The Statement of the Problem. In recent years some Christian thinkers have questioned the value of Christian Apologetics. It is argued that apologetics is of little value to the Christian because it makes an illegitimate appeal to reason. Christianity needs no justification at the bar of reason. The task of the Christian, it is said, is not to argue for the existence of God but to confront men with His judgment and mercy. Reason is not competent to criticize or to evaluate the possibility or the content of the Christian revelation. [1] This criticism has raised in our time the problem of the value of Christian apologetics: Does Christian apologetics have any value?
Analysis of the Problem. An analysis of this problem leads to two observations. First of all, the value of Christian apologetics depends upon its legitimacy. Its value has not been questioned on the grounds of its ineffectiveness (if it really is so); this has not been the reason. On the contrary, the value of Christian apologetics has been questioned on the grounds of its illegitimacy. Now this attack on the legitimacy of apologetics is a curious development in the history of Christian thought. Apologetics has been always and everywhere, until recently, considered an important Christian activity. [2] It is true that in certain periods apologetics was neglected. But then the need for apologetics is not great in an age in which the State orders everyone baptized and sends anyone to the stake for expressing religious unbelief. All the great theologians of the Early Church were at the same time "Apologists" and apologetic works are at least as numerous and important as those which may be called doctrinal. Probably the greatest apologetics work of all, The City of God, was written by probably the greatest theologian of the Early Church, Saint Augustine. This is also true of later theologians as, for example, those of the Reformation. Calvin in his great doctrinal work, Institutes of the Christian Religion, devotes a surprisingly large portion of the first book to apologetics and proofs from reason. This attack on the legitimacy of Christian apologetics is not representative of the general or classical attitude of Christian thought. Why then in modern times has the legitimacy of Christian apologetics been attacked? the answer to this question leads to our second observation.
The legitimacy of Christian apologetics has been attacked on the grounds that it makes its appeal to reason. Christian apologetics is illegitimate because it makes an illegitimate appeal to reason. This is the basic difficulty that contemporary Christian thinkers find with apologetics: What is illegitimate about this appeal to reason? What is wrong with reason that the appeal to it is considered illegitimate? The appeal to reason, it is said, involves an implicit abandonment of faith for unbelief. [3] Reason is just a form of unbelief and the appeal to it is the forsaking of faith for unbelief. [4]
What can we conclude from this analysis of the problem? It appears that the problem of the value of apologetics reduces to the problem of the nature of reason. What is reason? Is reason always a form of unbelief? The legitimacy and thus the value of Christian apologetics hangs on the answer to this question.
Clue to the Solution. Since Christian apologetics from the most early times appealed to reason in their writings, let us examine the First Apology of Justin Martyr in order to see how he appeals to reason and what he means by it. Does his appeal to reason involve an abandonment of faith? Is reason just a form of unbelief? By examining the First Apology of this early Christian thinker to find an answer to these questions, maybe we will find the clue to the solution of our problem.
Justin Martyr appeals to reason in the introductory chapters (1-12) [5] in which he pleads for a fair hearing for the Christians. He asks the emperor for a hearing on the basis that reason requires its followers to be just and cherish the truth.
"Reason (ho logos) requires that those who are truly pious and philosophers should honor and cherish the truth alone, scorning merely to follow the opinions of the ancients, if they are worthless. Nor does sound reason (ho sophron logos) only require that one should not follow those who do or teach what is unjust; the lover of the truth ought to choose in every way, even at the cost of his own life, to speak and do what is right.... So do you, since you are called pious and philosophers and guardians of justice and lovers of culture, at least give us a hearing -- and it will appear if you are really such." [6]He also appeals to reason when he asks that the charges against the Christians be investigated fairly.
"If they (the charges) are shown to be true, [let us] be punished as is proper. But if nobody has proofs against us, true reason (ho alethes logos) does not allow [you] to wrong innocent men because of an evil rumor -- or rather [to wrong] yourselves when you decide to pass sentence on the basis of passion rather than judgment." [7]Thus it is on the basis of reason that Justin asks for a fair hearing from the emperor. "But it is for you, as reason (logos) demands, to give [us] a hearing and show yourselves good judges." [8]
So far it would appear that Justin is appealing to unbelieving reason. But Justin's concept of the nature of reason begins to appear as he treats the causes of the persecutions of the Christians. Justin traces the cause of these persecutions to evil demons. These are the same evil demons that persecuted Socrates when he tried to unmask them and lead men away from them.
