THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH

INTRODUCTION.
Pilate therefore entered again into the Praetorium,
and called Jesus and said unto him,
"Are you the King of the Jews?"
Jesus answered, "Do you say this of yourself,
or did others tell it to you about me?"
Pilate answered, "Am I a Jew?
Your own nation and the chief priests delivered you unto me:
what have you done?"
Jesus answered, "My kingdom is not of this world:
if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight,
that I might not be delivered to the Jews:
but now my kingdom is not from hence."
Pilate therefore said unto him, "Are you a king then?"
Jesus answered, "You say that I am a king.
For this I have been born,
and for this I have come into the world,
that I should bear witness unto the truth.
Every one who is of the truth hears my voice."
Pilate said unto him, "What is truth?"
(John 18:33-38)
Many times in human history has this question been asked, but there is probably no more famous moment than when it was ask by Pilate, the Roman governor of Judea, during the trial of Jesus. This problem and the problem of the good are probably the most basic and most important problems that man has to face. For the answer to these problems determines a man's whole view of reality and life. It is not surprising therefore that this question has so often been asked in human history. And many answers have been given to this question; many have claimed to have "the truth". It is probably for this reason that we detect a note of skepticism in Pilate's question. Being an educated and politically wise person, Pilate had no doubt heard many of these claims to "the truth". So many conflicting claims to truth could not all be right. But which one was right? Who could say? Thus Pilate was skeptical when Jesus said that he was born into the world to bear witness to the truth. As far as he was concerned Jesus was just another claimant like the rest. But if Pilate had listen to the witness that Jesus had to bear concerning the truth, he would have heard a witness to the truth like he had never heard before and would never hear again. Let us examine the main solutions to the problem of truth that Pilate had no doubt heard and then the solution that Jesus gave in his witness to the truth.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH.
During the long intellectual history of man many answers have been given to this problem of truth. The problem of truth is really three problems:
(1) What is truth?
(2) What is the criterion of truth? and
(3) How do we know the truth?
The first problem leads to the second problem and the third problem raises the problem of knowledge. We will begin with the first problem: the nature of truth.
1. THE NATURE OF TRUTH.
  In the history of philosophy there have been two main theories of the nature of truth: the correspondence and the coherence theory. Both these theories of the nature of truth are theories of propositional truth. That is, truth is a property of propositions or statements. They both attempt to say how a proposition may be true.
  1. THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY.
    According to the correspondence theory of truth a statement ("proposition" or "judgment" are the technical terms used by the philosophers) is true if it corresponds with fact or objective reality. For example, if someone says, "It is raining outside today", this statement would be true if it is really in fact raining outside today. In other words a statement is true if it conforms to reality and it is false if it does not. This view of truth raises two questions:
    (1) How do statements correspond to reality? and
    (2) How do we know if our statements correspond to reality?
    The first question raises the problem of the nature of this correspondence. Obviously this correspondence is not physical or psychological. The statement and the reality with which it corresponds are different and not the same. In what way do the statement correspond with reality? The nature of this correspondence is not at all obvious or clear. The older or copy version of the correspondence theory, that our ideas are true when they exactly copy or agree with the object, contained this same obscurity. Our ideas are psychological or mental and the object is physical. How can ideas be copies of the physical object? The more modern versions of the correspondence theory of truth assert that it is not ideas but statements that correspond to reality. And statements correspond to reality if the state of affairs that they refer to do in fact actually exist. That is, does the situation asserted in the statement really hold or not? If it does, the statement is true; if it does not, the statement is false.
    The second question above raises the problem of the criterion of propositional truth. But before we examine this problem let us look at the coherence theory of truth.
  2. THE COHERENCE THEORY.
    The coherence theory of propositional truth appeals to the consistency and coherence of the system of propositions in order to establish their truth. A proposition is not true in itself but only as it belongs to a system of consistent or non-contradictory propositions. Thus the coherence theory defines the truth of a proposition as the coherence or systematic consistency of the proposition with the whole system of true propositions. Thus a proposition is true when it is is in agreement with this system of truth. But this raises the question: how do we known that our system of propositions are true? Thus this view of propositional truth also raises the problem of the criterion of truth.
