New interest has been stimulated in this problem by the continental theologians, Karl Barth and Emil Brunner. Revelation has been moved to the center in their respective theologies. They both speak of their theologies as theologies of the Word. This renewed emphasis on revelation has again raised the problem of the relation of revelation to reason.
This problem was first raised in the second century A.D. when Christianity began its conquest of the Roman Empire. Among the ones converted to Christianity in these early Christain centuries, there were men who had been trained in Greek philosophy. Such was Justin Martyr who had studied in turn the teachings of the Stoics, Peripatetics, Pythagoreans and Platonists. He had received help most from the Platonism yet in the end he was disappointed and uncertain. It was when he had met a venerable old man who told him about the prophets and the faith by which one should read them that Justin Martyr turned to Christianity. "A flame was kindled in my soul; and a love of the prophets and these men who are Christ's friends possessed me; and whilst revolving his words in my mind I found this philosophy alone to be secure and profitable. That is how and why I became a philosopher." [1] It was with such men as these or with Christians who tried to philosophize that this problem arose. For them the question of the relationship of revelation and reason took the form: What was the relationship between the Christian faith and Greek philosophy? Lactantius who succeed Justin Martyr, "thought that, if one accepted the Christian revelation, one would then be in a position to piece together all the elements that are true in the teachings of the different philosophical sects and so by a process of syncretism arrive at the true philosophy." [2] Justin Martyr had already said, "Whatever has been well said anywhere and by anyone belongs to the Christians." [3]
An abstract formulation of this problem in the Middle Ages grew more or less out of this concrete question of the relationship between the Christain faith and Greek philosophy. For Thomas Aquinas and others, the problem in abstract terms was the relationship between the "truths of Reason" and the "truths of Revelation". For them, reason was a body of propositions arrived at by the unaided intellect of man. Revelation was another body of propositions received by the Church from God and embodied in a book, the Bible, or in the traditions of the Church. The problem was essentially the problem of relating one body of propositions to another.
There seem to be at least four possible solutions to the problem when formulated in this way. They are:
Thomism, rejecting the first three possible solutions to the problem, has become the official position of the Roman Catholic Church regarding this problem. Older Protestanism differs only slightly from Roman Catholicism in regard to this formulation of the problem. Protestanism has held in regard to revelation that the body of propositions, which make up the "truths of revelation," are embodied only in the Bible and not also in the traditions of the Church. Apart from this, older Protestanism more or less agrees with Roman Catholicism in their solution of this problem. This solution seemed satisfactory until the rise of modern physical sciences and the Newtonian view of the universe. This involved the rejection of Ptolemaic-Aristotelian geocentric view of the universe, which had been made the official view of the Roman Catholic Church at the Council of Trent (1545-1563). Luther had protested against the influence of Aristotle on Christian theology, but his protests were largely ignored by his followers and the other Protestant Reformers and their followers. But the Protestants had not committed themselves to the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian view of the universe, so that, when the Newtonian view of universe became known with the publication in 1687 of Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, or, as it known from its Latin title, the Principia, it was hailed as a revelation of God's marvelous design of his creation. But the situation was different in Roman Catholic France. There the Church took it as a challenge to their official theology which incorportated the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian geocentric view of the world, they opposed it and tried to suppress it as they had done with Galileo's views in 1632 after the publication of his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World System. But this time they could not force Newton to recant as they did Galileo. And in addition the French intellectuals and philosophers, such as Voltaire, defended and popularized Newton's views, as the accomplishement of man's reason. Some French philosophers, but not Voltaire, interpeted Newton's views as implying an infinite and eternal universe in which God did not exist. This raised anew the problem of the relationship of revelation and reason, the "truths of reason" now being understood as the truths discovered by the new science and according to these rationalistic philosophers there are no "truths of revelation" and that the only truths are the "truths of reason". Accordingly, in the name of Reason they attacked the Roman Catholic Church, claiming that the Bible is a collection of myths and the teaching of the Church are based on superstitions. Other of the rationalistic philosophers, like Voltaire, called deist, believed that God as a perfect being existed, but after God had created the universe with its perfect laws, God had no need to interfere with the operation of this perfect cosmic machine. Voltaire denied that there is any special revelation and miracles because that would mean that God was interfering with the perfect machine that God had created, but he did believe that the existence of God could be proved by the fact that such a perfect machine required a perfect being to make it. Some writers referred to this design in nature as a natural or general revelation of God. Because Voltaire believed that there was no special revelation of God, he joined with those who attacked the Roman Catholic Church. Now the problems had become: Are there "truths of revelation" in addition to "truths of reason"? That is, is there special revelation in addition to general revelation of God? Liberal Protestants have answered "No," and Conservative Protestants have answered: "Yes."
