ONTOLOGY: THE PROBLEM OF BEING

  1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.
    The problem of being may be stated simply as follows: What is being?
    Or more precisely, which has primacy in the concept of being: essence or existence?
    Essence is what a thing is and
    Existence is that a thing is.
    Essence is given by definition.
    In defining something, one proceeds by giving
    "the genus nearest to the object being defined,
    and by giving the essential differential which sets this object off
    from the others belonging to the same genus. The object is said
    to belong to a class of objects known as the species, and
    the differential are the essential attributes of the species." [1]
    Thus to give the essence of a thing is to give its definition. This amounts to the analysis of the object to see which species it belongs to, that is, to find out what is essential attributes it has in common with other objects of a certain species. That which is definable in an object is called its essence. Thus essence and definiton are correlative terms.

    On the other hand, existence cannot be defined (in the traditional sense of giving its genus and species). Existence cannot be analyzed to find the essential attributes it has in common with other objects of a species. Existence as such, then, is indefinable. But this does not mean that it is necessarily incomprehensible.

    "....the word 'existence' carries an intelligible meaning.
    In addition it is a key-word which permeates the whole of
    human discourse and which cannot be safely ignored by any
    philosophy. Hence we must assume that existence is understood
    by virtue of a trans-rational act, an 'encounter.'" [2]
    There is evidently a real difference between essence and existence. Knowing what is the essence or the nature of a hundred dollars is not the same as knowing the existence of a hundred dollars in one's pocket to spend. The definition of the essence of a hundred dollars is different from the existence of a hundred dollars (in one's pocket).

    In giving the essence of a thing, like a hundred dollars, one does not state everything that it is. That is, for example, that it is printed on a certain kind of paper, has a certain serial number, etc. What one gives of a certain object in giving its essence is that which it has in common with all other objects like it. These common characteristics constitute the universal essence. With the addition of those other characteristics particular to an individual, the universal essence becomes a particular essence.

    What is involved in giving the universal essence of a thing is the process of abstraction. That is, certain characteristics of an object are separated from and considered apart from other or individual characteristics. Abstraction is the process of ignoring certain characteristics of an object and considering others. Abstraction combined with generalization gives us universal essences. Usually when we speak simply of essence we mean universal essence.

    Two more comparisons may be made between essence and existence.
    First, essence admits of an infinite multiplicity.

    "Essence, in every particular case, implies an infinite wealth of structure and relations. The essence of man, e.g., according to the classic definition, involves a participation in 'reason' and life, and such participation admits of degrees. A man can be more or less reasonable and accordingly he can be more or less of a man." [3]
    Thus there are an infinite multiplicity of degrees of essence. Existence, on the other hand, cannot be analyzed into degrees; it only posits an alternative. A thing exists or does not exist. There are no intermediate positions or degrees between existence and non-existence, though there may be many doubtful cases.

    Secondly, essence is the range of possibility. Essence does not imply that there must be actual instances in which it is realized. However, an essence is not impossible. An essence must be capable of being actualized in an actual instance. Existence is that which actualizes an essence.

  2. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM.
    Historically there have been two solutions proposed to this problem: essentialism and existentialism. Essentialism answers that essence has the primacy in the concept of being and existentialism answers that existence does. Essentialism says that being is an essence and existentialism says that being is an existent.

    1. Essentialism.
      Essentialism is that solution to the problem of being which gives primacy to essence in the concept of being. Accordingly being is defined as the most general and universal essence. This most general and universal essence is arrived at by the process of abstraction. By this process it is emptied of all characteristics except one, that is, to be. Being is therefore the most abstract of concepts. As the most general and abstract concept, it can be predicated of any thing. Therefore being is also defined as the most general and simple of predicates. Since it is the most general and universal essence, it is the class of all classes: summum genus. All other predicates denote sub-classes and sub-sub-classes of being. Being is therefore most universal of classes. Essentialism does not identify existence with being, since even non-existent things can be said "to be" or "to have being." Essentialism understands existence to mean to be at a certain place. As such existence is reduced to the category of place. To exist is to be in time and space. Sein is dasein. As such it is a sub-class of the class of being. "Being, then, neither presupposes nor necessarily implies existence." [4]

      Various thinkers of the late medieval and the early modern era became dissatisfied with the traditional metaphysical and theological structure. This dissatisfaction appeared in the universals controvery and in late Middle Ages in the nominalistic revolt from the Aristotelian- Thomistic philosophical theology.
      The Reformation (16th century) lent support at its beginning to this dissatisfaction. The Reformation attempted to get back to the Biblical view apart from the Classical Greek view.
      Luther turned against Scholastic Philosophy.
      However, soon after the Reformation (17th & 18th centuries),
      the Protestant theologians reverted to an Aristotelian metaphysics in support of their theological dogma. This Protestant Scholasticism was opposed by the religious movement called Pietism.
      The dissatisfaction broke into an open revolt as the experimental philosophy (as it was called in England) became stronger with ever increasing discoveries of such men as Galileo and Newton.
      The Modern Physical Sciences (16th to 20th centuries) rejected the Greek view of physical world.
      In the Pre-Newtonian period (16th & 17th), there was a revolt in astronomy against Aristotelian- Ptolemaic view of the universe by Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo
      and against Aristotelian physics by Galileo and Isaac Newton.
      In varying degrees, the philosophers with support of the discoveries of the sciences revolted from essentialism and the whole traditional philosophy built around it:

      The Enlightenment or The Age of Reason (18th century)
      reasserted the essentialistic Greek view of reality combined with Newtonian science. But in the Physical Sciences, the essentialistic Greek view of reality has been ignored and there has been a revolt against mechanism and determinism.