2. THE CRITERION OF TRUTH.
  As we have seen this is the problem that is raised by these two different views of the nature of propositional truth. What is the criterion by which the truth of our statements may be determined? Historically there have been many answers to this problem. The following is a list of the chief criteria or tests that have been proposed to answer this problem of the criterion of truth.
  Social criteria:
  1. Custom.
    Customs are the behavior patterns of the members of a group, such as folkways, conventions, and mores. These are contrasted with personal and random group behavior patterns. Folkways are group behavior patterns that are unenforced; conventions are moderately enforced, and mores are morally enforced. Customs vary from group to group and therefore cannot be a criterion of truth. Which group's customs are to be taken as the criterion? This question cannot not be answered by custom.
  2. Tradition.
    Tradition is like customs, but are long established customs of the group. Since traditions conflict and some are false, tradition cannot be the criterion of truth. For example, it was long held that the earth was flat, but that tradition has been proven false. The Old is not the criterion of truth.
  3. Consensus gentium.
    This means the consent of the nations. What is believed to be true by all, everywhere, always, is true. This catholic (universal) criterion faces the same difficulties that tradition faces as a criterion of truth. Long held and almost universal belief does not guarantee truth. Truth is not determined by counting noses or by the vote of majority or all. The group like the individual may be mistaken.
  4. Authority.
    The need for authorities is almost univerally recognized; everybody cannot have in-depth knowledge about everything. But when authorities disagree, the individual must choose which authority to believe. And when they do not disagree one still has to choose whether to believe them and that choice depends upon a criterion other than authority. The source of the authority must be examined to determined the trustworthiness of the authority. The claim to authority alone is not a guarantee of its truthfulness.
  Psychological criteria:
  1. Instinct.
    Automatic, build-in unpremeditated behavior such as a pigeon returning to its loft, a bird building a nest, a mother protecting her child is called instinct. The problem with instinct is the difficulty in determining what behavior is instinctive and what is learned. As a criterion of truth instinct is inadequate since it is difficult to distinguish between what is inherited and what is acquired. Another criterion than instinct must be used.
  2. Feeling.
    A feeling is a conscious, subjective impression which does not depend upon cognition or representation of an object. Feelings are two kinds: pleasures and pains. These represent nothing actual in the object, but show the state or condition of the subject. Pleasure results from the perceived harmony between the object and subject and pain from their disharmony. Feelings are not simply physical but psychological. Because feelings lack objective reference but are subjective, they cannot be a criterion of truth. What may feel like the truth one day may not feel like the truth on another day. Feelings are unreliable as a criterion of truth.
  3. Sense perception.
    The immediacy of sensation - seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and touching - have such a certainty that no one can doubt. I know what I see, what I hear, and so forth. To deny that I perceive various sense data is to deny that I have experience, that I am: To be is to perceive. But in spite of the undeniable immediacy of sense experience and its certainty, sense perception as test of truth is inadequate. The senses do err; for example, we often see things that are not so, such oasis seen in a mirage, railroad tracks that appear to converge in the distance. Not only that, but also the different senses often contradict each other: the pencil in a glass of water appears to be bent at the point where it enters the water, which the sense of touch does not detect. Sensation is untrustworthy as the sole criterion of truth and must be supplemented, reviewed and critized by other criterion.
