A CHRISTIAN VIEW OF WESTERN THOUGHT AND CULTURE

Introduction:
There are two views of western thought and culture; they are called
The One-root View and
The Two-root View.
The Two-root View is the Christian View of Western Thought and Culture.

1. The One-root View.
   The usually accepted view of western intellectual history and culture is that introduced by the French philosopher, Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Besides being the founder of the philosophy called positivism and introducing the new science of sociology for which he is called the "the father of sociology," Comte gave an interpretation of Western intellectual history which may by way of contrast be called the One-root View. Although it has been modified and elaborated by others, this view essentially holds that Western intellectual history and culture has only one root or source, the Graeco-Roman. According this view, Western intellectual history originated among the Greeks and developed in a series of three stages: the theological or religious stage, the metaphysical or philosophical stage, and the positive or scientific stage.

   The first of these stages was divided into three steps: animism in which everything was believed to be alive with spirits, polytheism in which different gods have control over different domains of the world like the sky, the sea or the earth, and monotheism in which these many gods are fused into one supreme deity. Religion evolved through these three steps during the theological or religious stage. Among the Greeks, the animistic step developed very early into the polytheistic step of the Homeric mythology and the popular Greek gods. This step persisted until the coming of the monotheism of Christianity at the beginning of the Middle Ages. Gradually the theological stage was replaced by the metaphysical or philosophical stage in which the previous spirits or gods are depersonalized and become abstract forces and ideas. This development began among the Greeks in the 6th century B.C. with the Milesian philosophers, Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, and came to a climax in Plato and Aristotle. After a relapse into the theological or religious stage with Christianity during the Dark Ages (5th century through the 13th century), Western thought moved forward again into the metaphyical stage with the medieval scholastics. The third and ultimate stage began with Copernicus in the 16th century. This scientific stage, in which we now are, was called by Comte the positive stage because he believed that in the scientific laws we have the only form of positive knowledge.

   Because of the obvious historical inadequacies of this interpretation and its failure to recognize and do justice to the other root or source of western intellectual history and culture, the Hebrew-Christian root, we believe that this One-root View should be replace with a more adequate Two-root View.

2. The Two-root View.
   Western thought and culture, as we know it today, had its origin not only among the Greeks but also among the Hebrews; it may be said to have two-roots or sources: the Greek-Roman and the Hebrew-Christian. This Two-root View of Western intellectual history and culture has three phases:
   1. the origin of Western thought and culture in the two different views of reality among the Greeks and the Hebrews in the Ancient World,
   2. the attempted synthesis of these two views in the Middle Ages, and
   3. the disintegration of this synthesis in the Modern Age.
   Let us discuss these three phases in greater detail.
   1. The Origin of Western Intellectual History.
      Each of these two roots involved a fundamentally different and mutually exclusive ultimate commitment. And associated with each of these ultimate commitments is a characteristic world view or view of reality which is grounded in and implied by these two distinctive ultimate commitments. We shall summarize here these two views of reality in order to bring out their differences and incompatiblity which arise from the mutually exclusive ultimate commitments:
      Hebrews-Christian world view and the
      Greek-Roman world view.
      1. The Hebrew-Christian view of reality.
         This view of reality is grounded in an ultimate commitment to the personal Creator God who manifested Himself in Jesus Christ and reveals Himself by the Holy Spirit. This revelation is recorded in the Old and New Testaments of the Bible. The personal God who has revealed Himself in this way exists as three persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. This triune personal Being exists independent of the world and is its Creator. The Hebrew-Christian view of reality makes a fundamental ontological distinction between the Creator and the Creation; God is the sovereign Creator of all things, of the world and man, and all things are His free creation.

         Man was created by God and, in contrast to the rest of creation, was created in the image of God, who is Jesus Christ, the God-man (Col. 1:13-15; compare II Cor. 4:4). Man, as created by God, is a personal being, a unity of spirit [person] and body (see Gen. 2:7), having dominion over creation and fellowship with another equal human being (woman). Man's existence as a person is also to be found not in his reason but in his limited free will and decision. And since decisions involve a reference to an ultimate criterion beyond the self, to a god, the Bibical view of man is that he is a religious animal, a being who must have a god.

         The first man Adam and his wife Eve used their freedom to disobey God and choose a false god, wisdom and knowledge; that is, Reason. The basic sin is turning from the true God and to faith in a false god of some kind; it is idolatry. Sin is any choice contrary to ultimate allegiance or faith in the true God. The consequence of Adam's sin was death: physical death (the separation of their spirits from their bodies) and spiritual death (the separation of their spirits from God). In other words, they lost their fellowship with God and with each other and their dominion over creation. But even though they have fallen from the image of God, they still are persons and still have the freedom of choice.

         The descendants of Adam are born not in the image of God but in the image of Adam, the man of dust, the old man, and as such are subject to death, physical and spiritual. Death has been inherited by all men. And since they have been born into the world spiritually dead, alienated from God, not knowing the true God, and since they must have a god, an ultimate criterion of decision, they choose a false god and thereby sin. The creation, man himself, contains a knowledge about the true God which leaves them without excuse for the sin of idolatry. But this knowledge is about the true God and is not a personal knowledge of the true God which comes from fellowship with God.

