of Hasidism, which emphasized God's immanence and the possibility of man's constant communion with Him, and by the works of Kierkegaard. Buber's dominant theme is concerned with how one is to relate oneself properly to the world, other men, and God. He distinguished two possible relationships: "I-thou" and "I-it." One relates oneself to another person properly in recognizing the other as a "thou", and improperly in regarding him as an "it". This basic difference between relating to a thing (or an object which I observe) and to a person (a "thou") that addresses me and to whose address I respond, runs through all of Buber's works and determines his approach to everything in which he was involved. In its simplest form, this is difference between the way people usually relate to inanimate things on the one hand and to living persons on the other hand. Inanimate things are watched, while persons are spoken to. But the distinction between "I-it" and "I-thou" cannot be drawn simply on this basis. A person as well as an inanimate thing can be viewed as a thing or, to use Buber's terminology, as an "It". Whenever we take an "objective" attitude toward a person, whenever we view him as part of the world and as caught in its causal chain, we are in an "I-it" relationship, even though the object is another person. The "I-it" relationship is improperly applied because the other person is not an "It". Whenever another person is an "It" to me, I am perfectly alone. I gaze at him and view him from every possible direction, I observe his place in the scheme of things, and I find the elements that he has in common with other human beings and things and the elements that distinguish him from them. And all of this takes place within me, I am judging and I am observing, and the external world is relevant only to extent that it enters my world. This is pseudo relationship and is different from that found in the "I-thou" relationship. Here the relationship is genuine because it is between me and the "thou" that addresses me. The "thou" that addresses me is no longer one thing among other things of the universe. In this "I-thou" relationship, the whole universe is seen in light of the "thou", and not the "thou" in the light of the universe.
It is in the religious context that the real significance of Buber's distinction between "I-it" and "I-thou" becomes most clear. In contrast to most mysticism that attempts to obliterate the abyss between the self and the Absolute in the ecstasy of the mystical union, the essence of Biblical religion, as understood by Buber, is a dialogue between man and God in which each is the other's "thou". There is one "Thou", argues Buber, who by his very nature cannot become an "It". According to Buber, much of traditional theology errs in dealing with God as if He could be turned into an "It". This happens when man is no longer addressing Him as "Thou" and is not in communion with the Living God. In a number of works devoted to Biblical interpretation, Buber develops in detail his view of the Bible as the record of Israel's dialogue with God. In these works he distinguishes between the Jewish emunah and the Greek pistis, the former of which, according to Buber, is faith in the sense of trust in contrast to the latter that is faith in the sense of belief in the truth of propositions. The Jewish faith, as found in the Hebrew Bible, is Israel's trust in the faithfulness of God's word as the word spoken in dialogue. Buber interpets the faith in the New Testament, particularly the Pauline letters, as heavily influenced by the Greek philosophical elements that Buber believes is reflected in the emphasis on salvation as resulting from the belief in the truth of propositions concerning the divinity and resurrection of Jesus. In Paul, Buber sees a departure from the Hebrew Biblical emphasis which is expressed in the "I-Thou" relationship.
As one of the "Three Bs" (Barth, Brunner, and Bultmann), who dominated twentieth century theological studies in the Christian world, Brunner help to develop the new theological movement that became known variously as the theology of crisis, dialectical theology, neo-orthodoxy, and Barthian theology; he represented the middle ground of the movement. With Karl Barth, Brunner was one of the pioneers of the theological movement that became known popularly as neo-orthodoxy, each developing his own thought independently of the other. A breach developed between Barth and Brunner over the issue of natural theology which culminated with the publication in 1934 of Brunner's Nature and Grace: A Discussion with Karl Barth and Barth's answer, No! - An Answer to Emil Brunner. Brunner accepted natural theology and Barth did not; Barth denied that there was any "point-of-contact" in fallen man for God's word to make contact. Barth rejected the analogia entis ("analogy of being") of Aquinas and others, that was so important to natural theology, and replaced it with analogia fidei ("analogy of faith"). Therefore, a natural theology, in which fallen man seeks a knowledge of God, is not possible. Barth rejected a general revelation of God before and in addition to the special revelation in Jesus Christ. Brunner in accepting natural theology believed that there was a continuing presence of God's image in humans after the fall; this is the point-of-contact to which God's revelation of Himself is addressed.
But Brunner rejected the philosophical subject-object antithesis as the primary category for understanding revelation and faith. In his Divine-Human Encounter (1943, which was first published in German in 1938 as Wahrheit als Begegnung; it was revised and enlarged in 1963; with a new Part I added, it was republished with new English title Truth as Encounter in 1964), Brunner rejected an objectivism (which he regarded as typical of the unquestioning biblical literalist and dogmatic Roman Catholics) and a subjectivism (which he regarded as a characteristic of certain Pietistic mystics, romantic liberals, and millenarian and Pentecostal enthusiast). Thus in his book Truth as Encounter in 1964, Brunner takes a middle ground between historic Calvinism and traditional Arminianism, arguing that the biblical witness shows God always to be God-approaching-man and man as always to be man-responding-to-God, and their meeting point is Jesus Christ. Although God takes the initiative in the meeting, God does not manipulate man as a thing but treats the human person as a free and responsible being whom He loves and whose choice is either to accept His gift of grace in faith or to reject it in sin. The primary place of this revelatory encounter is Jesus Christ, for God reveals Himself and His invitation as Lord and Savior uniquely and decisively in Jesus. Brunner also believes that God's encounters with man continues and occurs in several areas of history and experience -- namely, in the Scriptures, in the faith of Church, and in the personal testimony of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of individuals. Since God's revelation is neither timeless, nor confined to a certain point in time, God keeps on encountering man.