  4. Intuition.
    Sensation is not the only immediate certain experience. That I am conscious of myself and am aware of other selves are also immediately certain as are sense perceptions. The Latin word for perception is intuere, to look at; hence the term intuition is used to refer to all direct and immediate apprension by the knowing subject of itself, of its conscious states, and of other selves. Sensation is a kind of intuition, but it is not the only immediate experience. Some writers extend the term to apply to certain rational, moral and religious principles as intuitively certain. It is these universal principles or axioms that are believed to be self-evident, like the the Axioms of Euclidean geometry. But as modern mathemeatics has shown these self-evident axioms maybe replaced other axioms and mathematical systems developed from them. In mathematics it is customary to distinguish between statements that are arrived at by reasoning, which are called theorems, and ones which are not deduced from others, which are called axioms or postulates. It is these ultimate or fundamental propositions which are held by some philosophers to be intuitively true; they can be seen to be true of themselves and in their own right; they are self-evident. But self-evidence turns out to be a matter of familiarity. Axioms appear to be self-evident because they are not proved but are the basis for all proofs. While intuition may be a source of truth it is not the test of truth.
  Philosophical criteria:
  1. Correspondence.
    Some philosophers who have defined the nature of truth as correspondence with reality also advocate that the test for truth is also correspondence with reality. An idea or judgment is true, they say, if it corresponds to the reality to which it refers. But this test is difficult to apply. How can I compare my idea with reality? This comparison would be possible only if reality is immediately present to my mind and capable to be compare with my idea. But the reality of the object is not immediately present to my mind as are the ideas. My ideas are mental, in the mind; the object of my ideas are non-mental, outside my mind. How can these dissimilar things be compared? In my mind I can compare ideas with ideas, not ideas with non-ideas, extra-ideational reality. In our minds we cannot compare the idea of a tree with the tree itself. We can only compare our ideas of the tree only with the sense preceptions we have of the tree and they are not the tree. Correspondence may be the nature of truth, but surely it is not the test for truth.
  2. Practical consequences.
    Sensing the difficulties with other criterion of truth, some philosophers, called pragmatists, have advocated the practical consequences of a proposition to determine its truth. They (C.S.Peirce, William James, John Dewey) frequently attack the older forms of empiricism (John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume) and reject its correspondence theory of truth as static correspondence of propositions with sense data. They proposed a new empiricism with a dynamic theory of truth. James identifies truth with verifiability, making a proposition true. If the proposed proposition, or hypothesis, works it becomes true. Whatever activity makes the hypothesis work, whether it be scientific experimentation or practical activity, and leads to our desired goal, it makes the proposition true. Thus truth can be made. Verification, then, is not just a way of arriving at truth. It is truth. Verification and truth are two names for the same thing. But verification and truth are not the same thing. That a proposition may work is not the same thing as its truth. The truth of a proposition is the state of propositon, not a process. The process of verification may show the proposition to be true but it does not make it true. Truth is not made; it just is. To this the pragmatist objects, propositions like "USC defeated UCLA in football this year" only become true only when USC actually defeats UCLA this year. In reply the non-pragmatist says that while this is true of all propositions about future events, it is not true for all past events such as USC lost to UCLA in 1995. This statement is either true or false and shall always be either true or false no matter whether I verify its truth or falsity. My verification of the statement does not change the truth-value of the statement.
  3. Consistency.
    Some philosophers, noticing that the difficulties with other tests of truth is due to inconsistencies, propose that consistency is the true criterion of truth. In fact they advocate that the law of non-contradiction is the criterion of truth. That a proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time and the same place is a clear and infallible test of the truth of a proposition. But while it is true that a proposition is false if it involves a contradiction, the absence of contradiction does not guarantee the truth of a proposition. While the proposition that all bachelors are married is false because bachelors are by definition unmarried, the proposition that all bachelors are six feet tall may be false, not because it involves a contradiction, but because it may be factually false.