      In the geological and biological sciences, Darwinian Evolution (19th century) revolted against Biblical view of the world as God's creation.

      The many movements of modern philosophy have arisen and flourished because of their revolt and protest against this attempted synthesis of the essentialistic Greek view of reality with the Newtonian science.

      1. Romanticism (19th century) revolted against rationalism and mechanism of the Age of Reason.
      2. Absolute idealism (19th century)
        reasserted the essentialistic Greek view of reality in a modern form.
      3. Pragmatism (20th) rejected modern versions of the Greek view for a practical test for truth.
      4. Naturalism (20th) rejected modern versions of the Greek view as well as the Biblical view for the evolutionary view.
      5. Logical Empiricism or Positivism (20th) rejects modern versions of the Greek view for a empirical test for meaning or truth.
      6. Existentialism (20th) rejects modern version of essentialistic Greek view reality.

      This revolt from essentialism is thus the dominant theme of modern Western thought. It underlies all the scientific, ethical, political, and economic thought and action of the modern world.

      This revolt, in the physical sciences especially, placed an emphasis on physical existence -- existence of things in time and space -- rather than on essence. The particulars of physical existence are empirically apprenhended. Physical existence was something else than essence. The logical positivists have abandoned the essentialist's concept of being Thus the source of their repudiation and condemnation of metaphysics. To them metaphysics means essentialism -- of course, this identification is not explicitly stated by them.

      The taking of existence in such a narrow sense is not surprising in view of the emphasis of modern science on physical existence. A contributing factor to this taking of existence in this narrow sense is also the influence of traditional essentialist metaphysics. Since the reality of a thing was its essence, existence was reduced to a mere unessential attribute or quality of the thing, or substance. It is in this way that existence came to be conceived in the narrow sense of physical existence, that is, to exist is to be in a certain place at a certain time. This meaning of existence was thus carried over into modern philosophy. Sein is dasein. It is a interesting thing to note that when physical existence became all important in philosophical thinking as a result of the discoveries of modern science, the question was raised of the metaphysical status of these essences. It was answered that whereas things exist, essences subsist. This distinction between existence and subsistence is one of adjustments of essentialism to the revolt from essentialism which emphasizes physical existence.

    2. Existentialism.
      The whole essentialist interpretation of being seems ridiculous to many men. Existence alone imparts real being: the possible is only one degree removed from absolute non-entity. The essence of a hundred dollars, while a possibility, is nothing apart from existence (in my pocket). While science may properly consider the essence of things, for practical affairs the existence and non-existence of a thing like a hundred dollars is the important or real thing. Thus existentialism has been developed as that solution of the problem of being which gives primacy to existence. To be is to exist.

      It is necessary for us here to distinguish between existentialism as an ontology and existentialism as a historical movement. The historical movement by that name embodies only one form, and a very inadequate form, of the existential ontology. Dr. Helmut Kuhn delineates two types of existentialism on the basis of the two answers that may be given to the question:
      What is the nature of the act of comprehension of existence? That is,

      "What is the form under which existence is met with or encountered?
      According to the various answers to this question Existentialism
      becomes diversified into a number of conflicting types of thought." [5]
      The two main answers given to this question are
      1. "Existence is met with through crisis" and
      2. "Existence is met with through communion."
      Correspondingly, Dr. Kuhn points out the two main types of existentialism:
      1. Critical Existentialism and
      2. Social Existentialism.
      This question of the comprehension of existence is the epistemological question asked from the existentialist view-point and the two main answers given above are two main epistemological positions of existentialism.
      Now behind these two existential epistemological positions there lies two forms of existential ontology. They may be called
      1. Atomistic Existentialism and
      2. Relational Existentialism.

      1. Atomistic Existentialism.
        Let us try to make clear these two forms of existential ontology. Let us start again with the distinction between essence and existence. Essence is what a thing is and existence is that a thing is. As we saw above it is difficult to tell what existence is. It cannot be defined in the traditional sense of giving its genus and species. Essentialism in the attempt to define the essence of existence absorbs and reduces existence to essence. Usually when existence is defined, it amounts to reducing existence to the category of place. To exist is to be in time and space. Sein is dasein. Existence is thus considered to be a property or accident of something. Existentialism rejects this attempt to define the essence of existence and the reduction of existence to an essence. Since existence lies outside the realm of essence and definition,
        "a shift of attention takes place from existence as such
        to our way of encountering existence,
        from an objective interest in existence
        which is indifferent in regard to the multiple existents,
        to a subjective interest in that peculiar existent which everyone of us is." [6]
        Thus attention is focused on the human self rather than on existence in general. It focuses especially on that "passionately intensified form of human life which makes the mind susceptible to experiencing a crisis and through crisis, existence." It is this situation that gives rise to Atomistic Existentialism. This extreme emphasis on the individual gives rise to the view of each individual is an atomistic unit independent of every other individual. My own self alone is the locus where existence is discovered or even where it originates. For the most part what has been known as existentialism is of this form.