         Salvation is the restoration of fellowship and communion with God through the historical death, bodily resurrection and exaltation of Jesus Christ and the coming of the Holy Spirit. God in His love for man has sent His Son into the world to become a man - Jesus Christ. He is the image of God, the perfect man. But He came not just to be what man should have been or to give man a perfect example but to give them life and restore them to the image of God. He did this by entering into their condition of spiritual and physical death on the cross. So that as Christ was raised from the dead, they might be made alive with Him in His resurrection. That is, Christ's death was their death and His resurrection is their resurrection. That is, salvation is basically from death to life. Also, Jesus Christ was exalted to the right hand of God as Lord to become their Lord and their God. God has sent the Holy Spirit to save man from death and sin by revealing Him personally to them in the preaching of the gospel, the good news of what God has done for man in Jesus Christ's death and resurrection, of Jesus Christ as their Savior who died for them and as their resurrected and living Lord. When a man responds to this revelation by turning from his false gods (repentance) and turning to the true God, acknowledging Jesus as his Lord (faith) he is saved from sin. And since in this decision of faith he receives the living Christ as his life and identifies himself with the death and resurrection of Christ, a man is also saved from spiritual death, being made spiritually alive to God in Christ. Thus man is now being restored to the image of God.

         But this restoration is not now yet complete. At the second coming of Jesus Christ (Acts 1:9) the believers' bodies will be resurrected if they die before He comes (I Thess. 4:14-17), or will be transformed into bodies like His resurrected body if they are alive at His coming (I Cor. 15:51-52; Phil. 3:20-21; I John 3:2). Thus physical death will be replaced with physical life just as spiritual death was replaced with spiritual life when they first believed. What was begun at conversion will be brought to completion (Phil. 1:6) at Christ's coming. Spiritual life will become eternal life - eternal fellowship with the Father, the Son and Holy Spirit (heaven) (Rev. 21:3). Thus will man be restored to the image of God. And their salvation is from death (both spiritual and physical) unto life, from sin (idolatry - trust in false gods) unto righteousness (trust in the true God), will be completed.

      2. The Greek-Roman view of reality.
         This world view is grounded in an ultimate commitment to Reason, the universal and necessary. This religious foundation of classical Greek philosophy is usually denied or ignored by most writers and philosophers. [1] But Greek philosophy like all philosophy is involved with, grounded in, and carried on consciously or unconsciously from within a religious commitment. And this is essentially what classical Greek philosophy involved. Even though it was a rejection of the popular Homeric polytheistic religion, this does not mean that Greek philosophy is non-religious. "Greek thought did not cease to be religious when it became philosophical." [2] The interest of the pre-Socratic philosophers was not, or not primarily, scientific but theological. They abondoned the myths of the Homeric poets and rejected the then popular Homeric polytheistic religion, not because these were unscientific but because they presented an unworthy picture of the Divine. "The Being or Nature which philosophy sought to reach was thought of as a worthier conception of the divine than that presented by the anthropomorphic gods." [3] The religious language and the concepts of the pre-Socratics are not just relics of the pre-scientific way of thought, not yet outgrown, but the expression of their fundamental religious orientation. As Werner Jaeger says in his Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, "Though philosophy means the death of the old gods, it is itself religion." [4] And this religion is a religion of Reason. This became explicit in the teaching of Socrates. Socrates lived and taught the ultimacy of Reason and was executed in 399 B.C. for nothing less than the crime of rationalism - an act of destroying the gods by reason. [5] But he was only substituting for faith in one set of gods faith in another god - Reason. Plato was inspired by his teacher Socrates to the same faith.

         The divine, according to the Greek conception of reality, is that which is not subject to change, decay or death; the gods in Homer are "immortals." The divine, therefore, cannot be known through the senses because that which is known through the senses is a world characterized by change, decay or death. But since the objects of reason are always and everywhere the same, the divine can be known through reason. This eternal, unchanging realm of the Ideas, the Universals, the objects of Reason, are the divine.

         "Plato does not hesitate to use religious language of this knowing.
         He says that both reason in man and the objects of reason are divine,
         and speaks of the kinship of one with other." [6]

         With this conception of the divine, Aristotle is basically in agreement
         but without the use of the religious language. He says,

         "For while thought is held to be the most divine of things
         observed by us, the question how it must be situated
         in order to have that character involves difficulties." [7]

         After discussing these difficulties, he concludes,

         "Therefore it must be of itself that divine thought thinks
         (since it is the most excellent of things)
         and its thinking is a thinking on thinking." [8]

         This self-thinking thought is the divine. Thus both Plato and Aristotle held reason to be divine. God is the divine or eternal realm of the Ideas in Plato's philosophy, or he is a self-thinking thought of Aristotle's philosophy.
         1. The Eleatics.
            The Greek-Roman view of reality had its origin with the Eleactic school of early Greek thinkers who lived during the 6th and 5th centuries B.C. at Elea in southern Italy. The oldest of the Eleatics was Xenophanes, a wandering rhapodist, who was born about 570 B.C. at Colophon in western Asia Minor, on the Aegean Sea, and migrated to Elea in southern Italy probably because of the Persian invasions in about 546 B.C. He died about 470 B.C.. Little is known of his philosophy; he wrote several poems of which only 108 lines have surived. He rejected the Greek polytheism, attacking the anthromorphism of the Greek gods. He sets forth the doctrine that there is only one ultimate reality, "One god, supreme among the gods and men, and not like mortals in body and mind." This being does not have sense organs like men's, but "the whole of him sees, the whole of him thinks, the whole of him hears." He sets in motion all things by the power of his mind; he always remains in the same place, moving not at all; he is ominpresent, not needing to move.