  4. Coherence.
    Other philosophers seeing this difficulty with the consistency test for truth, that it is a negative test for truth, supplement consistency with a positive test: a proposition is true if it agrees with the whole system of true propositions. But lack of inconsistency with the whole body of true propositions does not guarantee the the truth of that proposition. It may be factually false and still consistent with the whole body true propositions. Seeing this difficulty with the coherence test of truth, some advocates of the coherence test of truth define coherence as systemic entailment. By this they mean that a proposition is true if it is logically implied or entailed by the whole system of true propositions, like the theorems of Eucledian geometry are implied by the axioms, postulates and definitions of the whole system. But this entailment does not guarantee the truth of the implied proposition; for if the truth of proposition p implies the truth of some other proposition q, then it is also true the falsity of q implies the falsity of p. In other words entailment applies to false propositions well as with true ones and coherence as systemic entailment is no guarantee of truth. In order to escape this criticism, the advocates of the coherence test point out that this test is the coherence with the whole system of true propositions, not with false ones. But how do we know that our system consists of true propositions? Some advocates of this test answer: the propositions of our system are true because they do not contradict each other. But this is an appeal to the consistency test and reduces the coherence test to the consistency test. Other advocates of this test answer: the propositions of our system are true because they correspond to reality which, they assert, is a coherent system. In other words their test of propositonal truth rests on a view of reality. Reality is a coherent system and coherence is the criterion of reality as it is criterion of propositional truth. That is, this criterion of propositional truth involves a view of ontological truth, a criterion of reality. Coherence is the criterion of reality; reality and truth are coherent systems.
  5. Systematic Consistency.
    Other philosophers seeing this difficulty with the coherence test of truth, have suggested that this difficulty can be removed by combining the coherence test with the correspondence test. This test of truth has been called "systematic consistency." A proposition is true if it does not contradict any other true proposition (horizontal test) and that any proposition is true when it correspondences with reality (vertical test). By combining the correspondence test of truth with the consistency test of truth, these philosophers attempt to answer the difficulty found in the correspondence test of truth; how can the ideas that are in my mind be compared reality, which is extra-mental? It is not ideas that must be compared with reality, but what the proposition asserts about reality. But this shift from ideas to propositions dose not eliminate the difficulty with the correspondence test. Some philosopher that advocate this test recognize this difficulty and assert that, since reality is really mental and rational, the mind can compared the propositions held in the mind with reality. This view has been called idealism. On the other hand, some Christian philosophers (for example, Edward John Carnell [1]), who advocate the systematic consistency test of truth, hold that truth is correspondence with mind of God. Since God is the Author of facts and their meaning, the test for truth to determine whether our propositions correspond to God's mind, must be systematic consistency; that is, a proposition is true when it sticks together with all the facts of our experience, while a proposition is false when it does not. There are two parts to this test for truth. First, there is consistency. Second, this consistency is systematic. The first is a formal criterion of truth and the second is a material criterion of truth. God is the definition of consistency, since consistency is what He does. God does not contradict Himself. This is the basis for the first part of the test for truth. The discrete facts of the empirical world are related to each other, not by demonstrable necessity, but by teleology. The world is knit together according to a plan and purpose which existed in mind of the Creator. Thus the relation between these facts is teleological. Since God is consistent and the world that He teleologically order gives system to this consistency, the test for truth is not just consistency but systematic consistency.
3. KNOWLEDGE OF THE TRUTH.
  Now we turn to the third problem of the problem of truth: how do we know the truth? This raises the problem of knowledge: what is the source and criterion of knowledge? Historically there has been two solutions proposed to this problem: empiricism and rationalism.
  1. EMPIRICISM.
    Empiricism holds that experience (primarily sense experience) is the source and criterion of knowledge. That is, the five senses (seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and touching) give us the only means by which we can test whether our statements correspond to reality. Thus empiricism defines truth as the correspondence of our statements with reality and the senses are the means by which we can determined whether our statements correspond with reality.
    There are three main difficulties with empiricism as the criterion and source of knowledge:
    1. The senses contradict one another and are subject to delusions and deception. Consider the paradoxes of perception. For example, when a pencil is half immersed in a glass of water, the pencil appears to be bent at the point where it enters the water. Since the pencil is not actually bent the sense of sight is deceiving and it contradicts the sense of touch which detects no bend at the point where pencil is seen to be bent. In addition when the senses contradict one another, they can not tell us which sense is correct; an appeal to a criterion beyond the senses must be made in order to choose which sense is to be believed. Sensation as the criterion of knowledge is inadequate.