Now the problem of revelation and reason was also formulated in another way. As we pointed out above, the problem was formulated in terms of the "truths of reason" and the "truths of revelation." And the problem stated thus was: What is the relationship between the "truths of reason" and the "truths of revelation"? Now this other formulation of the problem was in terms of faith and reason as human acts or activities. The problem when formulated in these terms was: What is the relationship between faith and reason?
It was Augustine who first perceived clearly the problem in these terms. The famous principle attributed to Augustine, credo ut intellegam ["I believe in order that I may understand"] is a formulation of his solution of this problem stated in terms of faith and reason. However, the problem formulated in these terms was often confused with the other formulation in terms of the "truths of reason" and the "truths of revelation". This is not too surprising as long as revelation was conceived in terms of propositions, doctrines, or a book. Faith thus was regarded as the acceptance of this propositional revelation.
Four solutions are possible when the problem is formulated in terms of faith and reason as human acts or activities. They are:
In this formulation of the problem as the relationship between faith and reason, theologians labored under the handicap of the traditional understanding of revelation as only propositional. Revelation as an activity was understood as inspiration - the giving or the dictation of certain propositions. Thus revelation, as the result of the activity of revealing or inspiring, was a set of propositions contained in a book. The Bible is the revelation of God. It was difficult for Augustine not to identify faith only with the believing of certain propositions, the intellectual acceptance of a creed or doctrinal formula. But "despite the temptation which that theory must have presented to him to do so, Augustine does not confuse Christian Faith with the acceptance of Scriptural propositions. He notes that Scriptures are unintelligible to those who do not read them with Christian eyes: 'the Spirit giveth life' to the words of Scripture." [4]
The recent discussion of revelation in theological circles has brought about a revision in the concept of revelation. In British theological circles, the concept of revelation has been attached to specific historical events and persons. Revelation is to these theologians the self-manifestation of God or the disclosure of His plan and demands in certain historical events, such as the history of the Hebrews. In continental theological circles, revelation is connected with the idea of a personal or, at least, a dynamic Godhead. Revelation is to these theologians the personal disclosure by a personal God of His reality, nature and presence to human persons.
One of these continental theologians is Emil Brunner. While not denying historical revelation [5], Brunner sees revelation basically as personal encounter. God is not an object or thing but a subject. Our knowledge of a subject, a person, is wholly contingent upon the act of self-disclosure on the part of the person to be known. However, revelation is not complete without the subjective act of perceiving, faith. Revelation is not purely an objective phenomenon, independent of the subjective act of receiving. Revelation is not a Something, a Thing, but a process, an event. [6] And as such it is transitive, proceeding from God and ending in man. The subjective act of perceiving on man's side is part of revelation. There is therefore no point in setting an objective fact of revelation over against a subjective act of receiving that revelation because revelation actually consists in the meeting of two subjects. [7]
Now the act of perceiving on man's side of the process of revelation is called faith. Faith is an act that involves the total person. As the central act of the person it is a process of willing, feeling and thinking. When man answers God's word in the act of faith, he is also accomplishing an act of thinking. [8] Hence reason has a place in faith.
As a result of this reinterpretation of revelation, the problem of the relationship of revelation and reason may at last receive a satisfactory solution. For as long as revelation was interpreted entirely in terms of propositions, the problem was formulated in a misleading form. As pointed out above, the problem was formerly formulated as the relationship of the "truths of revelation" to the "truths of reason", of theology to philosophy. Now revelation must be understood to be personal and historical, as well as propositional. Faith is not just believing the "truths of revelation", but a personal act of decision in response to that personal revelation. Faith is a personal commitment to the person Jesus Christ who is the historical revelation of God and who is revealed personally by the God the Holy Spirit in the preaching of the Gospel. And Reason is not just a set of propositions arrived at by man's unaided reason, the "truths of reason", but an activity of man. Theology as well as philosophy is an activity of thought, of reason. The problem of the relationship of revelation to reason is solved in the interpretation of revelation as an event in the divine activity of divine self-disclosure; faith is man's response to this revelation. Reason as an human activity should be grounded in faith, the human responsive side to divine revelation, both historical and personal. Thus reason has a place in faith.
[1] Dial. Trypho, Chap. 8, cited in
Richardson, Alan, Christian Apologetics, 232
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947).
[3] Apol. II, 13, cited in Ibid., 229.
[5] Brunner, Emil, The Scandal of Christianity, chapter 1
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1951).
[6] Brunner, Emil, The Christian Doctrine of God, 19
(London: Lutterworth Press, 1949).
[7] Brunner, Emil, Revelation and Reason, 33
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1946).
[8] Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, 73.
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New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940.
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