            The true founder of the Eleatic school is not Xenophanes, but Parmenides of Elea (c. 515 B.C.- c. 450 B.C.). He is probably the most important philosopher before Socrates, being the first to focus on the central problem of metaphysics, the problem of being. He held that "thought and being are the same thing," and that "being is and it is impossible for it not to be; it is impossible that non-being is." That is, being exists and non-being does not exist. Being is ungenerated and indestructible. It cannot come into being out of what does not exist. Neither can it cease to be, since being is not non-being. Hence being is eternal. Change is impossible; for if anything changes, it ceases to be what it is and becomes what it is not; and since being cannot cease to be and non-being does not exist, change is impossible. And also movement is impossible; for if anything moves, it must occupy empty space where it was not; and since empty space is non-being and does not exist, movement is not possible. And there can only be one being; for if there were more than one thing, they would have to be separated by empty space; since empty space is non-being and does not exist, they cannot be separated and thus must occupy the same space; thus the many are one and being is one. Finally being is homogeneous, not having parts; for if it has parts, then it would be many; but since being is one, it has no parts and thus is homogeneous. From this Paramenides argued that being is finite, like the surface of a sphere it is "perfected on every side," equally distance from its center at every point. Paramenides' student, Mellisus of Samos (5th cent. B.C.), rejected his teacher's conclusion that being is finite. Mellisus argued that being must be spatially and temporally infinite. For if being is finite, then beyond it there would be empty space; but since empty space is nothing, non-being, it does not exist and thus being occupies all space. Thus being is spatially infinite. Mellisus, like Parmenides, rejected a void or vacuum, empty space, as impossible and non-existent, "for what is empty is nothing. What is nothing cannot be." Another philosopher, Zeno of Elea (c. 490-430 B.C.) was a firm adherent to Parmenides's ideas and tried to show that they are true by showing their opposites are impossible and absurd (reductiones ad absurdum). By this form of argument, he attempted to show that pluralism (that reality is many, not one), empty space, time and motion are impossible. These famous arguments are known as Zeno's Paradoxes.

         2. Platonism.
            Plato (428-348 B.C.) in his dialogue Parmenides describes a meeting in Athens of Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates. Though the meeting is probably fictitious there is no reason why the issues discussed should be ignored. In this dialogue Plato discussed the concept of the One, ostensibly without conclusion. In one passage, he asserts hypothetically that if the One existed, it would be ineffable and unknowable. Whether this assertion was supposed to reveal the contradictory and, therefore, unacceptable character of the One, or to express Plato's acceptance of this assertion about the character of the One, is debatable. In the dialogue the Sophist, the problem of negative judgments is handled in such a way that it is not possible to make Parmenides' mistake of supposing that what is not does not exist. In his dialogues, Plato divides all reality into the realm of forms or ideas (intelligibles) and the realm of sensibles, treating the intelligibles alone as that which really is (Greek, ousia, "being") and implying that they are eternal and unchanging. One of these ideas, the idea of the Good, Plato elevated above the others, calling it "beyond being" (Greek, epekeina ousias). He compares it to the sun as the source of being and knowledge of all beings. In a lecture (or course of lectures), Plato seems to have identified the Good with the One. As to the realm of the sensibles, Plato in his dialogue Timaeus explains the origin of the cosmos in the form of a myth as the work of a divine artisan or demiurge (Greek, demiourgos, "craftsman") who uses the realm of Ideas, forming out of them something Plato calls the "receptacle," which is void of any qualities. Then the ideas in some way enter this void and by so doing form the rudiments of the four elements. In addition to the formation of the physical world, the demiurge also forms a cosmic soul and the immortal part of individual souls. Both of these consist of a mixture of the same ingredients, on which mixture the demiurge imposes a numerical and geometrical structure.

         3. Neo-Platonism.
            Neo-Platonism, as the name suggests, begin with teachings of Plato and develops it in distinctive manner. It holds that Being is God, the One, an eternal principle of unity. The One is completely separated from all things, the many, but is the source of all things as being. This transcendent being is related to all things by a series of intermediaries, which are derived from the One by the principle of emanation. In this view, reality is a graded series from the divine One being to the material world and man, who has in him some part of the divine and thus longs for union with the eternal source of things. The Egyptian-Roman philosopher Plotinus (A.D. 205-270) interpreted these emanations as logical, not temporal, progressions from the divine One into non-being and occurs by the refulgence of the original principle. According to him there are three levels of emanation:
            (1) Nous (Mind or Intellegence), in which is Plato's realm of Ideas or forms, which is the reflection of the One into multiplicity;
            (2) Psyche or Soul, which, like Plato's divine artisan, the demiurge, who is the principle of life and active intelligence, uses the forms as the patterns on the formation of the world;
            (3) Hyle or Matter itself, which, when devoid of form, is next to nothing or non-being. The evil in world and in man is due to this material principle.
            Man, combining in himself the material and spiritual principles, is in a uncomfortable position. He longs for the eternal forms and for the One, but is imprisoned in a body. He looks for liberation in comtemplation, both intellectual and spiritual, and by a mystical union with the divine.

