The heart of every religion is the commitment and devotion of each person of the religion to some object [1] which is for those persons of ultimate significance and supreme importance. A religion is not primarily an institutional organization (a church), nor a special set of acts (a ritual), nor a particular set of doctrines and concepts (a theology). A group of persons similarly committed may form a church with a particular ritual. They may also develop a unified doctrinal statement or theology. Such institutions, rites, and creeds are not the heart and core of a religion. These may be included in "religion" in wider sense of the word. And in this sense a religion may be defined as any system of actions or thought held by a group of persons who are committed to the same object of ultimate allegiance and devotion. But since the heart and core of a religion is this commitment, it would seem best to define a religion in the narrower sense of the term as the commitment and devotion of a person or a group of persons to some object of ultimate significance and supreme importance. [2]
The object of ultimate significance and supreme importance to which a person of group of persons is committed and devoted is the "god" of that religion. This object of trust and worship may be self, society, power, experience, nature, reason, the family, the state or some supernatural reality. The term "god" need not refer to the personal God of the Christian religion or the object of trust or worship of any historical or organized religion. It is a functional term; that is, a term which takes its meaning from the particular function or operation performed by the object to which the term is applied. A god performs the function of the object of supreme importance and ultimate significance to which persons amy commit and devote themselves. "Taken by itself this word [god] carries as little specific meaning as the word 'good.' Both are empty receptacles whose content varies from man to man and from religion to religion." [3] Martin Luther in his Larger Catechism states it very clearly. "Whatever, then, thy heart clings to and relies upon, that is properly thy god." [4]
Every man must have a god. By his very constitution, every man must necessarily have a god to which he can commit and devote himself, in which he can trust. This is apparent from an analysis of human freedom or decision. There are three elements in every decision: the ability to choose, the alternatives or options to be chosen between, and the criterion by which the choice is made. This third element means that every human decision involves a reference to a criterion beyond the self. In other words, behind every human decision as to what a person should do or think, there must be a reason. And the ultimate reason for any decision, practical or theoretical, must be given in terms of some particular criterion, an ultimate reference or orientation point in or beyond the self or person making the decision. This ultimate criterion is that person's god. In this sense, every man must have a god, that is, an ultimate criterion of decision. Thus in the very exercise of his freedom, decision, man shows that he is such a creature that must necessarily appeal to an ultimate criterion, a god. In fact, his every uncoerced decision implies this ultimate criterion. [5]
From this point of view, no man is an atheist in the basic meaning of that word (that is, no god). Every man must have a god. Man is a religious animal who must necessarily have some object of ultimate allegiance and trust which functions as his guide of truth and his norm of conduct. Every man must choose a god. Though free to adopt the god of his choice, no man is free to avoid this decision. Every attempt to do so turns out to be not a denial of the of having a god but an exchange of gods. Every man must choose and have a god. To ask whether one believes in the existence of God is to completely misunderstand the issue. The issue is not whether one should choose between theism or atheism, that is, to believe in the existence of God or not, but whether one should choose this god or that god as the true God. The atheist's god is that there is no god.
Since there are many objects to which a person or group of persons may commit or devote themselves, it is probably improper to speak of religion in the singular. It would be more correct to speak of religions than of religion. However, if the singular form the word is used, it may be used to refer to one of the many religions or, when taken as a collective noun, to refer to the formal characteristics common to all religions. This common core is the commitment and devotion to something as god.
There is no one all-inclusive religion. It is incorrect to conclude from the fact that the common essence of all religions is an ultimate commitment that all religions are basically the same (for example, as in the idealistic and rationalistic theories of religion). The fallacy of this conclusion consists in the assumption that since dissimilar religions have in common the same characteristics, they are identical in content. This is like saying that because baseball and tennis are both athletic activities, they are the same. There are as many religions as there are gods.
It is also incorrect to conclude that, since every man must have a god, all men therefore acknowledge the same god under different names and hence that all religions are "variations on a single theme" (Arnold Toynbee). To use a favorite illustration of the proponents of this view, everyone is climbing toward the summit of the same spiritual mountain, and it is therefore foolish to quarrel over whose route is the best. The fallacy of this position lies in the assumption that, since rival gods all have the same functional label ("god"), they are at the bottom identical. This is like saying that, since Louis XIV and Henry VIII were both kings, they are basically the same person.