    2. Sensation does not give us a knowledge of the real world. Since the senses contradict and deceive the mind concerning the object known, the real object must be other than what appears to our senses. The senses give us only a knowledge of what the world appears to be (appearance) but not what the world really is (reality). And since sensation does not give us direct knowledge of real world, this leads inevitably to skepticism concerning knowledge of the real world and/or of the knowing mind. By the senses direct knowledge of the real world or of the mind that receive the sensations is not possible. Hence there is no human knowledge of anything (see Hume). But this is skepticism. And skepticism is self-contradictory; for it asserts that it knows that there is no knowledge of anything. Therefore, since skepticism contradicts itself, it is not true. And since empiricism leads to skepticism, empiricism is also not true. Sensations is not a adequate source of knowledge.
    3. Sensations also do not give us knowledge of universals - general ideas. The senses gives us ideas of individual things (particulars) but not a knowledge of general ideas (universals). Since the sensations are not the source of knowledge of general ideas, they also cannot be the criterion of general idea. Again sensation as the source and criterion of knowledge is inadequate.
  2. RATIONALISM.
    Rationalism holds that reason is the criterion of knowledge and it defines reason as that which is universal and necessary: that which must be true everywhere. Since the law of non-contradiction, that is, that a proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time, is necessarily true everywhere, it is the basic principle of reason. Rationalism not only appeals to consistency but also to coherence of the system of propositions in order to establish their truth. A proposition is not true in itself but only as it belongs to a system of consistent or non-contradictory propositions. Thus rationalism defines truth as the coherence or systematic consistency of a proposition with the whole system of propositions. A proposition is true when it does not contradict this system of truth. Since logic and mathematics are universal and necessary, they are the highest embodiment of reason. Historically there have been two forms of rationalism:
    1. ancient (Greek) rationalism that saw reason to be objective (external and independent of the mind) and static and
    2. modern rationalism that sees reason to be subjective (internal and dependent on the mind) and dynamic.
    There are three main difficulties with rationalism (both ancient and modern) as the criterion of knowledge:
    1. Reason is an empty criterion: it is a formal criterion without content. In attempting to answer the question: what is most universal? the formal character of the criterion becomes evident. The more universal the criterion the more abstract and empty of content does it become (See, for example, the concept of being). The process of abstraction empties the criterion of all content in order to become most universal. Hence, reason is a formal criterion, not a material criterion. This formal criterion, when taken as the only criterion of knowledge, leads inevitably to skepticism about existence of concrete and individual things.
    2. There is another difficulty with reason as the criterion of knowledge. Reason appears not to be an universal criterion. Consider the paradoxes of reason and, for example, the paradox of the liar. This paradox was devised by Greek philosopher, Eubulides, in the sixth century B.C. In this paradox Epimenides, the Cretan, says, "All Cretans are liars." Now if the Cretan is telling the truth, he is lying; and if he he is lying, he is telling the truth. A simpler form of this paradox was known to the ancients as the pseudomenon. Is the speaker lying or telling the truth when he says, "I am lying."? If he is telling the truth, he is lying; and if he is lying, then he is telling the truth. Thus some statements appear to be both true and false at the same time and same place. Reason as the criterion of knowledge appears to be limited and not universal.
    3. There is one more difficulty with reason as the criterion of knowledge. Reason is not a necessary criterion: the ultimate criterion of knowledge is chosen, not proved. Basic presuppositions like axioms and postulates cannot be proved or demonstrated; that is, they are not the necessary consequences of other statements. For then they would cease to be basic presuppositions and become theorems that must be proved. Any attempt to deny this non-necessary character of basic presuppositions leads either to an endless regress or to circular reasoning (assuming what is to be proved in order to prove it). Hence reason is not a necessary criterion of knowledge and itself cannot be established by reason. In order to establish reason as the criterion of knowledge an appeal beyond reason becomes necessary. In order to escape this difficulty the rationalist turns to intuition or to the so-called self-evident or innate truths of reason. These all involve the abandonment of reason, the univeral and necessary, as the criterion of knowledge.