            Plotinus was born in Egypt and studied in Alexandria under Ammonius Saccas. After accompanying the emperior Gordian on a campaign in the East, he settled in Rome about 244, opening his own school. He wrote essays for his students about their philosophical discussions. His pupil, Porphyry, collected these and arranged them systematically into six Enneads [groups of nine], that are the major source of Plotinus' philosophy. Porphyry published the Enneads after A.D. 300 with an accompanying Life of Plotinus. Prophyry reports that Plotinus had a mystical experience of union with the divine on four occasions, which union is described in the Enneads and is one of classics of mysticism.

            In the fourth and fifth Christian centuries, Neoplatonism provided the philosophical basis for pagan opposition to Christianity. Prophyry, in addition to his numerious philosophical treatises, wrote a massive fifteen volume work, now lost, Against the Christians. The Roman emperor, Julian, in addition to decrees against Christians, wrote Against the Galileans, which can be reconstructed from Cyril of Alexandria's refutation of it. In addition to providing the philosophical basis for this opposition, Neoplatonism also provided the philosophical framework for the thought of several Christian theologians: Gregory of Nyssa, Victorinus, Ambrose, Augustine, and later Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite. The influence of Neoplatonism continued in both the Western and Eastern churches. Even in the twentieth century, elements of it has appeared in the thought of Paul Tillich.

         4. Aristotelianism
            According to Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), a student of Plato, "first philosophy" investigates being. It is the science of being as being. The special sciences investigate particular parts of being; zoology, for example, deals with animals and physics with the motion of bodies. But "first philosophy," later called ontology (literally, "the study of being") has being in general as its subject matter, without primary reference to some particular kind of being. Aristotle says,

            "There is a science which investigates Being as Being
            and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature.
            Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences;
            for none of these treats universally of Being as Being.
            They cut off a part of Being and investigate the attributes of this part."

            Aristotle divides being into two kinds:
            (a) immutable or changeless being and
            (b) mutable or changing being.
            The study of the second kind, mutable being - which, according to Aristotle, is the only kind we see in the world about us - belongs to the subject matter of the philosophy of nature or physics [Gr. phusis, "nature"]. The study of the first kind of being, immutable being, belongs to the subject matter of metaphysics [Gr. meta, "after", and phusis, "nature"; that is, "after or beyond physics"] and theology; for there is only one being "eternal and immovable" and that is God.

            Aristotle derived this dual classification of being from his teacher, Plato, who held that "true being" was something not subject to change and decay. According to Plato, our world of the senses displays only becoming; everything in it is coming into being and going out of being; nothing really is. Only that which is changeless is real, thought Plato; reality is permanent and immutable. Plato held that these two primary modes of being, permanence and change, that are separate and distinct from each other. The permanent is the realm of Ideas or forms, apprehended by the mind only, and the changing is the realm of the sensibles, apprehended by the senses.

            Aristotle rejected this dualism of being, but accepted the distinction between the two kinds of being. Aristotle combined these two kinds being in the concept of "substance." He introduces the distinction between "substance" and "accident"; a substance or thing has relatively independent being from other things, whereas accidents or qualities have no independent being, but exist in a substance. Blue and hard are not like houses and rocks. These qualities must "inhere" in a substance; they qualify the substances. Now substances, in some fundamental way, remain the same, although their qualities may change; that is, substances retain their identity through change. A house may be white or red, but even if the color of house changes, the house remains a house; its identity is perserved through the change. Substance, then, represent the relatively permanent side of reality and qualities the changing side. Instead of separating the permanent from the changing, as Plato did, Aristote unites them in things as substances and their accidents or qualities.

            But how is change possible, if the permanent is primary, more important, "realer," while change is secondary, less important, less real? Aristotle attempts to solve this problem by introducing the distinct between "form" and "matter," in which he interprets "matter" as potentially and "form" as actuality. According to Aristotle, change is the process of going from potential to actual. The block of stone is potentially a statue and the statue is the actualization of this potential. Matter is potentiality and form is actuality. Aristotle combined form and matter in a series from prime matter to pure form; the form of a lower level is the matter of the higher level. At the top of this hierarchy of form and matter is pure form, pure actuality, pure being, God.

         5. Stoicism.

   2. The Attempted Synthesis in the Middle Ages.
      As Christianity spread thoughout the Roman world, the Biblical view of reality came into conflict with the Greek view of reality. Attempts were made to resolve this conflict by trying to synthesize these two views of reality.
      There were two major attempts at this synthesis:
      the Augustinian synthesis by Aurelius Augustine (A.D. 354-430) in the 5th century and
      the Thomistic synthesis by Thomas Aquinas (A.D. 1225-1274) in the 12th century.