Upon analysis, this position turns out to be a clever argument for one particular god: the undifferentiated unity of mysticism in which all contraries merge. [6] The appeal of this position to universal tolerance is really an adroit piece of propaganda for this god. Its contention that all gods are fundamentally the same, are attempts to cover its claim to be the true God.
Another appeal that this position has is that life's most urgent question can be safely ignored; namely, "Which god is the true God?" But this cannot be gotten rid of so easily. Since every man by the structure of his freedom must have a god, he must choose beween rival claimants. And since the claims of these rival gods to be the true God are mutually exclusive, man must choose between them. Only one of them can be the true God. Hence the famous words of the prophet Elijah, "If Jehovah be God, then follow him; but if Baal, then follow him" (I Kings 18:21 ARV) [7] . Of course this question is more difficult to face in the modern twentieth century America because rival gods are not easily identified as such. They have become more sophisticated and civilized. But absence of a label does not alter the contents of the package. Although anonymous, they are none the less gods when they become the object of faith and trust in a man's life. If anything, they are more dangerous and deceptive because they are not generally recognized as gods.
Since everyone must have a god, the crucial question for every man is: Which god is the true God? Or to put the question differently: How are we to distinguish between the one true God, on the one hand, and the many false gods, on the other? In other words, by what means can we determine which of all possible gods are pretenders and which is the true one? The clue to the answer to these questions may be found in a further analysis of freedom.
As we have already seen, every man by the structure of his freedom must have a god. That is, in every one of his choices a man must necessarily appeal to some criterion by reference to which the decision is made. An the ultimate criterion by which a man makes his choices is his god. Clearly then the choice of one's god is the most basic and fundamental choice that a man can make, it lies behind and is presupposed by every other decision as to what a man will do or think; it is clearly the most important exercise of his freedom. What should one choose as his ultimate criterion of decision? Negatively, he should not choose that as his ultimate criterion which will deny, destroy or limit the very freedom of choice by which it is chosen. And positively, he should choose that ultimate criterion which will enhance and fulfil that freedom. Any ultimate criterion that denies or takes away the very freedom of choice by which it is chosen cannot be the true God. The choice of such an ultimate criterion is a contradiction of man's basic freedom of choice; such a god is fatal to man's freedom.
By freedom we do not mean purposeless caprice or chance, indeterminism, but rather the ability to choose, freedom of decision, free will, self-determination. Neither is this freedom an abstract entity, "freedom-in-general," Freiheit, but rather the concrete decision of someone, of a free agent. The most appropriate word for such a being who has such freedom is the word "person." A person is a being that is self-determining, not determined, who has freedom, free will, the ability to choose. A person is to be distinguished from a non-person, a thing, an "it", a being that is determined, not self-determining, that has no freedom, no free will, no ability to choose.
A god that is a thing has less freedom than the person who chooses it as his god. Such a god does not have as much freedom as its worshippers. Now a god who does not have at least the freedom that man himself has cannot be the true God. It cannot do any more for them than they can do for themselves. Such a god is only the projection of the whims and fancies of the worshippers because it is in reality inferior to its worshippers. As a minimum criterion, therefore, a god can be recognized as a false god if it has less freedom than man himself. To choose such a god as one's ultimate criterion of choice would be a denial of one's freedom of choice and the worst kind of bondage. An impersonal or non-personal god must therefore be a false god because it does not have as much freedom as the one who chooses it as his god. The commitment to such a god is the denial of human freedom. A false god can be recognized by the effect that it has upon the freedom of the one who gives it his allegiance; it limits the freedom and puts into bondage the one who choose it as his god. The true God, on the other hand, sets free the one committed to him and fulfils and enhances his freedom. The true God must be at least a person in order to have at least as much freedom as the one who chooses Him as his god. Now the true God must not only be a person, but He must also have unlimited freedom if He is to be able to do the things He promises and to deliver the one who cries to Him in trouble and need. A god without unlimited freedom might not be able to keep his promises or to save the one who cries to him. Therefore, a god that does not have unlimited freedom must be a false god. The prophet Isaiah applied this criterion to the denunciation of idolatry.