  3. SKEPTICISM.
    Both empiricism and rationalism leads to skepticism (each in its own way). Empiricism leads to skepticism because the senses cannot give us a source of knowledge of the real world or of universals (general ideas) and a criterion of knowledge to distinguish between appearance and reality. Rationalism also leads to skepticism because reason cannot give us a source of factual knowledge and a necessary criterion of knowledge. Since both empiricism and rationalism leads to skepticism, the following problem has arisen: what is the criterion of the knowledge that does not lead to skepticism? In attempting to avoid skepticism and the difficulties of both empiricism and rationalism, some philosophers have attempted a synthesis of reason and sense experience (Aristotle and Kant). But these attempted syntheses have turned out to be another form of rationalism and hence have not answered the basic problem of rationalism: how is the truth of the basic presuppositions of reason established?
4. THE PROBLEM OF ONTOLOGIAL TRUTH.
  In our examination of these theories of propositional truth we see that there is an another kind of truth: ontologial truth. The problem of propositional truth raises the problem of ontologial truth, the problem of the criterion of reality: how do we decide what is real? For the choice of the criterion of propositional truth leads to and involves the choice of something as real. The truth of propositions are based on the reality of something that is the criterion of reality, ontological truth. Further more, each epistemology makes an ontological assertion as to what is real. Empiricism asserts the reality of the object (Realism) that is known through the senses. Rationalism asserts the reality of the rational (Idealism). Empiricism appeals to the reality of the object beyond the senses to establish the truths of the senses. Rationalism appeals to the reality of the rational, the universal and necessary, to establish the truths of reason. For both of these criteria of knowledge involves an appeal to something that is assumed to be real.
  This raises the question: what is real? To answer this question an appeal must be made to a criterion of reality, the Truth. Thus the problem of the criterion of truth raises and involves the problem of ontological truth: what is the criterion of reality? The criterion of reality answers the question: what is real? Whatever is the criterion of reality is the Truth and the Truth is the criterion of reality; it is ultimate reality, the really real. Realism asserts that the objects of senses are ultimately real, the Truth; Idealism asserts that mind or the rational is the ultimately real, the Truth.
  1. REALISM.
    Realism holds that the objects of knowledge are real independent of the knowing mind. They are non-mental and their reality does not dependent upon any mind. There are many philosophical views that are called "realism"; the term "realism" is here used to designate that view which is often called "epistemological realism". There are two forms of epistemological realism: naive realism and critical realism. Naive realism holds that the objects of knowledge are really as they appear to our sense. Critical realism, realizing the difficulties of naive realism, makes a distinction between the appearance and the reality of the objects of the senses. For realism the objects of the senses are the ultimately real, the Truth, the criterion of reality. The major objection against critical realism is that, if the senses gives only knowledge of appearances, then how can the real objects behind the appearances be known?
  2. IDEALISM.
    Idealism (or more accurately, idea-ism) holds that the reality of the objects of knowledge are dependent upon the knowing mind. The objects of knowledge are essentially mental otherwise they could not be known by mind. The essence of physical objects are ideas or concepts, hence they can be known by a mind. There are many philosophical views that are called "idealism"; the term "idealism" is here used to designate that view which is often called "epistemological idealism". There are two forms of epistemological idealism: subjective idealism and objective idealism. Subjective idealism holds that the only reality that an object of knowledge has is the idea of the object in the mind of the knower. This view is supposed to have been held by George Berkeley (1685-1753). On the other hand, objective idealism denies that the only reality of the objects of knowledge are in the ideas in the mind, but asserts that their reality are in the ideas in the objects themselves. The reality of the objects of knowledge are in the concepts, the rational element, that they contain. Idealism asserts that the rational, the universal and necessary, is the criterion of reality, the ultimately real, the Truth. The major objection against objective idealism is that, if the reality of the objects of knowledge are in the universal ideas in the objects themselves, then how can the objects as particulars be known? Knowing the universal concept of treeness in a particular tree, does not mean that that particular tree is known.