      2. Relational Existentialism.
        Thus ontological Atomistic Existentialism arose.
        How does ontological Relational Existentialism arise?
        This form of existential ontology agrees with the former that existence may be discovered in our own human self. However, this is not the only place it may be encountered. It may be encountered in the other whom I may meet and do meet. This other may be another self, a person, or a thing. A careful analysis of crisis on which the Atomistic Existentialist places such an emphasis as the place of discovering existence would reveal that the other is presupposed. It is the other which creates the situation of crisis in which the passionate decision has to be made. The inadequacy and one- sided emphasis of the Atomistic Existentialism becomes immediately evident. The other must be taken into account in developing an adequate existentialist ontology. Only an ontology which views the existent that we call the self in relation to many other existents will be adequate to account for the other.

        Thus there has arisen a form of existential ontology which may be called ontological Relational Existentialism to account for the other. Now it seems to me that the form of ontological Relational Existentialism that most adequately accounts for the other is a personalistic existential ontology. This form of ontological Relational Existentialism may be called Personism.

  3. THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.
    1. Personism.
      Personism is not to be confused with Personalism which is a pluralistic form of essentialism. Personalism views reality as being in essence personal. Brightman calls this qualitative idealism. [7] Thus for Personalism, essence has the primacy in the concept of being. For this reason, Personalism is classified as a form of essentialism. Personism, on the other hand, is not a view concerning the essence of reality; it does not tell us nature of beings. Personism as an ontological relational existentialism only affirms that persons exist, and that existence may be encountered in persons: ourselves and other selves. Whether there are other beings and what kind of beings they are, Personism makes no affirmations; it is not mainly a view concerning the essence of reality.

      But since Personism affirms that persons exist, the question naturally arises:
      What is a person?
      In answer to this question, let us return to the shift
      that has taken place in the discussion of existence.
      The shift of attention was from the general concept of existence and the attempt to define it to the locus where existence can be discovered: the human self. As pointed out above this shift took place because of the impossibility of defining existence in the traditional way. Existence just cannot be reduced to essence. Now within the self, existence is known in the act of decision. To exist is to decide. This is particularly apparent in those momentous passionate decisions of a crisis. In fact, every act of decision, whether a great crisis or not, is the place where existence can be found. The act of decision itself is also an act of existence. That is, to be is to choose. This was partially apprehended in Descartes' phrase: cognito ergo sum; I think, therefore I am. Descartes saw that the act of thinking or even doubting is to exist. For one to think or doubt he had to exist. However, since he sought to fit this into an essentialistic scheme of thought, Descartes did not recognize that thinking and doubting are basically acts of decision. Not only to think or doubt but to decide is to exist. Any act of decision is an act of existence: decerno ergo sum, I choose, therefore I am. A person therefore should be defined as a being (an existent) that is self-determining, not determined, who has freedom, free will, the ability to choose. A person is distinguished from a non-person, a thing, an "it," which is a being that is determined, not self-determining, that has no freedom, no free will, no ability to choose.

      Now a careful analysis of decision reveals that every act of decision involves three elements:
      (a) the agent making the decision,
      (b) the alternatives to be decided between, and
      (c) a criterion to decide by.
      The last two elements involve the act of decision of the agent deciding in relations to something else beyond the act of decision itself. The criterion and the alternatives of an act of decision involve relations to other existents. Personism is pluralistic. But it is a relational pluralism, not an atomistic pluralism; that is, there are many existents that are interrelated in various ways. We have given to Personism and other forms of existential relational pluralism the general name of Relational Existentialism. However, we believe that there is only one form of the Relational Existentalism which adequately relates the many existents: Personism.
      This will become clear below in the next section.

    2. Personism and God.
      The third element of every decision, the criterion by which the choice is made, means that every human decision involves a reference to a criterion beyond the self. In other words, behind every human decision as to what a person should do or think, there must be a reason. And the ultimate reason for any decision, practical or theoretical, must be given in terms of some particular criterion, an ultimate reference or orientation point in or beyond the self or person making the decision. This ultimate criterion is that person's god. In this sense, every man must have a god, that is, an ultimate criterion of decision. Thus in the very exercise of his freedom, decision, man shows that he is such a being that must necessarily appeal to an ultimate criterion, a god. In fact, his every uncoerced decision implies this ultimate criterion. [8]

      From this point of view, no man is an atheist in the basic meaning of that word (that is, no god). Every man must have a god. Man is a religious animal who must necessarily have some object of ultimate allegiance and trust which functions as his guide of truth and his norm of conduct. Every man must choose a god. Though free to adopt the god of his choice, no man is free to avoid this decision. Every attempt to do so turns out to be not a denial of having a god but an exchange of gods. Every man must choose and have a god. To ask whether one believes in the existence of God is to completely misunderstand the issue. The issue is not whether one should choose between theism or atheism, that is, to believe in the existence of God or not, but whether one should choose this god or that god as the true God. Atheism wants you to believe in his god and his god is that God does not exist.