"Those who lavish gold from the purse,The true God, on the other hand, has unlimited freedom; He can do whatever He pleases (Psa. 115:3; 135:6); He can save when He is called upon (Isa. 43:11; 45:15-17). The true God, therefore, is a person (or persons) with unlimited freedom.
and weigh out silver in the scales, hire a goldsmith,
and he makes it into a god;
then they fall down and worship!
They lift it upon their shoulders, they carry it,
they set it in its place, and it stands there;
it cannot move from its place.
If one cries to it, it does not answer or
save him from his trouble." (Isa. 46:6-7)
(See also Isa. 44:18-20; 45:20-21; Psa. 115:2-7; 135:5-7, 15-17.)
The Apostle Paul, in the first chapter of his letter to the Romans, refers to these criteria to show that man is without excuse for his idolatry.
"Because that which is known of God is manifest in them;Man has no excuse for choosing a false god. He knows that his god is not the true God because a false god is impersonal and powerless or is a person with limited power or freedom.
for God manifested it to them.
For since the creation of the world the invisible things of Him,
both His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen,
being understood by the things that are made,
so they are without excuse." (Rom. 1:19-20 ERS)
It is this knowledge of what the true God must be like that lies behind all primitive religions, with their anthromorphic gods. Primitive man knows what a god must be like in order for it to be the true God. This knowledge, derived intuitively from the nature of his freedom, makes him uneasy about the things that he worships as god. He knows that the true God must be a living God. But having failed to encounter such a God, he fills the vacuum with what he imagines to be a facsimile of Him. And since the highest living being he knows is himself, he makes gods in his own image. He also knows that the true God must be a God of unlimited power, not limited like himself. He therefore identifies these anthromorphic creations with the powerful forces that he sees in the physical world about him. Beyond the simple and profound suspicion that such a God does exist, he is at the end of his knowledge ("...whom ye ignorantly worship..." Acts 17:23 KJV).
In what way can man find any additional knowledge of the true God? In the
same way in which he gets knowledge about another person: by what the
other person says and does. But the initiative lies with the other
person. If he remains silent and inactive, no knowledge is available in
addition to the fact that he is there. Therefore, if man is to know
anything additional about the true God, God must take the initiative and
reveal Himself in word and/or deed. And God has taken the initiative and
has revealed Himself in word and deed. The Bible is a record of the
"words and the mighty acts of God." The true God is not silent and He is
not inactive; He has spoken and He has acted. This is recorded for us in
a book, the Bible. And we know that these are the words and deeds of the
true God because they are the words and the acts of a God who is personal
being and has unlimited freedom and power. The God who is revealed in the
Scriptures of the Old and New Testament is the living God who created all
things.
(The living God - Joshua 3:10; I Sam. 17:26; Psa. 84:2; Jer.
10:10; Matt. 16:16; Acts 14:15; I Thess. 1:9; I Tim. 3:15; Heb. 10:31;
The Creator - Gen. 1:1; 2:3-4; Ex. 4:11; Neh. 9:6; Job 38:4;
Psa. 90:2; 102:25; 104:1-5, 24; Isa. 40:28; 44:24; 45:11-12, 18; 48:12-12;
Jer. 10:11-12; John 1:1-3; Acts 17:24; I Cor. 8:6; Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:2, 10;
11:3; Rev. 4:11).
Because He is a person, He is alive; and because He has unlimited freedom,
He is the all powerful Creator of all things. The God of the Bible is the
true God, and all other gods are false.
The God of the Bible has not only revealed Himself in word and deed, but in the person of His Son, who became the man, Jesus Christ. Christianity is that religion which is centered in the person and work of Jesus Christ as recorded in the New Testament of the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures. In the Christian religion, the object of ultimate significance and supreme importance is a living person, Jesus Christ. Christianity is not primarily an institutional organization (the Christian Church), nor a special set of acts (ritual or the liturgy), nor a particular set of doctrines or concepts (Christian creed or theology). The Christian religion is first of all faith and trust in Jesus Christ as a living person. This is the significance of the earliest Christian confession, "Jesus is Lord" (Romans 10:9; I Cor. 12:3). The confession that Jesus Christ is God and Savior is the lowest common denominator of all ecumenical Christian statements of faith, both ancient and modern. Both the Apostle's Creed and the Nicene Creed, for example, are no more that an expanded form of this confession, particularly in their second articles. The modern ecumenical confessions of Lausanne, Jerusalem and New Delhi re-echo this same emphasis.