      	Hebrew-Christian	Medieval Synthesis	Greek-Roman
      God	Creator	Supernatural - Grace	The rational
      World	Created	Natural - Nature	The non-rational
      Man	spirit (person) & body	spirit (moral) & soul (rational) & body (animal)	mind (rational) & body (non-rational)

      1. The Augustinian Synthesis (5th to 12th centuries).
         Augustinianism is the philosophy of Aurelius Augustinus, better known at Saint Augustine, and of his followers. He was born at Tagaste in the Province of Numidia of North Africa on November 13th, A.D. 354; his father, Patricius, was a pagan and his mother, Monica, was a devoted Christian; she brought him up as a Christian but his baptism was deferred, as was the practice of the time. He learned the rudiments of Latin and arithmetic and a little Greek. In A.D. 370, the year his father died after becoming a Christian, Augustine began the study of rhetoric at Carthage and broke with Christian teaching and morals, taking a mistress, with whom he lived for ten years and by whom he had a son in his second year at Carthage. He became a follower of the teaching of the Manicheans. The Manicheans, founded by a Persian named Mani, taught a dualism of two ultimate principles, a principle of good that is the light, God or Ormuzd, and a principle of evil that is the darkeness, Ahriman. These principles are eternal and are engaged in an eternal strife, which is reflected in the world and in man. Man's soul is composed of light, the principle of the good, while the body, composed of grosser matter, is the work of the principle of evil, darkness. This religio-philosophic system commended itself to Augustine because it seemed to explain the problem of evil and because of its materialism, since he could not yet conceive how there could be an immateral reality. Although the Manicheans condemned sexual intercourse and the eating animal flesh and prescribed various ascetic practices, such as fasting, for the "elect," but not for the "hearers," Augustine did not follow them, being only a "hearer." Eventually Augustine became dissatisfied with Manichean when it was not able to answer his questions and difficulties with its teachings. After returning to Tagaste in A.D. 374, he taught rhetoric and Latin Literature for a year. He then returned to Carthage to open a school of rhetoric; but becoming frustrated with his students, he went to Rome in A.D. 383 and started another school of rhetoric. Although giving up belief in the teachings of Manicheans, being attracted to Academic skepticism, he retained an outward adherence to Manicheanism, still accepting its materialism. Having obtained a position at Milan of municipal professor of rhetoric in A.D. 384, he moved to Milan and finally broke with the Manicheans through the influence of his new friends in Milan, the Bishop Ambrose and the circle of Christian Neo-Platonist around him. He got the answers to his questions about Manichean doctrine, and encountered a more satisfying interpretation of Christianity than he had previously found in the simple, unintellectual faith of his mother. The Neo-Platonic teaching of evil as privation, non-being, rather than as second kind of being, showed him how the problem of evil could be solved without recourse to the Manichean dualism. In this Christianized Neo-Platonism, he believed he found the truth and he began to read the New Testament, particularly Paul's letter to the Romans. After a intense moral struggle, in the summer of A.D. 386, while he was sitting in the garden of his friend Alypius' house, weeping, he heard a child's voice outside singing the words, "Tolle lege! Tolle lege!" [Take up and read! Take up and read!]. He picked up the New Testament and, opening it at random, his eyes lighted on Romans 13:13b-14:

         "not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chanbering and wantonness,
         not in strife and envying. But put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ,
         and make no provision for the flesh, to fulfill the lusts thereof."

         He tells us later,

         "No further would I read, nor had I any need; instantly,
         at the end of this sentence, a clear light flooded my heart
         and all the darkness of doubt vanished away."

         On Holy Saturday of A.D. 387 Augustine was baptized by Bishop Ambrose and soon after returned to North Africa in A.D. 388. He was ordained a priest in A.D. 391 and was consecrated Bishop of Hippo in A.D. 396. He wrote extensively against the Donatist and the Pelagains. He died on August 28th, A.D. 430.

         Although Augustine wrote against pagan philosophy, he still showed a strong predilection for Neo-Platonism. There is a depreciation of sense-objects in comparison with eternal and immaterial realities; a grudging admission of practical knowledge as a necessity of life; the insistence on "theoretic" contemplation and purification of the soul and liberation from the slavery of the senses. Philosophically this predilection is shown in the Platonic and Neo-Platonic view that the objects of the senses, corporeal things, are inferior to the human intellect, which judges them with reference to objective standard as falling short. These standards are the immutable and eternal universal ideas or forms. The standards of goodness and beauty, for example, correspond to Plato's first principles or archai, the exemplary ideas, and the ideal geometrical figures correspond to Plato's mathematical objects, ta mathematika, the objects of the dianoia.

         To the question, which was asked of the Platonic Ideas, "Where are these ideas?", Augustine answers that they are in the mind, the Nous, of God, they are the thoughts of God. The Neo-Platonics made this suggestion and Augustine apparently accepted it as the answer to the question: Where are they? Augustine does not accept the emanation theory of Neo-Platonism, where the Nous emanates from the One as the first hypostasis. But the exemplar ideas and eternal, immutable truths are in God. This theory must be accepted, Augustine argues, if one wishes to avoid having to say that God created the world unintelligently. Thus creation is like Plato's formation of the sense-world by the divine artisan, the demiurge, except that there is no pre-existent matter; God created it out of nothing.

         Thus the world of creatures reflect and manifests God, even if it does in a very inadequate way. The order and unity of creatures, their positive reality, reveals the goodness of God and the order and stability of the universe manifest the wisdom of God. But God, as the self-existent, eternal and immutable Being, is infinite and, as infinite, is incomprehensible. God is His own Perfection and is "simple," without parts, so that His wisdom and knowledge, His goodness and power, are His own essence, which is without accidents. God, therefore, transcends space in virtue of His spiritually and simplicity, as He transends time in virtue of His eternity.