      Since everyone must have a god, the crucial question for every man is:
      Which god is the true God?
      Or to put the question differently:
      How are we to distinguish between the one true God, on the one hand,
      and the many false gods on the other?
      In other words, by what means can we determine
      which of all possible gods are pretenders and which is the true one?
      The clue to the answer to these questions may be found in a further analysis of freedom.

      As we have already seen, every man by the structure of his freedom must have a god. That is, in every one of his choices a person must necessarily appeal to some criterion by reference to which the decision is made. And the ultimate criterion by which a person makes his choices is his god. Clearly then the choice of one's god is the most basic and fundamental choice that a man can make, it lies behind and is presupposed by every other decision as to what a man will do or think; it is clearly the most important exercise of his freedom.
      What should one choose as his ultimate criterion of decision?
      Negatively, he should not choose that as his ultimate criterion
      which will deny, destroy or limit the very freedom of choice by which it is chosen.
      And positively, he should choose that ultimate criterion
      which will enhance and fulfil that freedom.
      Any ultimate criterion that denies or takes away the very freedom of choice by which it is chosen cannot be the true God. The choice of such an ultimate criterion is a contradiction of man's basic freedom of choice; such a god is fatal to man's freedom.

      By freedom, we do not mean purposeless caprice or chance, indeterminism, but rather the ability of choice, freedom of decision, self-determination. Neither is this freedom an abstract entity, "freedom-in-general," Freiheit, but rather the concrete decision of someone, of a free agent. The most appropriate word for such a being who has such freedom is the word "person." A person is a being that is self-determining, not determined, who has freedom, free will, the ability to choose. A person is to be distinguished from a non-person, a thing, an "it", a being that is determined, not self-determining, that has no freedom, no free will, no ability to choose.

      A god that is a thing has less freedom than the person who chooses it as his god. Such a god does not have as much freedom as the one who chooses it to be his god. Now a god who does not have at least the freedom that man himself has cannot be the true God. It cannot do any more for them than they can do for themselves. Such a god is only the projection of the whims and fancies of its worshippers because it is in reality inferior to them. As a minimum criterion, therefore, a god can be recognized as a false god if it has less freedom than man himself. To choose such a god as one's ultimate criterion of choice would be a denial of one's freedom of choice and the worst kind of bondage. Thus having used his freedom to give this god his ultimate allegiance, the worshipper finds his freedom denied to the point of extinction and himself bound in a miserable slavery. As long as the false god remains his ultimate criterion of decision, he will not have the grounds for rejecting that god, since that god has not allowed him to have freedom of choice to do so. His power of choice having been effectively taken away from him, he is unable to reject the false god and free himself from its bondage. The commitment to such a god is the denial of human freedom. Therefore, a false god can also be recognized by the effect that it has upon the freedom of the one who gives it his allegiance; it limits the freedom and puts into bondage the one who chooses it as his god. The true God, on the other hand, sets free the one committed to him and fulfils and enhances his freedom. The true God must be at least a person in order to have at least as much freedom as the one who chooses Him as his god. But the true God must not only be a person, He must also have unlimited freedom if He is to be able to do the things He promises and to deliver the one who cries to Him in trouble and need. A god without unlimited freedom might not be able to keep his promises or to save the one who cries to him. Therefore, a god that does not have unlimited freedom must be a false god. The true God, on the other hand, has unlimited freedom; He can do whatever He pleases (Psa. 115:3; 135:6); He can save when He is called upon (Isa. 43:11; 45:15-17). The true God, therefore, is a person (or persons) with unlimited freedom.

      It is this knowledge of what the true God must be like that lies behind all primitive religions, with their anthromorphic gods. Primitive man knows what a god must be like in order for it to be the true God. This knowledge derived intuitively from the nature of his freedom makes him uneasy about the things that he worships as god. He knows that the true God must be a living God. But having failed to encounter such a God, he fills the vacuum with what he imagines to be a facsimile of Him. And since the highest living being he knows is himself, he makes gods in his own image. He also knows that the true God must be a God of unlimited power, not limited like himself. He therefore identifies these anthropomorphic creations with the powerful forces that he sees in the physical world about him. Beyond the simple and profound suspicion that such a God does exist, he is at the end of his knowledge ("...whom ye ignorantly worship..." Acts 17:23 KJV). [9]