"When Socrates tried by true reason (logo alethei) and with due inquiry to make these things clear and to draw men away from the demons, they, working through men who delighted in wickedness, managed to have him put to death as godless and impious, saying that he was bringing in new divinities." [9]The Christian who attempts to do the same thing as Socrates in obedience to Jesus Christ are persecuted by men at the instigation of these same evil demons. For the same reason by which Socrates condemned these demonic errors took form and became man and is called Jesus Christ.
"For these errors were not only condemned among the Greeks by reason (hupo logon), through Socrates, but among the barbarians, by Reason himself (hup' autou tou logou) who took form and became man and was called Jesus Christ." [10]Thus does Justin's concept of the nature of reason appear; Reason (ho logos) is a person. Herein lies the difference between the concept of reason (ho logos) of popular Greek philosophy and Hellenistic Judaism, on the one hand, and the Christian concept, on the other, which had been introduced into Christian circles by the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel: the former is impersonal and the latter is personal, or better yet, a person. [11] For only as a person could Reason Himself take form and became a man. The impersonal reason of Greek philosophy and Hellenistic Judaism could not become man. For it is universal and unchanging and cannot as such become a particular man subject to the changes of human life. At no place is the difference between the Greek and the Christian concept of Reason so clear.
Justin presupposes this concept of Reason as a person in the main argument of his First Apology. The purpose of this argument is to prove that Jesus Christ is not a mere man but the Son of God and thus the divine Word.
"But lest someone should argue against us, What excludes [the supposition] that this person whom you call Christ was a man, of human origin, and did these miracles you speak of by magic arts, and so appeared to be God's Son's? -- we will bring forward our demonstration." [12]This "greatest and surest demonstration" is prophecy. The subject of this prophecy is Jesus Christ.
"We find it predicted in the books of the prophets that Jesus our Christ would come, born of a virgin, grown to manhood, healing every sickness and every disease and raising the dead, hated and unacknowledged and crucified, dying and rising again and ascending into heaven, both really being and being called Son of God." [13]Jesus Christ is the subject of these prophecies because the prophetic Spirit who spoke through the prophets was none other than the divine Word (theion logos).
"The Spirit and the Power from God cannot rightly be thought of as anything else than the Word (ton logon), who is also the First-born of God,... Even you will agree, I think, that those who prophesied were inspired by none other than the divine Word (logo theio)." [14]And also in connection with mode of prophecy he says,
"When you hear the words of the prophets spoken as in a particular character, do not think of them as spoken by the inspired man themselves, but by the divine Word (theiou logou) that moved them." [15]Thus the argument from prophecy gets its cogency only on the supposition that the same divine Word that spoke through the prophets had become incarnate in Jesus who fulfilled the prophecies. Jesus Christ is divine Word because the events of his life were predicted before they actually came to pass by the preincarnate divine Word. This argument presupposes that divine Word is a person.
Justin also presupposed the concept of reason as a person in his discussion of those who lived before Christ. What about those who lived before the time of Christ? Are they without responsibility because they lived before him? In answering this problem Justin first reminds his readers that Christ is the Reason of which all men partake.
"We have been taught that Christ is the First-begotten of God, and have previously testified that he is the Reason (logon) of which every race of man partakes (metesche)." [16]The sense in which all men partake of Reason is explained in an earlier chapter (28). All men are given the ability to choose the truth and do right.
"In the beginning he made the race of men endowed with intelligence, able to choose the truth and do right, so that all men are without excuse before God, for they were made with the powers of reason (logikoi) and observation (theoretikoi)." [17]Having laid down his presuppositions, he answers the problem.
"Those who lived in accordance with Reason (meta logou) are Christians, even though they were called godless, such as, among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and other like them; among the barbarians, Abraham, Ananiah, Azariah, and Mishael, and Elijah, and many others, whose deeds and names I forbear to list, knowing that this would be lengthy. So also those who lived without Reason (logou) were ungracious and enemies to Christ, and murderers of those who lived by Reason (meta logou). But those who lived by Reason (meta logou) and those who so live now, are Christians, fearless and unperturbed." [18]They are Christians because the Reason according to whom they live is the preincarnate Christ. The cogency of this answer depends upon this presupposition: Reason is a person and he has taken form and become man.