But even though these Christian confessions affirm that Jesus Christ is God, they never say that God is Jesus Christ, as though Jesus Christ is all that there is to God. On the contrary, they also affirm a faith in the "God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." (Compare I Cor. 8:6) That is, it is through Jesus Christ that the Father is also the object of ultimate commitment in the Christian religion (Matt. 11:27; John 14:6; etc.). For He is the "God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" (Eph. 1:3; I Peter 1:3). And faith is also affirmed in the Holy Spirit. For Jesus Christ is only acknowledged as Lord by the revealing and convicting work of the Holy Spirit (I Cor. 12:3; John 15:26; 16:14, 15) and the Holy Spirit is known only to those to whom Jesus sends and gives Him (John 14:16, 17). Thus the God of Christianity is a personal God who exists in three persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (Matt. 28:19; II Cor. 13:14). God has manifested Himself in the Son, Jesus Christ (John 1:18) and reveals Himself by the Holy Spirit (I Cor. 2:10).
One objection that might be raised against this presentation of the religious foundation of philosophy is that it involves philosophy in pure subjectivism. Philosophy, according to this point of view, becomes just the instrument for the expression of the philosopher's personal interests and prejudices. This objection overlooks the fact that philosophy is the intellectual activity of a person, a self. [10] But even though philosophy is subjective in the good sense of that term as any other human activity, it is not purely subjective. For every subjective decision of a person has objective reference if it is not whimsical or arbitrary.
"The value judgments which free choice entails are 'objective' in the sense that they refer to a standard of good and evil independent of oneself. They are distinguished from private inclinations and tastes by the fact that this external criterion can overrule personal preferences. If a man's value judgments are consequent upon the particular standard which he adopts, and if he cannot make a responsible decision without reference to it, the conclusion is that the very exercise of freedom necessarily involves the agent in a relation to something beyond himself." [11]The subject is not without its object in the sense of an external criterion and standard of good and evil. When this object is the subject's ultimate criterion, it is his god and the subject's commitment and devotion to it is his religion.
The elaboration and clarification of the philosophic implications of the Christian ultimate commitment to Jesus Christ and to God the Father through Him is called a Christian philosophy. The Christian ultimate commitment implies a definite view of the world or reality. This view of reality which is contained in the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures makes the fundamental ontologial distinction between the Creator and the creation (Gen. 1:1; Isa. 40:28; Acts 17:24; Rev. 4:11). God the Father is the creator of all things that are not-God through Jesus Christ, His Son (I Cor. 8:6; Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:2; John 1:3). This Christian world view gives a certain character to the whole of reality. All that is real is created by God the Father through Jesus Christ, His Son, except God Himself (John 1:3). Also God freely created all things (Rev. 4:11). All that is not-God is the free creation of God. He was under no compulsion or necessity to create. There was no inner necessity in God which required that He create to fulfill a lack or need. Even though all of creation is dependent upon God for its existence, God is not dependent upon anything. In addition, the creation is neither an emanation nor a part of God; it neither came out of God nor did it eternally exist as a part of God. Finally, all creation is good. Although not-God, the creation is not evil; it is good but not ultimate good. It is good because God created it and recognized that it was good. "And God saw everything he had made, and, behold, it was very good" (Gen. 1:31; see also Gen. 1:4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25). This character of reality given in the Christian world view implies a definite position with regard to those aspects of reality characteristic of it as a whole, such as being, value, and knowledge. A Christian philosophy is the intellectual expression of this position. Thus a Christian philosophy may be defined as an intellectual construction which contains the elaboration and clarification of the philosophic implications of the Christian ultimate commitment to Jesus Christ and to God His Father through Him.
[1] The use of the term "object" here and in the following discussion is not intended to indicate that the object of the commitment and devotion is a non- person. Whether the object of religious trust and worship should be a person or a non-person or suprapersonal is a subject for later discussion.