      In what way can man find any additional knowledge of the true God?
      In the same way in which he gets knowledge about another person: by what the other person says and does. But the initiative lies with the other person. If he remains silent and inactive, no knowledge is available in addition to the fact that he is there. Therefore, if man is to know anything additional about the true God, God must take the initiative and reveal Himself in word and/or deed. And the true God has taken the initiative and has revealed Himself in word and deed. The Bible is a record of the "words and the mighty acts of God." The true God is not silent and He is not inactive; He has spoken and He has acted. This is recorded for us in a book, the Bible. And we know that these are the words and deeds of the true God because they are the words and the acts of a God who is a personal being and has unlimited freedom and power. The God who is revealed in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament is the living God who created all things.
      (The living God - Joshua 3:10; I Sam. 17:26; Psa. 84:2; Jer. 10:10; Matt. 16:16; Acts 14:15; I Thess. 1:9; I Tim. 3:15; Heb. 10:31;
      The Creator - Gen. 1:1; 2:3-4; Ex. 4:11; Neh. 9:6; Job 38:4; Psa. 90:2; 102:25; 104:1-5,24; Isa. 40:28; 44:24; 45:11-12,18; 48:12-12; Jer. 10:11-12; John 1:1-3; Acts 17:24; I Cor. 8:6; Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:2,10; 11:3; Rev. 4:11).
      Because He is a person, He is alive; and because He has unlimited freedom, He is the all powerful Creator of all things. The God of the Bible is the true God, and all other gods are false.

    3. The Problem of Ontologial Truth.
      In our examination of the theories of propositional truth, we see that there is an another kind of truth: ontologial truth. The problem of propositional truth raises the problem of ontologial truth, the problem of the criterion of reality: how do we decide what is real? For the choice of the criterion of propositional truth leads to and involves the choice of something as real. The truth of propositions are based on the reality of something that is the criterion of reality, ontological truth. Further more, each epistemology makes an ontological assertion as to what is real. Empiricism asserts the reality of the object (Realism) that is known through the senses. Rationalism asserts the reality of the rational (Idealism). Empiricism appeals to the reality of the object beyond the senses to establish the truths of the senses. Rationalism appeals to the reality of the rational, the universal and necessary, to establish the truths of reason. For both of these criteria of knowledge involves an appeal to something that is assumed to be real.

      1. Analysis of the Problem.
        This raises the question: what is real?
        To answer this question, an appeal must be made to a criterion of reality, the Truth. Thus the problem of the criterion of truth raises and involves the problem of ontological truth: what is the criterion of reality? The criterion of reality answers the question: what is real? Whatever is the criterion of reality is the Truth and the Truth is the criterion of reality; it is ultimate reality, the really real. Realism asserts that the objects of senses are ultimately real, the Truth; Idealism asserts that mind or the rational is the ultimately real, the Truth.

        1. Realism.
          Realism holds that the objects of knowledge are real independent of the knowing mind. They are non-mental and their reality does not dependent upon any mind. There are many philosophical views that are called "realism"; the term "realism" is here used to designate that view which is often called "epistemological realism". There are two forms of epistemological realism: naive realism and critical realism. Naive realism holds that the objects of knowledge are really as they appear to our sense. Critical realism, realizing the difficulties of naive realism, makes a distinction between the appearance and the reality of the objects of the senses. For realism, the objects of the senses are the ultimately real, the Truth, the criterion of reality. The major objection against critical realism is that, if the senses gives only knowledge of appearances, then how can the real objects behind the appearances be known?

        2. Idealism.
          Idealism (or more accurately, idea-ism) holds that the reality of the objects of knowledge are dependent upon the knowing mind. The objects of knowledge are essentially mental otherwise they could not be known by mind. The essence of physical objects are ideas or concepts, hence they can be known by a mind. There are many philosophical views that are called "idealism"; the term "idealism" is here used to designate that view which is often called "epistemological idealism". There are two forms of epistemological idealism: subjective idealism and objective idealism. Subjective idealism holds that the only reality that an object of knowledge has is the idea of the object in the mind of the knower. This view is supposed to have been held by George Berkeley (1685-1753). On the other hand, objective idealism denies that the only reality of the objects of knowledge are in the ideas in the mind, but asserts that their reality are in the ideas in the objects themselves. The reality of the objects of knowledge are in the concepts, the rational element, that they contain. Idealism asserts that the rational, the universal and necessary, is the criterion of reality, the ultimately real, the Truth. The major objection against objective idealism is that, if the reality of the objects of knowledge are in the universal ideas in the objects themselves, then how can the objects as particulars be known? Knowing the universal concept of treeness in a particular tree, does not mean that that particular tree is known.

      2. The Clue to the Solution of the Problem of Ontological Truth.
        The analysis of the problem of ontological truth above showed that both empiricism and rationalism make an appeal to a criterion of reality, the Truth, as the criterion of propositional truth: empiricism to the reality of the objects of sense knowledge, and rationalism to the rational, the universal and necessary.

        But both empiricism and rationalism ignore the freedom of human choice in determining the criterion of knowledge of the truth. The criterion of knowledge is not rationally necessary nor empirically given; it is chosen. Both of these epistemologies allow no place for this choice, or recognize its function in the process of knowing.

        Now an analysis of human choice discloses the fact that choice involves a reference to a criterion of choice and ultimately to an ultimate criterion of choice. The choice of what statements or propositions are held to be true depends ultimately on the choice of this ultimate criterion. This observation raises the question:
        What is the true ultimate criterion of choice?