Statement of the Solution. What can we conclude concerning Justin's concept of the nature of reason? Is reason a form of unbelief? Does his appeal to reason involve an abandonment of faith? If these questions could be put to Justin, his answer would obviously be no. Reason is a form of faith and the appeal to reason naturally leads to faith. But the question naturally arises from this reply: How is this so? How can faith and reason be combined so that they are compatible? The answer to this question is twofold. Faith and reason can be combined by making the object of faith Reason Himself. They can be combined in this way because Reason is a person, the Son of God, having taken form and become a man, Jesus Christ, He is the object of faith. This solution is possible only if Reason is a person. The Greek concept of impersonal reason would make this solution impossible. Thus on the basis of the personal concept of reason, the appeal to reason is an appeal to Jesus Christ. Thus the appeal to reason naturally leads to faith.
Faith and reason can also be combined by making faith the presupposition of reason. The operation of reason depends upon faith. Unless reason presupposes an ultimate commitment to the person Jesus Christ it will not function properly. For Reason, like all human activities, involves a commitment to something that has ultimate significance and supreme importance. This object of ultimate commitment is that person's god. It may be self-interest, money, society, power, experience, nature, reason, science, family, state or some supernatural being. The term "god" need not refer to the personal God of the Christian religion. As Martin Luther put it in his Larger Catechism, "Whatever your heart clings to and confides in, that is really your God." [19] Now, whatever is a person's god will determine the quality of his whole life by furnishing him with an entire set of values which in turn will govern his specific moral and intellectual decisions. Therefore the operation of reason will be governed consciously or unconsciously by one's ultimate commitment. However, reason cannot properly operate unless this prior commitment is made to the true God. For the true God is the only proper ultimate criterion for the operation of reason. Since Jesus Christ is Reason Himself (ho logos) by whom all things were created, [20] He is the true God and thus the only proper ultimate criterion for human reason. Therefore, reason is a form of faith in a twofold sense: formally reason involves faith and materially the proper operation of reason presupposes faith in Jesus Christ.
Now let us return to our original problem: What is the value of Christian apologetics? We saw that the answer to this problem depended upon the legitimacy of the appeal to reason and the legitimacy of its appeal to reason depended in turn upon the nature of reason. Our examination of the First Apology of Justin Martyr led us to the twofold view that Reason is the divine person who became the man Jesus Christ and, because reason involves faith, human reason, in order to operate properly, presupposes faith in this person. Therefore, the appeal to reason is legitimate because it is ultimately an appeal to Jesus Christ.
Of course this appeal is open to dangers. It may be misunderstood by the Christian and/or non-Christian as an appeal to either the impersonal universal and necessary principles operative in the natural and moral universe (the Greek and particularly the Stoic idea of reason) or the infallible human capacity of ratiocination by which man can arrive at the truth independent of faith (the modern idea of reason of the Enlightenment). Of course the appeal to reason in either these senses is an appeal to a false god. Christian thinkers and writers have not always been careful to avoid this misunderstanding. [21] The appeal to reason is also open to the danger of appealing to reason in the wrong way. How we appeal to reason is just important as what we appeal to as reason. The way in which some Christian thinkers [22] appeal to reason obscures what reason is, that is, that reason is the divine person who became the man Jesus Christ, and how human reason is made complete through faith in Him. The appeal to reason must be made in such a way as not to obscure this fact. [23]
But in spite of these dangers the appeal to reason is legitimate. Christian apologetics is a legitimate undertaking for the Christian Church. The value of Christian apologetics may be denied, but not on the grounds of its legitimacy. Some Christian apologetics may improperly appeal to reason, either in the way in which they appeal to reason or in what they appeal to as reason. This may lessen the value of apologetics accordingly, but it does not affect the legitimacy of this discipline. [24]
[1] Cf. Alan Richardson, Christian Apologetics, 23.
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947).
Richardson apparently has Karl Barth and his followers in mind here.
See his footnote 1 on page 22.
[2] Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God: Dogmatics, Vol. I, 99
(London: Lutterworth Press, 1949).