         "... He is above all things.
         So too He is in no interval nor extension in time,
         but in His immutable eternity he is older than all things
         because He is before all things and younger than all things
         because He is after all things."

         From all eternity, God knew all things which He was to make. He does not know them because He has made them, but rather the other way around. God first knew the things of creation before they came into being in time. The species of created things have their ideas or rationes seminales or "seminal reasons" in the things themselves and also in the Divine Mind as rationes aeternae, as "eternal reasons" or ideas. God from all eternity saw in Himself, as possible reflections of Himself, the things which He could create and would create. He knew them before creation as they are in Him, as the Exemplar, but He made them as they exist, that is, as external and finite reflections of His divine essence. Since God did nothing without knowledge, He foresaw all that He would make, but His knowledge is not distinct acts of knowledge, but "one eternal, immutable and ineffable vision." In virtue of this eternal act of knowledge, of vision, to which nothing is past or future, that God sees, "foresees," even the free acts of men, knowing them "beforehand." This exemplarist doctrine passed into the Middle Ages and was taken as characteristic of Augustinianism.

      2. The Thomistic Synthesis (A.D. 13th to 15th centuries).
         The Medieval philosopher-theologian, Thomas Aquinas (A.D. 1225-1274), attempted to bring Aristotelian philosophy into the framework of the Christian faith. He was born in the vicinity of Naples, Italy. After studying under both the Benedictines and the Dominicans, he joined the Benedictine order in 1243. He studied with Albertus Magnus (1206-1280) in Paris (1245-1248) and in Cologne (1248-1252). Albertus Magnus, or Albert the Great, translated Aristotle from Greek and Arabic manuscripts and wrote commentaries in which he interpreted Aristotle to the Christian Western mind. In fact his interpretation of Aristotle was an attempt to fused Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, which had dominated Christian Western thinking since Augustine. In 1252, Thomas Aquinas returned to Paris to studied at the faculty of theology in the University of Paris, where in 1256 he was given the licentia docendi in theology and he taught theology until 1259. From 1259 to 1269 he was advisor to the papal curia or court in Rome. He returned to the University of Paris in 1269 to stem the tide against Averroism.

         Averroism was that form of Aristotelian philosophy based on the commentaries of Aristotle written by the Arabic philosopher Averroes (Mohammed ibn Roshd) (1126-1198), whose Latin name was a corruption of Ibn Roshd. His commentaries became known to Western scholars in their translations by Michael Scottus, Hermannus Alemannus, and others at the beginning of the 13th century. Albertus Magnus relied heavily on Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle, while noting certain difficulties. The teachings of Averroes became the basis for a whole school of philosophers, represented first by the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris, among whom the most prominent was Siger of Brabant. No philosophy was more often condemned in the Middle Ages by church leaders and councils than Averroism. It was condemned in 1209, 1215, 1240, 1270, and 1277. It was condemned for its teachings that held that
         (1) matter is eternal (God and the world are co-eternal),
         (2) the absence of personal immortality (the numerical identity of the intellect of all men), and
         (3) the doctrine of double truth (that a proposition may be true in philosophy and false in theology).

         Aquinas, relying on the translation of Aristotle by William of Moerbecke, criticized Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle.

         • On the first point, Thomas argued that there is no philosophical proof, either for the co-eternity of God and the world or against it; but the creation of the world is an article of the faith.
         • On the second point, Thomas argued that the unity of the intellect of all men should be rejected, since it is incompatible with the true concept of person and with personal immortality.
         • On the third point, it is doubtful whether Averroes himself held to the double truth theory; but it was taught by the Latin Averrosts, who, not withstanding the opposition of the Roman Church and the Thomistic philosophers, gained great influence and soon dominated many universities, especially in Italy at the University of Padua. Thomas and his followers were convinced that they had interpreted Aristotle correctly and that the Averroists had misinterpreted Aristotle; Aristotle did not teach the double truth theory. Truth is one, but there are two ways to discover it: by revelation of it in the Bible and by reason in the writings of Aristotle. Where the two are contrary to each other, the truths of revelation are to be accepted and the results of reason are to be modified to conform to the truths of revelation.

         From 1272 Aquinas taught at the University of Naples. He died on March 7, 1274 on the way to the Council of Lyons. Aquinas was canonized in 1326, made a Doctor of the Church in 1567, and Pope Leo XIII (Aetrni Patris) gave his philosophy official status in 1879.

         At the heart of Aquinas' philosophy is his concept of being. And to understand being, reason must use the principle of analogy to fix the appropriate meaning of the term. And since there are certain "transcendental" terms that go beyond any genus, and apply to everything that is, they are attributes of everything. These transcendentals are ens (being), res (thing), unum (unity), aliquid (distinction), verum (true), bonum (good). All beings (ens) are things (res) with unity (unum), distinguished (aliquid) from what is not themselves. And since all beings are what they are, in relation to knowledge, they are true (verum). And since all beings tend toward their ends or goals, they are good (bonum). When the principle of analogy is applied to these transcendentals, human reason can begin to understand, within limits, the nature of God. The kind of analogy to be used here is the analogy of proportionality; that is,

         The properties of x             The properties of y
             are to              as          are to   
            x's being                       y's being
         

         By the use of this analogy of proportionality, human reason can begin to understand how God's being exceeds any other being by comparing the properties of being. Since there are five properties of being, there are five ways to establish this comparison. From this comparison, there arises the idea of a perfect being, God. God is perfect and unchanging being, utterly simple (without parts) and unitary, hence indestructible, absolute truth and goodness, not related to the world, yet everything in the world related to Him. Since the divine mind contains the archetypes of all things, simply in knowing Himself God is able to know at once all that is, was, or will be. In His self-knowledge, all time is concentrated in an eternal moment, in a totum simul. Aquinas argued that while God is the primary cause of all things, there are secondary causes and among these secondary causes some are necessary and others are contingent. Thus free will is compatible with God's foreknowledge and God's causation of all things.