        1. Negatively: Any ultimate criterion which denies or destroys the freedom of choice by which it is chosen can not be the true ultimate criterion of choice. Such an ultimate criterion is a false criterion. All false criteria imply and result in a denial, diminution and lost of the freedom of those who choose them.
        2. Positively: Only that ultimate criterion which maintains and guarantees the freedom of choice by which it is chosen can be the true ultimate criterion of choice.

      3. The Solution to the Problem of Ontological Truth.
        What ultimate criterion can guarantee and fulfill that freedom of choice?
        Since an impersonal or non-personal reality (Nature or Reason) does not have this freedom, only another person who has the freedom of choice can be this ultimate criterion. But not only must this person have freedom of choice but he must be committed to the preservation of freedom of the one who has chosen him, that is, he must motivated by love. And in order to be able to preserve that freedom, his freedom must be unlimited. This implies that this person must also be the basis and ground of the rest of reality; that is, he must be ultimate reality (God) and the criterion of reality. And since the Truth is the criterion of reality, that person will be the Truth. Thus the Truth is a person. And if we are to know this person, that is, who he is and that he exists, he must reveal himself. For the only way we can know another person is only by what he says and does. But the initiative lies with the other person. If he chooses to remain silent and inactive, no knowledge can be had of him in addition to the fact that he is there. If this person who is ultimate reality (the Truth) is to be known, He must reveal Himself. The Bible claims that He has taken the initiative and He has revealed Himself in word and deed, and that the Bible is the record of that revelation.
        Who is this person that is the Truth?
        The Biblical answer is that Jesus Christ is the Truth. Jesus said,
        "I am the way, the truth, and the life;
        no man comes to the Father, except through me." (John 14:6).
        He is the source of the knowledge of God. That is, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is the way to God, the revelation of God, the Father, the Creator of all reality except God Himself. Through Jesus Christ, as the pre-incarnate Word of God, were all things made and He is basis and ground of the rest of reality that God has created (John 1:1-3; Col. 1:15-17). He is the criterion of the real, the Truth, because through Him God has determined by His sovereign creative choice what is real. And as such He is committed to the preservation and fulfilment of our freedom.
        "And you will know the truth and the truth will make you free...
        So if the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed." (John 8:32, 36).
        The Truth that will make you, a person, free is the Person, the Son of God.
        He sets free and perserves the freedom of one who chooses him as their ultimate criterion of the reality, as the Truth.

      4. The Consequences of the Solution to the Problem of Ontological Truth.
        What is the place of reason and the senses in this view of truth?
        1. Negatively: Reason is not the ultimate criterion of knowledge of the truth. Neither are the senses. The object of the senses is not ultimate reality as assumed by Empiricism. Neither is the rational the real, that is, ultimate reality, as claimed by Rationalism.
        2. Positively: But since God created a real world to be perceived by our senses, the objects of senses are real. Thus sensation can be used as a factual criterion of knowledge of the created world - sensation appealing to the reality of the object as its criterion. And since the rational is a function and expression of the will, reason can also be used as a criteria of knowledge - reason appealing to the universality and consistency of the propositions of knowledge as its criterion. Thus
          reason provides a formal criterion of knowledge and
          sensation provides a material criterion of knowledge.
          Reason and sensation are not mutually exclusive but complementary criteria of knowledge. The Biblical epistemology is empirical, but not Empiricism, and rational, but not Rationalism. Ultimate reality is neither the empirical objects of Realism nor the rational ideas of Idealism, but the Person through whom all things were created. The Biblical view is that the personal creator God is ultimate reality and He has created the empirical objects of the senses and man in his own image whose statements are true when they correspond to the reality that God has created.

    4. The Image of God.
      What is the image of God?
      The image of God is a person, the Son of God:
      "13 For He [God] delivered us from the domain of darkness,
      and translated us to the kingdom of His beloved Son.
      14 in whom we have redemption through His blood,
      the forgiveness of sins;
      15 And He is the image of the invisible God,
      the first-born of all creation."
      (Col. 1:13-15 NAS; compare II Cor. 4:4; Rom. 8:29);
      God's Beloved Son is the model and pattern according to which God created man. As such He is the first-born of all creation. Not that He is the first created being, but that He is the pattern by which all men will be born. God created man with the anticipation that His Son would become man, a human being. Thus He is the first-born of all creation. Note that the Scriptures never says that the image of God is in man, but rather that man has been created in the image of God.
      What does it mean for man to be created in the image of God?
      The answer may be seen in Genesis 1:26-27.
      "26 Then God said,
      'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness;
      and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea,
      and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle,
      and over all the earth,
      and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.'
      27 So God created man in his own image,
      in the image of God he created him;
      male and female he created them."
      In this passage of Scripture, we find that there are two aspects to man being created in the image of God.
      1. The first aspect is found in the words "let them have dominion over the fish of the sea,... over all the earth...."
        God has given man dominion, sovereignty, and lordship over the creation (Psa. 8:4-8). As God has sovereignty and dominion over all He has created, so God has given man sovereignty and dominion over all the earth. Man in his limited sovereignty over creation is like God in His unlimited sovereignty. In this sense man is like God. Man's lordship over creation is the first aspect of man being created in the image of God. This passage in Genesis justifies the task and existence of all the sciences and especially biology. But it is not only the study and knowledge of creation that is involved here. Man has a God-given right to use this creation for the good of mankind and for the glory of God.
      2. But there is also a second aspect to man being created in the image of God. In these verses of Genesis one, we see this aspect in the words "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him: male and female he created them" (Gen. 1:26). This does not mean that God is male and female but that He is more than one person existing in an unique personal relationship or fellowship. As God has created man, he cannot live alone. In Genesis 2:18,
        "The Lord God said,
        'It is not good that the man should be alone;
        I will make him a helper fit for him.'"
        Of all the creatures God had created "there was not found a helper fit for him" (Gen. 2:20). So God created, out of man, woman. Man, in the very way in which he was created had a social need -- a need for fellowship. This need could only be satisfied through an equal fellow creature. None of the animals could satisfy this need for fellowship. So God made an equal being, a woman. Man as a social being is able to enjoy a reciprocal personal relationship or fellowship with an equal being. In this respect man is also like God. In God there is an equality and fellowship between the three persons of the Godhead.