[3] Barth says that in false apologetics "faith must take
unbelief seriously and itself not quite seriously, and therefore
secretly or openly ceases to be faith."
Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, 32
(Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1936).
[4] See Karl Barth, The Doctrine of God: Church Dogmatics,
Vol. II, part I, 92ff.
(Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1957).
[5] See the appendix at the end of this paper for my outline of Justin Martyr's First Apology. The course of the argument of this paper did not permit a detailed discussion of the structure of the Apology.
[6] Justin Martyr, First Apology, Ch. 2.
All quotations of the First Apology of Justin Martyr are taken
from the English edition translated and edited by Edward Rochie Hardy in
Early Christian Fathers, Vol. I,
The Library of Christian Classics
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953).
The Greek text used was the one appearing in Basil L. Gildersleeve,
The Apologies of Justin Martyr
(New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1877).
"This leads us to turn to the meaning of a constantly recurring feature in the spiritual history of man, that is to say Religionskritik (Critique of Religion).... Two kinds of criticism are well known. First, that of the Prophets of Israel, the great denouncers of all self-willed and self-centered piety, whether acceptable and laudable according to human standards or not. Theirs is the most trenchant criticism of religion ever given. The second kind of criticism is the philosophical type, which arose repeatedly in history as a protest against the degradation of reason, or as a voice in the name of a more refined and sensitive moral consciousness. Unlike prophetic criticism it does not advocate the honour and majesty of God, but the independence and dignity of human reason. In Athens it broke out in the asebeia and atheoi cases which led to the condemnation of Socrates, who, although he had a deeply religious nature and respected the traditional gods, claimed free enquiry of the mind, and therefore had to die as being dangerous to the basis of communal life which reposed on tradition."
Hendrik Kraemer, Religion and the Christian Faith, pp. 39-40
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956).
[11] Emil Brunner points out that
"there are three radical differences between the two. The first is that it is not an abstract principle, an 'it,' as it always is in Greek philosophy, but a person -- 'in Him, all things were made by Him and in Him was life.' The second is to be seen in the fact that this Logos is not an immanent element of the human mind or spirit, but given to man by historical revelation as the secret of God's essence and will. Finally, it is not a timeless, fixed truth, but the moving dynamism of history, the definite manifestation of that which in the end of time brings with it the victory of the divine will over the powers that threaten the meaning of life, thus completing the meaning of historical, earthly existence."
Emil Brunner, Christianity and Civilization, Vol. I, 64
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948)."The philosophical conception of the Logos (cf. HEINZE in loco) here determines Christian thought, although the important difference must not be overlooked, that the Logos of the Christian writers is an independent personality. The divine person of Christ is acknowledged without any limitations; and when the Johannine conception of the Logos is presented as parallel with that of the Stoic philosophy, it must be understood merely as an outward clothing of the thought (momentous indeed in its consequences) in such garb as to commend it to the heathen world."
Reinhold Seeberg, Textbook of the History of Doctrine, Vol. I, 114
(Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1958).
[12] Justin Martyr, Op. Cit., ch. 30.
"We are sure that all the things taught by him are so, since we see that what he predicted is actually coming to pass. This is God's work, to announce something before it happens and then to show it happening as predicted." Ch. 12. Cf. Ch. 23.
[17] Ibid., Ch. 28, cf. Ch. 17. Elsewhere Justin indicates that the exercise of these rational powers in choosing that which is clear to God produces conviction and leads to faith.
"For on the one hand we did not bring ourselves into being, but on the other the following after the things that are dear to him (God), choosing them by the rational power (logikwn dunameon) which he has given us, persuades and also leads unto faith." (Ch. 10 -- my own translation)In fact, faith in Jesus Christ is in accordance with reason. Thus Justin says concerning the purpose of his Apology,
"We will show that we honor him in accordance with reason, having learned that he is the Son of the true God himself, and holding him to he in the second place and the prophetic Spirit in the third rank." (Ch. 13)The worship of idols, on the other hand, is contrary to reason, irrational.
"We consider it not only irrational (alogon) but an insult to God, whose glory and form are ineffable, to give his name to corruptible things which themselves need care." (Ch. 9)This idolatry is the work of evil demons who cause men to live contrary to reason.