         At the heart of Aquinas' ontology is the real distinction between essence and existence in all finite beings. Aristotle distinguished between actuality and potentiality, but he applied this to form and matter, not to the order of being. Aquinas argued that only God is pure being, pure actuality (actus purus), with no potentiality whatsoever. That is, God's being is from Himself, not from another. He has aseitas in contrast to those beings that have derived their being from another. Thus God is necessary being, because God's essence (what He is) and existence (that He is) are identical, hence He cannot fail to exist. In finite creatures, their essence (what they are) is separate from their existence (that they are). Aristotle does not make or use this distinction between essence and existence; Aquinas introduced this distinction because it allowed him to explain the difference between God and the angels. Angels are pure forms like God, but their essence and existence are not identical, unlike God whose essence and existence are identical. According to Exodus 3:14, God revealed Himself as the "I am". Aquinas interpreted this to mean that God alone is Being (I-Am-ness). Everything else has being. God's essence is identical to His existence; that is, it is of His essence that He exists. Thus God is a necessary being, not a contingent being like everything else; He cannot not exist. Neither can God change, since He is without potentiality to be anything other than he is. Likewise, God is eternal, timeless, since time implies a change from a before to an after. But as the I-am, God has no before and no after. God is also simple (indivisible), since He has not potential for division. And he is infinite, since pure act as such is unlimited, having no potentiality. Thus God is perfect Being.

         Aquinas views reality as a hierarchical pyramid of being. Like Aristotle, he viewed the lowest level of reality as pure matter, without form, that is, prime matter, and the highest level as pure form, without matter, that is, God. God is regarded as pure actuality, Prime matter, on the other hand, is viewed as pure potentiality. But Aquinas also held that since prime matter cannot exist by itself, it is dependent upon form for its existence in a concrete individual substance. Since form, on the other hand, is not dependent upon anything for it to exist, it can exist from itself and indeed as pure form it must exist. But in Aquinas' view, prime matter does not exist; it has only the potentiality of existence. God, on the hand, does exist and cannot avoid existing. Like Aristotle, Aquinas held that between these extremes there are to be found various levels of formed matter, the order of nature. Concrete individual substances are constituted of the abstract metaphysical elements of form and matter. Aristotle described substance as the union of form and matter. For example, man is the substantial union of form (mind or intellect) and matter (body).

         By contrast the Augustinians of the thirteenth century held that man is the union of two different substances, the intellectual soul and the material body; a man is a soul in a body. That is, there is gap between the intellectual soul and the material body, which for Bonaventure is the guarantee of the soul's spirituality and its immortality. Albert the Great somewhat closed the gap by asserting that there is one substantial form between the soul and the body, the form of corporeity. The soul, he tells us, can be viewed either in itself, as an intellectual substance, or as a form exercising the function of animating a body. The first view, defining the soul's very nature, he attributes to Plato; the second, describing one of its external and accidental functions, he attributes to Aristotle. Here Albert was simply following the Arabic philosopher Avicenna (980-1037), who had already tried to reconcile the two Greek philosophers in this way. What neither Avicenna nor Albert could see by considering the soul as a substance in another substance such as the body, was the relation between them is purely extrinsic and accidental. Now this view did safeguard the independence of the soul from matter and its immortality; but it is difficult to see how, under these circumstances, man is anything more than an accidental aggregate of soul and body. Thomas Aquinas saw this problem. The view of the Aristotelians and Averroism, on the one hand, threatened the independence of the soul from the body and the immortality of the soul; but, on the other hand, the view of the Augustinians and the Avicennians threatened the unity of man.

         Albert the Great considered soul and body as radically distinct because he thought of each as an essence which by definition differs from each other. The Avicennian world is composed of essences of this sort, each of which corresponds to a definition and includes only what is contained in its definition. Whatever is outside the definition is accidental to it. For example, when we define man as a rational animal, nothing is said about his individuality and universality; these are accidental to the essence of man as such, so that it can be individual in Peter and Paul and universal in the concept we form of it in our mind. In addition, although the definition of a thing tells us what it is, it does not say whether it exists or does not exist. That is, existence itself is not included in the essence of a thing but is accidental to it. This is true of everything except God, whose essence includes his existence. William of Auvergne (1180-1249) adopted from Avicenna this view of the accidentality of existence and used it to explain the contingency of created being. For, he reasoned, if essence of God is existence, all other things must receive existence as an accident of their essence. Existence, then, is given them as a gift and they are contingent in their very being. Albert the Great expressed this same view, but Aquinas transformed and used it for his own purposes.