      Thus according to Genesis 1:26-27, being created in the image of God means for man to have dominion over creation and to have a personal relationship with an equal human person - woman; these are the two aspects of man being created in the image of God. Both of these presuppose freedom - the freedom of choice and the freedom of action. This freedom is the presupposition and possibility of being in the image of God. Since God created man with freedom, dominion over creation and personal relationships with equal personal beings become possible. With freedom of choice and action, man can exercise his dominion over creation. And since love is the essence of personal relationships, with his freedom of choice and action, man can love an equal person and enter into a personal relationship with her. The freedom of choice and not reason, neither self-consciousness, nor self-transcendence, is that which make possible man's dominion over creation and personal relationship with an equal personal being.

    5. The Biblical View of Man.
      This freedom of decision of man, not his reason, is what distinguishes man from the rest of creation; this is what gives to man his existence as a person or self and to his reason that human and personal character. Man as a personal being in a created physical world is as such a union of spirit (person or self) and body (psycho-physical organism).
      "Then the Lord God formed man of the dust from the ground, and
      breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and
      man became a living soul [nephesh]" (Gen. 2:7 KJV).
      When God breathed into the nostrils of the body of man the breath of life, He created man's spirit and man became a living soul. The soul of man is the union of this created spirit and the body formed from the dust of the ground. Thus man is diparite being having two parts, spirit and body; the soul is not a part of man but is the union of man's created spirit and his body.

      Man's soul is the union and expression of the spirit or person of a human in and through the body. And his existence as a person is found in his ability to choose, to make decisions.
      "I choose, therefore, I am", not, "I think, therefore, I am".
      To be is to choose, not to think nor to preceive.
      Man's reason is a function and an expression of his will.

      "...whatever evidence one accepts,
      whether that of experience or that of logic,
      will depend upon neither logic or experience alone,
      but upon a decision by the individual concerned
      in favor of the one or the other." [10]
      Knowledge and reason depend upon a prior decision as to what is real and to what is the criterion of reality, ultimate reality, the Truth.

      Ultimate reality is not the universal and the necessary. That is, Reason, the universal and the necessary, is not God. God is a person (or more accurately, three persons) whose existence is not in His reason but in His unlimited sovereign free decision and will; it is not the universal ideas in God's mind that determine how or why God will create man and the world, but His unlimited sovereign will (Rev. 4:11). Since reason is a function of the will, God is rational and His reason is a function of His will. Thus the world that God has chosen to create is rational.

      Man is also a person (or more accurately, a spirit [person] in a body) whose existence is also to be found, not in his reason, but in his limited free decision and will. And since decisions involve a reference to an ultimate criterion in or beyond the self, to a god, the Biblical view of man is that man is a religious animal, a being who must have a god; the view that man is a rational animal is not the Biblical view of man. Reason is not that which makes man different from the rest of the animals.

      Reason as the universal and necessary is not God and Reason is not man's ultimate criterion but the sovereign will of the Creator who made all things and has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ. This is the basic choice that a human person must make if he is understand what is real and what is the Truth, the criterion of reality. Is the Truth the universal and necessary or is it the sovereign will of the personal Creator who made all things and has revealed Himself in the person of Jesus Christ?

      This choice explains the basic incompatibility between Greek philosophy and the Biblical view of God and man; it also explains the conflict between Greek philosophy and the Christian faith and the failure of the attempted synthesis of these divergent points of view by Augustine and Aquinas. All attempts to synthesize the classical Greek philosophical view of God and man with the Biblical view will fail. And worst of all, the Biblical view of God and man will be and has been obscured and misunderstood.

    6. The Biblical View of Reality.
      The Hebrew-Christian view of view of reality is grounded in an ultimate commitment to the personal Creator God who manifested Himself in Jesus Christ and reveals Himself by the Holy Spirit. This revelation is recorded in the Old and New Testaments of the Bible. The personal God who has revealed Himself in this way exists as three persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. This triune personal Being exists independent of the world and is its Creator. The Hebrew-Christian view of reality makes a fundamental ontological distinction between the Creator and the Creation; God is the sovereign Creator of all things, of the world and man, and all things are His free creation.