[2] "Fundamental to all religion is the experience of commitment or dedication."
[David Elton Trueblood, Philosophy of Religion
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 11.]
"An individual's religion, any individual's religion, is his
commitment to something or someone which is for him of ultimate
significance... It would seem that this is really a common core of all so-
called 'historical religions,' which may vary widely as to the content of a
proper commitment. They are all agreed, however, that man is to commit his
life to something which is of supreme importance, and it is this which makes
them religious. Religion is a leap of faith which man makes in regard to that
which seems most important to him."
[Harold A. Durfee,
"The Relationship of Philosophy, Theology, and Religion,"
Journal of Religion, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, (1952), pp. 188-189.]
[3] E. La B. Cherbonnier, Hardness of Heart
(New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), p. 40.
[4] Martin Luther, "Larger Catechism," in
Luther's Primary Works
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1896), p. 34.
[5] Ibid., pp. 39-40.
See also E. LaB. Cherbonnier,
"Biblical Metaphysic and Christian Philosophy,"
Theology Today, Vol. IX, No. 3 (October 1952), p. 367.
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[6] See W. T. Stace, Time and Eternity
(Princeton University Press, 1952).
[7] All quotations from the Scripture are taken from the Revised Standard Version (RSV) of the Holy Bible (NT-1946, OT-1952) unless otherwise noted. The following symbols will be used to designate other translations.
KJV King James Version, 1611 RV English Revised Version, 1881-1885 ARV American Revised Version, 1901 GNB Good News Bible, 1976 NAS New American Standard, 1971 NEB New English Bible, 1961-1970 NIV New International Version, 1978 ERS My own translation from the Greek or Hebrew
[8] John A. Hutchison, Faith, Reason, and Existence
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 28-29.
[9] "In thinking, no beginning can be made without assumptions. No matter how
basic the problem, there is not [sic]
absolute starting point behind which there remains nothing to be defined."
[Marten Ten Hoor, "The Role of the Philosopher,"
Philosophical Review, LVI (1947), p. 510.]
[10] "Reasoning never occurs in the abstract. It is always the activity of an
individual mind. It can never be separated from the crucial experience of a
particular living person."
[Edward Thomas Ramsdell, The Christian Perspective
(New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950), p. 31.]
[11] E. LaB. Cherbonnier, op. cit., p. 39. Philosophy, ancient and modern, has either overlooked or ignored this relation (See E. LaB. Cherbonnier, pp. 45-48.).
[12] "A reader of the higher class of works in German theology¾especially those
that deal with the philosophy of religion¾cannot fail to be struck with the
constant recurrence of a word for which he finds it difficult to find a
precise equivalent in English. It is the word 'Weltanschauung,' sometimes
interchanged with another compound of the same signification, 'Weltansicht.'
Both words mean literally 'view of the world,' but whereas the phrase in
English is limited by associations which connect it predominantly with the
physical nature, in German the word is not thus limited, but has almost the
force of a technical term, denoting the widest view which the mind can take
of things in the effort to grasp them together as a whole from the standpoint
of some particular philosophy or theology."
[James Orr, The Christian View of God and the World
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1947), p. 3.]
[13] "Whatever a man worships as the supremely important defines his
perspective."
[Edward Thomas Ramsdell, op. cit., pp. 32, 33. Italics are his.]
[14] Many philosophers use the terms "world-view" and "philosophy" synomymously
(cf. Brightman, Kattsoff). This seems to me to lead to much confusion. A
philosophy (in distinction from philosophy as an intellectual activity) is an
intellectual construction about those aspects of the whole of reality which
are characteristic of it as a whole such as knowledge, value and being. A
philosophy is the result of an intellectual activity, whereas a world-view is
the point of view given with one's ultimate commitment. Thus to use these
terms interchangeably is to confuse these two very different things. This,
however, is not intended to deny that there is a positive relation between
them. The character given to the whole of reality by a world-view implies a
definite position with regard to those aspects of the whole of reality which
are characteristic of it as a whole. This position comes to intellectual
expression in a philosophy. For further discussion on this point see
H. A. Durfee, op. cit., footnote 10, p. 197.