         Thomas Aquinas saw that solution to the problem of the unity of man was, not to consider essence as primary in the understanding of being, but existence. Instead of the world being composed of forms or essences, Aquinas viewed the world as consisting of individual acts of existing (esse). Existence has the primacy in the concept of being. The form of each being is that whereby it is what it is; it is the principle that specifies and determines it to be a certain kind of being. But in addition to form there is a further and ultimate act[uality] that makes it to be or to exist. This is the act of existing, which Thomas describes as "the actuality of all acts" and the "perfection of all perfections". It is the most profound in any being, its ontological nucleus, so to speak, the source of all its perfections and its intelligibilities.

         The soul when looked at from the point of view of essence or nature, it appears deficient and in need of the body, for it is only a part of the complete essence of man. But from the point of view of existence, this is not true. As a substantial form the human soul has a complete act of existing (esse), and since it is a spiritual form, its act of existing is itself spiritual. When it informs the body it communicates to it that act of existing so that there is but one substantial existence of the whole composite. For Thomas, therefore, the unity of man does not consist in a combination or assemblage of various parts or substances, but in his act of existing. This is the reason that Aquinas denied the presence of several substantial forms in man. If a substantial form gives substantial existence, several forms of this kind would give man several existences and his unity as a substance would be destroyed.

         Aquinas upheld this doctrine of being in the face of wide spread opposition from his contemporaries. On the one hand, philosophers like Siger of Brabant wished to return to the Aristotelianism of the Averroes. Siger reminded Thomas that Aristotle had written about form and matter and composition of the two in substances; he had never mentioned an esse distinct from them. On the other hand, he faced the opposition of those who admitted esse as a distinct principle of being but simply treated as an accident of essence. This had been the view of William of Auvergne and Albert the Great, who traced the concept to Avicenna. For Thomas this was still to view being as primarily essence or form and to reduce the role of existence to an accidental determination of essence. Thomas stood alone in his century and indeed in the whole Middle Ages for the doctrine of existential being.

   3. The Disintegration of the Medieval Synthesis in the Modern Age.
      Because of the basic incompatibility between the Greek and Biblical view of God and man, the two syntheses of these divergent views of reality attempted by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas disintegration in the Modern Age.
      The disintegration took the form of three revolts.
      1. First Revolt (15th to 16th century).
         1. Renaissance (15th & 16th century) -
            attempted to get back to the Classical Greek view before and apart from the Biblical view.
         2. Reformation (16th century) -
            attempted to get back to the Biblical view apart from the Classical Greek view. Luther turned against Scholastic Philosophy.
         3. Modern Physical Sciences (16th & 17th centuries) -
            rejected Greek view of physical world.
            • Pre-Newtonian (16th & 17th) -
              there was a revolt in astronomy against Aristotelian- Ptolemaic view of the universe by Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo
              and against Aristotelian physics by Galileo and Isaac Newton.
            • Newtonian (18th) -
              the Newtonian physics lead to the reign of mechanism.
            • Atomism (19th) -
              the development of atomic theory of matter in chemistry was a revolt against Aristotelian continuous view of matter.
      2. The First Modern attempts at synthesis (17th to 19th century) -
         The Age of Reason.
         1. In religion:
            • Protestant Scholasticism (17th & 18th centuries).
            • Pietism - reaction to Protestant Scholasticism.
            • Deism (18th & 19th century).
         2. In philosophy:
            • Modern rationalism (17th century)
            • Modern empiricism (18th century)
            • Common Sense Realism (18th & 19th century)
            • Kantian critical idealism (18th & 19th century)
         3. The Enlightenment or The Age of Reason (18th century)
            reasserted the rationalism of the Greek view of reality combining it with Newtonian science.
            • Modern rationalism (17th century)
            • Mechanism
            • Determinism
            • Materialism
            • Atheism
            • Moralism
      3. Second Revolt (19th century).
         1. Romanticism (19th century) -
            revolt against rationalism and mechanism of the Age of Reason.
         2. Darwinian Evolution (19th century) -
            revolt against Biblical view of the world as God's creation.
         3. In the Physical Sciences - revolt against mechanism and determinism.
            • Maxwellian Field Physics (19th) -
              the rise of field physics and the decline of mechanism.
            • Relativity and Quantum Mechanics (20th) -
              revolt against mechanism and determinism.
         4. In Religion -
            1. Protestant Liberalism (19th & 20th century)
            2. Fundamentalism - reaction to Protestiant Liberalism.
      4. The Second Modern attempts at synthesis (19th century) -
         1. Idealism reasserted the Greek view of reality, in the
         2. Absolute Idealism of Hegelianism (19th century).
      5. Third Revolt (20th century).
         1. Pragmatism (20th) - rejected modern versions of the Greek view for a practical test for truth.
         2. Naturalism (20th) - rejected modern versions of the Greek view and also the Biblical view for the evolutionary view.
         3. Logical Empiricism or Positivism (20th) - rejects modern versions of the Greek view for a empirical test for meaning or truth.
         4. Existentialism (20th) - rejects modern version of Greek view for
            1. Christian Existentialism - and for the Christian view.
               • Soren Kierkegaard.
               • Neo-Orthodoxy - Barth and Brunner.
               • Neo-Protestantism - Niebuhr and Tillich.
            2. Non-Christian Existentialism - rejects the Christian view.
               • Martin Heidegger.
               • Karl Jaspers.
               • Jean-Paul Sartre.