      Man was created by God and, in contrast to the rest of creation, was created in the image of God, who is Jesus Christ, the God-man (Col. 1:13-15; compare II Cor. 4:4). Man, as created by God, is a personal being, a unity of spirit [person] and body (see Gen. 2:7), having dominion over creation and fellowship with another equal human being (woman). Man's existence as a person is also to be found not in his reason but in his limited free will and decision. And since decisions involve a reference to an ultimate criterion beyond the self, to a god, the Bibical view of man is that he is a religious animal, a being who must have a god.

      The first man, Adam, and his wife, Eve, used their freedom to disobey God and choose a false god, wisdom and knowledge; that is, Reason. The basic sin is turning from the true God and to faith in a false god of some kind; it is idolatry. Sin is any choice contrary to ultimate allegiance or faith in the true God (Rom. 14:23). The consequence of Adam's sin was death (Gen. 2:16-17): physical death (the separation of their spirits from their bodies) and spiritual death (the separation of their spirits from God). In other words, they lost their fellowship with God and with each other (Gen. 3:7-8) and their dominion over creation. But even though they have fallen from the image of God, they still are persons and still have the freedom of choice.

      The descendants of Adam are born not in the image of God but in the image of Adam, the man of dust, the old man, and as such are subject to death, physical and spiritual. Death has been inherited by all men (Rom. 5:12). And since they have been born into the world spiritually dead, alienated from God, not knowing the true God, and since they must have a god, an ultimate criterion of decision, they choose a false god as their God and thereby sin (Gal. 4:8). The creation, man himself, contains a knowledge about the true God which leaves them without excuse for the sin of idolatry (Rom. 1:19-20). But this knowledge is about the true God and is not a personal knowledge of the true God which comes from an encoounter and fellowship with God.

      Salvation is the restoration of fellowship and communion with God through the historical death, bodily resurrection and exaltation of Jesus Christ and the coming of the Holy Spirit. God in His love for man has sent His Son into the world to become a man - Jesus Christ. He is the image of God, the perfect man. But He came not just to be what man should have been or to give man a perfect example but to give them life and restore them to the image of God. He did this by entering into their condition of spiritual and physical death on the cross. So that as Christ was raised from the dead, they might be made alive with Him in His resurrection. That is, Christ's death was their death and His resurrection is their resurrection. That is, salvation is basically from death to life (John 5:24). Also, Jesus Christ was exalted to the right hand of God as Lord to become their Lord and their God. God has sent the Holy Spirit to save man from death and sin by revealing Him personally to them in the preaching of the gospel, the good news of what God has done for man in Jesus Christ's death and resurrection, of Jesus Christ as their Savior who died for them and as their resurrected and living Lord. When a man responds to this revelation by turning from his false gods (in repentance) and turning to the true God, acknowledging Jesus as his Lord (in faith), he is saved from sin (Rom. 10:9-10). And since in this decision of faith he receives the living Christ as his life and identifies himself with the death and resurrection of Christ, the believer is also saved from spiritual death, being made spiritually alive to God in Christ. The believer has eternal life which a personal knowledge of the true God and Jesus Christ He has sent (John 17:3). Thus man is now being restored to the image of God.

      But this restoration is not now yet complete. At the second coming of Jesus Christ (Acts 1:9) the believers' bodies will be resurrected if they die before He comes (I Thess. 4:13-17), or will be transformed into bodies like His resurrected body if they are alive at His coming (I Cor. 15:51-52; Phil. 3:20-21; I Thess. 4:13-17; I John 3:2). Thus physical death will be replaced with physical life just as spiritual death was replaced with spiritual life when they first believed. What was begun at conversion will be brought to completion (Phil. 1:6) at Christ's coming. Spiritual life will become eternal life - eternal fellowship with the Father, the Son and Holy Spirit (heaven) (Rev. 21:3). Thus will man be restored to the image of God. And their salvation is from death (both spiritual and physical) unto life, from sin (idolatry - trust in false gods) unto righteousness (trust in the true God), will be completed.

ENDNOTES

[1] Daniel Sommer Robinson, The Principles of Reasoning
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1947), p. 53.

[2] Helmut Kuhn, "Existentialism,"
Vergilius Ferm ed., A History of Philosophical Systems
(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1950), p. 407.

[3] Ibid., p. 405.

[4] Louis O. Kattsoff, Elements of Philosophy
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1953), p. 181.

[5] Helmut Kuhn, op. cit., p. 407.

[6] Ibid., p. 408.

[7] Runes, D.D. ed., Twentieth Century Philosophy
(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1947), p. 346.

[8] E. La B. Cherbonnier, Hardness of Heart
(New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), p. 40.
See also E. LaB. Cherbonnier,
"Biblical Metaphysic and Christian Philosophy,"
Theology Today 9 (October 1952): 367.
To read this article, click here

[9] Cherbonnier, "Biblical Metaphysics," p. 369.
To read this article, click here

[10] E. LaB. Cherbonnier, "Biblical Metaphysic and Christian Philosophy,"
Theology Today 9 (October 1952): p. 372.
To read this article, click here.