"in old times evil demons manifested themselves, seducing women, corrupting boys, and showing terrifying sights to men -- so that those who did not judge these occurrences rationally were filled with awe. Taken captive by fear and not understanding that these were evil demons, they called them gods and gave each of them the name which such of the demons had chosen for himself. (Ch. 5) Reason (the Word) persuades men to renounce the demons and follow the true God. "...they [the demons] get hold of all who do not struggle to their utmost for their own salvation -- as we do who, after being persuaded by the Word, renounced them and now follow the only unbegotten God through his Son." (Ch. 14).
[19] Martin Luther, "Large Catechism," in
Luther's Primary Works, 34
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1896).
[20] God created man in his own image Gen. (1:26, 27). What is this image? Scripture seems to suggest that the image of God lies in man's freedom of choice. "Let us make men in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, etc." (Gen. 1:26 RSV) Man's lordship like God's presupposes freedom. The difference between them is that God's freedom is unlimited and man's is limited. An analysis of freedom shows that the ability to choose entails a reference beyond the self to a criterion of decision. The ultimate criterion of all criteria for that person is his god. Man's sin is that he has chosen false gods rather than the true God. This results in a decrease of freedom, a bondage to the idol. For the false god, being without freedom of choice, that is, impersonal, or a person with limited freedom of choice, is a strait jacket on his freedom. The true God, on the other hand, since he is personal (three persons), having unlimited freedom, fulfills man's freedom and makes him truly free. Since Reason is a function of the person, it also presupposes freedom. For Justin reason includes freedom (See Ch. 10, 28 and 43).
[21] This suggests the answer to the following question: Why do such writers as Karl Barth condemn reason and the appeal to reason? Is there any explanation for this attitude? These Christian thinkers perceive, whether clearly or not, that the appeal to reason involves an appeal to a false god. Reason has usually been understood in Western philosophy either as an impersonal, universal and necessary principle operative in the natural and moral universe or as a human intellectual capacity of ratiocination by which man could arrive at the truth independently of faith. The former is the Greek (and particularly the Stoic) view and the latter is the modern view of the Enlightenment. Appeal to reason in either of these senses involves an appeal to a false god. Understood in this sense, the objection of these Christian thinkers is well taken. "Thou shalt have no other gods before me." (Exodus 20:2) And this includes reason also. The danger of idolatry even among Christians cannot be emphasized enough.
[22] See Stuart C. Hackett, The Resurrection of Theism
(Chicago: Moody Press, 1957) and
Edward J. Carnell Introduction to Christian Apologetics
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1948).
[23] Space will not permit a detailed presentation of the correct way to appeal to reason. This would require a book on apologetics. But a few suggestion will indicate the way it should be done. Human reason should be analyzed to show what formally it involves, logically and psychologically, faith; that is, an ultimate commitment to something. And then the analysis should show that the only proper object of faith which is compatible with proper operation of human reason is the person Jesus Christ. In other words, the analysis of reason must show that every man must have a god and that the only true God is the person Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and through Him God the Father. Proofs from reason like the traditional arguments for the existence of God are the incorrect way to appeal to reason.
[24] What is the nature of apologetics? Apologetics should be distinguished from an Apology (Richardson, op. cit., p. 19). An Apology is a written or spoken defense of the Christian faith against those attacks, explicit or implicit, made on it. Apologetics, on the other hand, is the study of the methods of defending the Christian faith in Jesus Christ. It is not a defense but a preparation for the defense. In its study apologetics attempts to answer the question, Why is the choice involved in the ultimate commitment to Jesus Christ and through him to God, his Father, the only true and correct choice? In other words, Why this God rather than another? The answer to this question and related questions is the main task of Apologetics. Apologetics should also be distinguished from Polemics which is the study of the methods of attack on rivals to the Christian faith in Jesus Christ. It attempts to answer the question, Why are the choices involved in the commitments to non-Christian gods, ancient and modern, crude and sophisticated, false and incorrect choices? In other words, Why are these gods false gods? Apologetics and Polemics are very closely related and accordingly some writers do not always clearly distinguish them from each other.
"It [apologetics] will testify both to the truth of the true God and to the falsity of the false gods simply on the ground that these facts are previously and finally testified by God's Word and need from the Church only this repetitive and confirmative witness."In other places Barth distinguishes between them.
Karl Barth, The Doctrine of God, 8
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957).