THE BIBLICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH.
The analysis of the problem of ontological truth above showed that both empiricism and rationalism make an appeal to a criterion of reality, the Truth, as the criterion of propositional truth: empiricism to the reality of the objects of sense knowledge, and rationalism to the rational, the universal and necessary.
1. THE CLUE TO THE SOLUTION.
  But both empiricism and rationalism ignore the freedom of human choice in determining the criterion of knowledge of the truth. The criterion of knowledge is not rationally necessary nor empirically given; it is chosen. Both of these epistemologies allow no place for this choice.
  Now an analysis of human choice discloses the fact that choice involves a reference to a criterion of choice and ultimately to an ultimate criterion of choice. The choice of what statements or propositions are held to be true depends ultimately on the choice of this ultimate criterion. This observation raises the question: what is the ultimate criterion choice?
2. STATEMENT OF THE SOLUTION.
  1. Negatively: Any ultimate criterion which denies or destroys the freedom of choice by which it is chosen can not be the true ultimate criterion of choice. Such an ultimate criterion is a false criterion. All false criteria imply and result in a denial, diminution and lost of the freedom of those who choose them.
  2. Positively: Only that ultimate criterion which maintains and guarantees the freedom of choice by which it is chosen can be the true ultimate criterion of choice. What ultimate criterion can guarantee and fulfill that freedom of choice?
    Since an impersonal or non-personal reality (Nature or Reason) does not have this freedom, only another person who has the freedom of choice can be this ultimate criterion. But not only must this person have freedom of choice but he must be committed to the preservation of freedom of the one who has chosen him, that is, he must motivated by love. And in order to be able to preserve that freedom, his freedom must be unlimited. This implies that this person must also be the basis and ground of the rest of reality; that is, he must be ultimate reality (God) and the criterion of reality. And since the Truth is the criterion of reality, that person will be the Truth. Thus the Truth is a person. And if we are to know this person, that is, who he is and that he exists, he must reveal himself. For the only way we can know another person is only by what he says and does. But the initiative lies with the other person. If he chooses to remain silent and inactive, no knowledge can be had of him in addition to the fact that he is there. If this person who is ultimate reality (the Truth) is to be known, He must reveal Himself. The Bible claims that He has taken the initiative and He has revealed Himself in word and deed, and that the Bible is the record of that revelation. Who is this person that is the Truth? The Biblical answer is that Jesus Christ is the Truth. Jesus said,
    "I am the way, the truth, and the life;
    no man comes to the Father, except through me." (John 14:6).
    He is the source of the knowledge of God. That is, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is the way to God, the revelation of God, the Father, the Creator of all reality except God Himself. Through Him, as the pre-incarnate Word of God, were all things made and He is basis and ground of the rest of reality that God has created (John 1:1-3; Col. 1:15-17). He is the criterion of the real, the Truth, because through Him God has determined by His sovereign creative choice what is real. And as such He is committed to the preservation and fulfilment of our freedom.
    "And you will know the truth and the truth will make you free...
    So if the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed." (John 8:32, 36).
    The Truth that will make you, a person, free is the Son of God. He sets free and perserves the freedom of one who chooses him as their ultimate criterion of the reality, as the Truth.
3. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOLUTION.
  1. Negatively: Reason is not the ultimate criterion of knowledge of the truth. Neither are the senses. The object of the senses is not ultimate reality as assumed by Empiricism. Neither is the rational the real, that is, ultimate reality, as claimed by Rationalism.
  2. Positively: But since God created a real world to be perceived by our senses, the objects of senses are real. Thus sensation can be used as a factual criterion of knowledge of the created world - sensation appealing to the reality of the object as its criterion. And since the rational is a function and expression of the will, reason can also be used as a criteria of knowledge - reason appealing to the universality and consistency of the propositions of knowledge as its criterion. Reason provides a formal criterion of knowledge and sensation provides a material criterion of knowledge. Reason and sensation are not mutually exclusive but complementary criteria of knowledge. The Biblical epistemology is empirical, but not Empiricism, and rational, but not Rationalism. Ultimate reality is neither the empirical objects of Realism nor the rational ideas of Idealism, but the person through whom all things were created. The Biblical view is that the personal creator God is ultimate reality and He has created the empirical objects of the senses and man in his own image whose statements are true when they correspond to the reality that God has created.
    The image of God is not reason, but the person, Jesus Christ (Col. 1:13-15; compare II Cor. 4:4). He is the model and pattern according to which God created man. Note that the Scriptures never says that the image of God is in man, but rather that man has been created in the image of God. What does it mean for man to be created in the image of God? According to Genesis 1:26-27, being created in the image of God means for man to have dominion over creation and to have personal relation with an equal human person - woman; these are the two aspects of man being created in the image of God. Both of these presuppose freedom - the freedom of choice and the freedom of action. This freedom is the presupposition and possibility of being in the image of God. Since God created man with freedom, dominion over creation and personal relations with equal personal beings become possible. With freedom of choice and action, man can exercise his dominion over creation. And since love is the essence of personal relations, with his freedom of choice and action, man can love an equal person and enter into a personal relation with her. The freedom of choice and not reason, neither self-consciousness, nor self-transcendence, is that which make possible man's dominion over creation and personal relationship with an equal personal being. This freedom of decision, not his reason, is what distinguishes man from the rest of creation; this is what gives to man his existence as a person or self and to his reason that human and personal character. Man as a personal being in a created physical world is as such a union of spirit (person or self) and body (psycho-physical organism).
    "Then the Lord God formed man of the dust from the ground, and
    breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and
    man became a living soul [nephesh]" (Gen. 2:7).
    Man's soul is the union and expression of a spirit or person in and through a body. And his existence as a person is found in his ability to choose, to make decisions.
    "I choose, therefore, I am", not, "I think, therefore, I am".
    To be is to choose, not to think nor to preceive.
    Man's reason is a function and an expression of his will.
    "...whatever evidence one accepts,
    whether that of experience or that of logic,
    will depend upon neither logic or experience alone,
    but upon a decision by the individual concerned
    in favor of the one or the other." [2]
    Knowledge and reason depend upon a prior decision as to what is real and to what is the criterion of reality, ultimate reality, the Truth.
    Ultimate reality is not the universal and the necessary. That is, Reason, the universal and the necessary, is not God. God is a person (or more accurately, three persons) whose existence is not in His reason but in His unlimited sovereign free decision and will; it is not the universal ideas in God's mind that determine how or why God will create man and the world, but His unlimited sovereign will (Rev. 4:11). Since reason is a function of will, God is rational and His reason is a function of His will. Thus the world that God has chosen to create is rational.
    Man also is a person (or more accurately, a spirit [person] in a body) whose existence is also to be found, not in his reason, but in his limited free decision and will. And since decisions involve a reference to an ultimate criterion beyond the self, to a god, the Biblical view of man is that man is a religious animal, a being who must have a god; the view that man is a rational animal is not the Biblical view of man. Reason is not that which makes man different from the rest of the animals.
    Reason is not God and Reason is not man's ultimate criterion but the sovereign will of the Creator who made all things and has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ. This is the basic choice that a human person must make if he is understand what is real and what is the Truth, the criterion of reality. Is the Truth the universal and necessary or is it the sovereign will of the personal Creator who made all things and has revealed Himself in the person of Jesus Christ?
    This choice explains the basic incompatibility between Greek philosophy and the Biblical view of God and man; it also explains the conflict between Greek philosophy and the Christian faith and the failure of the attempted synthesis of these divergent points of view by Augustine and Aquinas. All attempts to synthesize the classical Greek philosophical view of God and man with the Biblical view will fail. And worst of all, the Biblical view of God and man will be and has been obscured and misunderstood.

End Notes

[1] Edward John Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1948), 56-63.

[2] E. LaB. Cherbonnier, "Biblical Metaphysic and Christian Philosophy,"
Theology Today 9 (October 1952): p. 372.
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